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@ -56,12 +56,14 @@ The more dangerous the consequences of failure
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the higher SIL rating we can demand for it.
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%
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A band-saw with one operative may require a SIL rating of 1,
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a nuclear power-station, with far greater consequences on dangerous failure
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but something with higher potential for harm to a larger number of people,
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such as a nuclear power-station or air-liner,
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with far greater consequences on dangerous failure
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may require a SIL rating of 4.
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%
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What we are saying is that while we may tolerate a low incidence of failure on a band-saw,
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we will only tolerate extremely low incidences of failure in nuclear plant.
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SIL ratings give us another objective yardstick for the measurement of system safety.
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SIL ratings provide another objective yardstick for the measurement of system safety.
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%governing failure conditions and determining risk levels associated with systems.
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All of these risk assessment techniques are based on variations of %on the theme of
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@ -80,11 +82,11 @@ which make them unsuitable for the higher safety requirements of the 21st centur
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Problems with state explosion in failure mode reasoning and the current difficulties %impossibility
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of integrating software and hardware failure mode models~\cite{1372150} are the most obvious of these. %flaws.
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%
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The four current methodologies are described in chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} and %the advantages and drawbacks
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These four current methodologies are described in chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} and %the advantages and drawbacks
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%of each FMEA variant are examined
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critically assessed in chapter~\ref{sec:chap3}.
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In chapter~\ref{sec:chap4}, a new methodology is proposed which addresses the state explosion problem
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and, using contract programmed software, allows the modelling of integrated
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and using contract programmed software, allows the modelling of integrated
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software/electrical systems.
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%
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This is followed by two chapters showing examples of the new modular FMEA analysis technique (Failure Mode Modular De-Composition FMMD)
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@ -169,9 +171,10 @@ Using the symptoms of failure, we could now treat these modules as components in
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{\fgs}. Higher and higher levels of {\fgs} could be built until we had a hierarchy
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representing a failure mode model for the system.
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%
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Because this is modular, we can apply double simultaneous failure mode checking; and as %because
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Because this is modular, %we can apply double simultaneous failure mode checking; and as %because
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double simultaneous failure mode checking can be applied as
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the number of components
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in each {\fg} is typically small---we avoid state explosion problems. % for the general case. % AF says `in the general case' here 12JAN2013
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in each {\fg} is typically small; we therefore avoid state explosion problems. % for the general case. % AF says `in the general case' here 12JAN2013
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%
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%
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If we apply
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@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ double checking all the way up the hierarchy we can guarantee to have considered
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every double simultaneous failure of all components in a system.
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%
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This means, as a fortunate by-product, that many multiple as well as double
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failures would be analysed, but because failure modes are traceable from the base components to the top level---or system---failure modes
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failures would be analysed, but because failure modes are traceable from the base components to the top level---or system---failure modes,
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these relationships can be held in a traversable data structure.
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%
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If held in a traversable data structure we can apply automated methods to search for all the combinations of multiple failure modes
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@ -200,7 +203,7 @@ be more user friendly than using formal logic.
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For an FMEA Spider diagram, contours represent failure modes, and the Spider diagram
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`existential~points' represent instances of failure modes.
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%
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Overlapping contours could represent multiple failure modes.
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Overlapping contours represent multiple failure modes.
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%
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By drawing a spider collecting existential points, a common failure symptom could
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be determined and from this a new diagram generated automatically to represent the {\dc}.
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@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
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%\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.15}
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\chapter*{Colophon}
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%Thanks every body !
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Completing my PhD degree is the most intellectually challenging %% FUCK OFF ZERNIKE POLYNOMIALS WERE MORE DIFFICULT --- and actually useful unlike set theory
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In short ``Thanks every body''!
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%
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\\
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\\
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%
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Completing my PhD %degree
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is the most intellectually challenging %% FUCK OFF ZERNIKE POLYNOMIALS WERE MORE DIFFICULT --- and actually useful unlike set theory
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activity of my first 52 years of my life! %% SET THEORY IS A LOAD OF BOLLOCKS
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%
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The best and worst moments of this journey
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@ -10,65 +16,99 @@ have been shared with many people.
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It has been a great privilege to spend several years
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visiting the Mathematics and Engineering departments of
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the University of Brighton, pushing me forward in clarity of self-expression,
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precision through mathematics, critical assessment and carefully crafted English,
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precision through mathematics, critical assessment and carefully crafted English:
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its members will always remain dear to me.
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%
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%%%% IS THIS BIT A BIT MAD????
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Like an army recruits training Sergeant Major I found them
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hard task masters at first, and then, as with realising the rationale behind training and
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{\em even} parade drill, respected and grew to like them.
