more we removal, now 1,2,3,8 all fixed and paper PR
was going to tunbridge wells tonight by JS is in the isle of wight I am sure he said he was going last wednesday:wq
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@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ A wish list is presented, stating the features that should exist
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in an improved FMEA methodology,
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Must be able to analyse hybrid software/hardware systems,
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\item no state explosion (which has rendered exhaustive analysis impractical),
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\item no state explosion (i.e. XFMEA is impractical),
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\item exhaustive checking at a modular level, %(total failure coverage within {\fgs} all interacting component and failure modes checked),
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\item traceable reasoning inherent in system failure models,% to aid repeatability and checking,
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\item re-usable i.e. it should be possible to re-use analysis,
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@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ These are presented below.
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An FMMD model has a data structure (described by UML diagrams, see figure~\ref{fig:cfg}), and by traversing an FMMD hierarchy
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system level failures can be mapped back to {\bc} {\fms} (or combinations thereof).
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%
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Because these mappings can be determined reports in the traditional FMEA format ({\bc}~{\fm}~$\mapsto$~{system failure}) can be produced.
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Because these mappings can be determined reports in the traditional FMEA format (i.e. {\bc}~{\fm}~$\mapsto$~{system failure}) can be produced.
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%
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With the addition of {\bc} {\fm} statistics~\cite{mil1991} reliability predictions for system level failures can be provided.
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%
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@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ The next analysis phase looks at how the circuit will behave under double simult
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conditions.
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%
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%
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\paragraph{Pt100 Example: Double Failures and statistical data}
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\paragraph{Pt100 Example: Double Failures and statistical data.}
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Because double simultaneous failure analysis can be performed under FMMD
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failure rate statistics to double failures can also be determined.
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failure rate statistics for double failures can also be determined.
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%
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\frategloss
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%
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@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ Environmental influences will affect specific components in specific ways\footno
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affected by environmental conditions, in this case temperature, is the opto-isolator~\cite{tlp181}
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which typically starts having performance problems at {60 \oc} and above.
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Most electrical components are robust to temperature variations and
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would not normally require special environmental attributes.}.
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would not normally require special environmental consideration/attributes.}.
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Environmental analysis is thus applicable to components.
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%
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Environmental influences, such as over-stress due to voltage
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@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ The reasons for applying retrospective failure mode analysis could be:
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%\item approving previously un-assessed systems to a safety standard,
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\item to re-visit a safety analysis after a small hardware or software change,
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\item upon discovery of a new {\bc} {\fm}---or in software---a new contract programming requirement,
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\item or to determine the failure mode behaviour of an previously un-assessed sub-system/instrument used in safety critical verification.
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\item to determine the failure mode behaviour of an previously un-assessed sub-system/instrument used in safety critical verification.
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\end{itemize}
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% verification.
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%
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