more we removal, now 1,2,3,8 all fixed and paper PR

was going to tunbridge wells tonight by JS
is in the isle of wight I am sure he said
he was going last wednesday:wq
This commit is contained in:
Robin P. Clark 2013-09-11 17:29:29 +01:00
parent d7dee62f42
commit fd55a7a81e
2 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ A wish list is presented, stating the features that should exist
in an improved FMEA methodology, in an improved FMEA methodology,
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\item Must be able to analyse hybrid software/hardware systems, \item Must be able to analyse hybrid software/hardware systems,
\item no state explosion (which has rendered exhaustive analysis impractical), \item no state explosion (i.e. XFMEA is impractical),
\item exhaustive checking at a modular level, %(total failure coverage within {\fgs} all interacting component and failure modes checked), \item exhaustive checking at a modular level, %(total failure coverage within {\fgs} all interacting component and failure modes checked),
\item traceable reasoning inherent in system failure models,% to aid repeatability and checking, \item traceable reasoning inherent in system failure models,% to aid repeatability and checking,
\item re-usable i.e. it should be possible to re-use analysis, \item re-usable i.e. it should be possible to re-use analysis,

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@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ These are presented below.
An FMMD model has a data structure (described by UML diagrams, see figure~\ref{fig:cfg}), and by traversing an FMMD hierarchy An FMMD model has a data structure (described by UML diagrams, see figure~\ref{fig:cfg}), and by traversing an FMMD hierarchy
system level failures can be mapped back to {\bc} {\fms} (or combinations thereof). system level failures can be mapped back to {\bc} {\fms} (or combinations thereof).
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Because these mappings can be determined reports in the traditional FMEA format ({\bc}~{\fm}~$\mapsto$~{system failure}) can be produced. Because these mappings can be determined reports in the traditional FMEA format (i.e. {\bc}~{\fm}~$\mapsto$~{system failure}) can be produced.
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With the addition of {\bc} {\fm} statistics~\cite{mil1991} reliability predictions for system level failures can be provided. With the addition of {\bc} {\fm} statistics~\cite{mil1991} reliability predictions for system level failures can be provided.
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@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ The next analysis phase looks at how the circuit will behave under double simult
conditions. conditions.
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\paragraph{Pt100 Example: Double Failures and statistical data} \paragraph{Pt100 Example: Double Failures and statistical data.}
Because double simultaneous failure analysis can be performed under FMMD Because double simultaneous failure analysis can be performed under FMMD
failure rate statistics to double failures can also be determined. failure rate statistics for double failures can also be determined.
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\frategloss \frategloss
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@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ Environmental influences will affect specific components in specific ways\footno
affected by environmental conditions, in this case temperature, is the opto-isolator~\cite{tlp181} affected by environmental conditions, in this case temperature, is the opto-isolator~\cite{tlp181}
which typically starts having performance problems at {60 \oc} and above. which typically starts having performance problems at {60 \oc} and above.
Most electrical components are robust to temperature variations and Most electrical components are robust to temperature variations and
would not normally require special environmental attributes.}. would not normally require special environmental consideration/attributes.}.
Environmental analysis is thus applicable to components. Environmental analysis is thus applicable to components.
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Environmental influences, such as over-stress due to voltage Environmental influences, such as over-stress due to voltage
@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ The reasons for applying retrospective failure mode analysis could be:
%\item approving previously un-assessed systems to a safety standard, %\item approving previously un-assessed systems to a safety standard,
\item to re-visit a safety analysis after a small hardware or software change, \item to re-visit a safety analysis after a small hardware or software change,
\item upon discovery of a new {\bc} {\fm}---or in software---a new contract programming requirement, \item upon discovery of a new {\bc} {\fm}---or in software---a new contract programming requirement,
\item or to determine the failure mode behaviour of an previously un-assessed sub-system/instrument used in safety critical verification. \item to determine the failure mode behaviour of an previously un-assessed sub-system/instrument used in safety critical verification.
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
% verification. % verification.
% %