From fd55a7a81e559bf228f30a3c5307f62644fe46ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Robin P. Clark" Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2013 17:29:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] more we removal, now 1,2,3,8 all fixed and paper PR was going to tunbridge wells tonight by JS is in the isle of wight I am sure he said he was going last wednesday:wq --- submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex | 2 +- submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex index 275765b..86cbb1c 100644 --- a/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex +++ b/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ A wish list is presented, stating the features that should exist in an improved FMEA methodology, \begin{itemize} \item Must be able to analyse hybrid software/hardware systems, - \item no state explosion (which has rendered exhaustive analysis impractical), + \item no state explosion (i.e. XFMEA is impractical), \item exhaustive checking at a modular level, %(total failure coverage within {\fgs} all interacting component and failure modes checked), \item traceable reasoning inherent in system failure models,% to aid repeatability and checking, \item re-usable i.e. it should be possible to re-use analysis, diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex index 4cb4524..b4cfc51 100644 --- a/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex +++ b/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ These are presented below. An FMMD model has a data structure (described by UML diagrams, see figure~\ref{fig:cfg}), and by traversing an FMMD hierarchy system level failures can be mapped back to {\bc} {\fms} (or combinations thereof). % -Because these mappings can be determined reports in the traditional FMEA format ({\bc}~{\fm}~$\mapsto$~{system failure}) can be produced. +Because these mappings can be determined reports in the traditional FMEA format (i.e. {\bc}~{\fm}~$\mapsto$~{system failure}) can be produced. % With the addition of {\bc} {\fm} statistics~\cite{mil1991} reliability predictions for system level failures can be provided. % @@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ The next analysis phase looks at how the circuit will behave under double simult conditions. % % -\paragraph{Pt100 Example: Double Failures and statistical data} +\paragraph{Pt100 Example: Double Failures and statistical data.} Because double simultaneous failure analysis can be performed under FMMD -failure rate statistics to double failures can also be determined. +failure rate statistics for double failures can also be determined. % \frategloss % @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ Environmental influences will affect specific components in specific ways\footno affected by environmental conditions, in this case temperature, is the opto-isolator~\cite{tlp181} which typically starts having performance problems at {60 \oc} and above. Most electrical components are robust to temperature variations and -would not normally require special environmental attributes.}. +would not normally require special environmental consideration/attributes.}. Environmental analysis is thus applicable to components. % Environmental influences, such as over-stress due to voltage @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ The reasons for applying retrospective failure mode analysis could be: %\item approving previously un-assessed systems to a safety standard, \item to re-visit a safety analysis after a small hardware or software change, \item upon discovery of a new {\bc} {\fm}---or in software---a new contract programming requirement, - \item or to determine the failure mode behaviour of an previously un-assessed sub-system/instrument used in safety critical verification. + \item to determine the failure mode behaviour of an previously un-assessed sub-system/instrument used in safety critical verification. \end{itemize} % verification. %