tunbridge wells juggling club

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Robin P. Clark 2013-08-21 18:19:37 +01:00
parent 03b5905ff1
commit 4bc631a54b
2 changed files with 20 additions and 15 deletions

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@ -56,12 +56,14 @@ The more dangerous the consequences of failure
the higher SIL rating we can demand for it.
%
A band-saw with one operative may require a SIL rating of 1,
a nuclear power-station, with far greater consequences on dangerous failure
but something with higher potential for harm to a larger number of people,
such as a nuclear power-station or air-liner,
with far greater consequences on dangerous failure
may require a SIL rating of 4.
%
What we are saying is that while we may tolerate a low incidence of failure on a band-saw,
we will only tolerate extremely low incidences of failure in nuclear plant.
SIL ratings give us another objective yardstick for the measurement of system safety.
SIL ratings provide another objective yardstick for the measurement of system safety.
%governing failure conditions and determining risk levels associated with systems.
All of these risk assessment techniques are based on variations of %on the theme of
@ -80,11 +82,11 @@ which make them unsuitable for the higher safety requirements of the 21st centur
Problems with state explosion in failure mode reasoning and the current difficulties %impossibility
of integrating software and hardware failure mode models~\cite{1372150} are the most obvious of these. %flaws.
%
The four current methodologies are described in chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} and %the advantages and drawbacks
These four current methodologies are described in chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} and %the advantages and drawbacks
%of each FMEA variant are examined
critically assessed in chapter~\ref{sec:chap3}.
In chapter~\ref{sec:chap4}, a new methodology is proposed which addresses the state explosion problem
and, using contract programmed software, allows the modelling of integrated
and using contract programmed software, allows the modelling of integrated
software/electrical systems.
%
This is followed by two chapters showing examples of the new modular FMEA analysis technique (Failure Mode Modular De-Composition FMMD)
@ -169,9 +171,10 @@ Using the symptoms of failure, we could now treat these modules as components in
{\fgs}. Higher and higher levels of {\fgs} could be built until we had a hierarchy
representing a failure mode model for the system.
%
Because this is modular, we can apply double simultaneous failure mode checking; and as %because
Because this is modular, %we can apply double simultaneous failure mode checking; and as %because
double simultaneous failure mode checking can be applied as
the number of components
in each {\fg} is typically small---we avoid state explosion problems. % for the general case. % AF says `in the general case' here 12JAN2013
in each {\fg} is typically small; we therefore avoid state explosion problems. % for the general case. % AF says `in the general case' here 12JAN2013
%
%
If we apply
@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ double checking all the way up the hierarchy we can guarantee to have considered
every double simultaneous failure of all components in a system.
%
This means, as a fortunate by-product, that many multiple as well as double
failures would be analysed, but because failure modes are traceable from the base components to the top level---or system---failure modes
failures would be analysed, but because failure modes are traceable from the base components to the top level---or system---failure modes,
these relationships can be held in a traversable data structure.
%
If held in a traversable data structure we can apply automated methods to search for all the combinations of multiple failure modes
@ -200,7 +203,7 @@ be more user friendly than using formal logic.
For an FMEA Spider diagram, contours represent failure modes, and the Spider diagram
`existential~points' represent instances of failure modes.
%
Overlapping contours could represent multiple failure modes.
Overlapping contours represent multiple failure modes.
%
By drawing a spider collecting existential points, a common failure symptom could
be determined and from this a new diagram generated automatically to represent the {\dc}.

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.1}
\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.15}
\chapter*{Colophon}
In short ``Thanks every body''!
@ -18,21 +18,23 @@ and its members will always remain dear to me.
My first debt of gratitude must go to my supervisors,
Dr. C Garret, %% TOP BLOKE
Professor J. Howse and %% JAVALA LAT HUND
Dr. A. Fish %% JAVALA LAT HUND
.
Dr. A. Fish. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
%
They patiently provided the guidance,
encouragement and advice necessary for me to proceed through the
research, consolidation and write-up phases of the PhD program,
to prepare and submit three papers to conferences~\cite{syssafe2011,syssafe2012,Clark_fastzone}
to prepare and present three papers to conferences~\cite{syssafe2011,syssafe2012,Clark_fastzone}
and to complete and submit this thesis.
%
I owe a debt of thanks to Dr J. flower, my MSc project supervisor,
who explained that the chapter in my project documentation postulating a modular form of
FMEA---which had obvious potential for making FMEA
FMEA---which had %obvious
potential for making the process %FMEA
more efficient---was a concept worthy of being developed for a PhD and assisting me
to submit this as a conference paper~\cite{Clark200519}.
to present the chapter as %submit this as
a conference paper~\cite{Clark200519}.
%
Further I thank her for encouraging me to apply for the PhD. %% PITY SHE DID NOT STAY ON AS MY PHD SUPERVISOR
%
@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ applications and benefits.
% Grandma Serife Gur and grandaunt Fadime Altinteril, who left us too soon.
I wish to thank my parents, Jeniffer and Richard Clark.
I wish to thank my parents, Jennifer and Richard Clark.
% MY MUM for proof reading alot!
I hope that this work makes you proud.