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%
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%
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My first debt of gratitude must go to my supervisors,
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Dr. C Garret, %% TOP BLOKE
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Professor J. Howse and %% JAVALA LAT HUND
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Dr. A. Fish. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
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Dr. A. Fish,
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Dr. C Garret and %% TOP BLOKE
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%Dr. C Garret, %% TOP BLOKE
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Professor J. Howse. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
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%Dr. A. Fish. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
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%
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They patiently provided the guidance,
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encouragement and advice necessary for me to proceed through the
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research, consolidation and write-up phases of the PhD program,
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to submit three papers to conferences~\cite{syssafe2011,syssafe2012,Clark_fastzone}
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to prepare and present three papers to conferences~\cite{syssafe2011,syssafe2012,Clark_fastzone}
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and to complete and submit this thesis.
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\\
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\\
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%
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%
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I owe a debt of thanks to Dr J. flower, my MSc project supervisor,
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who explained that the chapter in my project documentation postulating a modular form of
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FMEA---which had obvious potential for making FMEA
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FMEA---which had %obvious
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potential for making the process %FMEA
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more efficient---was a concept worthy of being developed for a PhD and assisting me
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to submit this as a conference paper~\cite{Clark200519}.
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to present the chapter as %submit this as
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a conference paper~\cite{Clark200519}.
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%
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Further I thank her for encouraging me to apply for the PhD. %% PITY SHE DID NOT STAY ON AS MY PHD SUPERVISOR
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%
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I am deeply thankful to the directors of Energy Technology Control not only for
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\\
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\\
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%
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I am deeply thankful to the directors of {\etc} not only for
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funding this course, but providing training and work experience in the
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field of safety critical engineering, and giving me Friday
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afternoons to pursue my studies.
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%
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At Energy Technology Control, the following people gave encouragement, and
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validated the concepts for modular FMEA that I was proposing, Martin~Thirsk, Colin~Talmay,
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Darren~Legge and Hazel~Anderson. The environment and context of the work there
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was very useful for clarifying concepts relating to FMEA and
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safety, at least once a week there would be a new practical case study arising
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and being discussed, be it the observability of the effect of failures in an amplifier,
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or how a particular sensor could fail.
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%
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The field of industrial burner control
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is rich with practical examples that my new methodology have been % be
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applied to and thus the theoretical aspects were often
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sounded out against `real~world' problems.
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%
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These real~world failure scenarios were reflected in the
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design documentation, often submitted in support of
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safety accreditation, that I am tasked to produce there.
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%
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Again I thank energy Technology control Ltd, for giving me
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these parallel tasks, which aided my studies.
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At Energy~Technology~Control, the following people gave encouragement, and
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validated the concepts for the `modular~FMEA' that I was developing, Martin~Thirsk, Colin~Talmay,
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Darren~Legge and Hazel~Anderson.
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%
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These Engineers, whose whole careers
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have been focused on the safety critical electronic/computing area,
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gave valuable time to look at and comment on my FMMD proposals.
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%
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% Grandma Serife Gur and grandaunt Fadime Altinteril, who left us too soon.
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I wish to thank my parents, Jeniffer and Richard Clark.
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Their comments gave me confidence that the methodology I was developing had
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%was not only an academic exercise but had
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potential practical
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applications and benefits.
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%
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The environment and context of the work at {\etc}
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was very useful for clarifying concepts relating to FMEA and
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safety; at least once a week there is a new practical case study arising
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and being discussed, be it, say, the observability of the effect of failures in an
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traditional amplifier configuration,
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or how a particular sensor could fail.
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%
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The field of industrial burner control, is highly regulated and
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is rich with practical examples of safety measures built into
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hybrid digital/electronic systems.
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%
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This has given me many opportunities to % has been % be
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apply the new methodology against `real~world' problems.
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%
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%and thus its
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%theoretical aspects have been often
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%sounded out against `real~world' problems.
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%
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These real~world failure scenarios and their proposed solutions, were often detailed in
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requirements and design documentation, submitted in support of
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safety accreditation.
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%
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I was glad to be tasked to produce many of these documents.
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%
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Again I thank {\etc}, for giving me
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these parallel tasks, which aided my studies.
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\\
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\\
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%
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%
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I wish to thank my parents, Jennifer and Richard Clark.
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% MY MUM for proof reading alot!
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I hope that this work makes you proud.
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%
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\\
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\\
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%\vspace{3cm}
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Typeset in \LaTeX \today.
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\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.5}
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\newcommand{\pin}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{pi}{\longleftrightarrow}}}
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\newcommand{\half}{\ensuremath{\frac{1}{2}}}
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\newcommand{\cf}[1]{\textbf{#1()}}
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\newcommand{\etc}{Energy~Technology~Control~Ltd}
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%
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% OK after about 3 years its not rigorous FMEA (RFMEA) anymore, oh no, its Exhaustive FMEA
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% but since the fuckers might change it yet again, I am making this a macro.
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