final printout and pencil then edit
This commit is contained in:
parent
097c23b4e9
commit
dc4ecbea45
@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ The algorithm, represented by the symbol `$\derivec$', is described using five a
|
|||||||
%These are described using the Algorithm environment in the next section \ref{algorithms}.
|
%These are described using the Algorithm environment in the next section \ref{algorithms}.
|
||||||
%
|
%
|
||||||
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
||||||
As a function $\derivec$ has the following signature:
|
% As a function $\derivec$ has the following signature:
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
%\clearpage
|
% %\clearpage
|
||||||
$$ \derivec: \mathcal{FG} \rightarrow \mathcal{DC} .$$
|
% $$ \derivec: \mathcal{FG} \rightarrow \mathcal{DC} .$$
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\begin{algorithm}
|
\begin{algorithm}
|
||||||
\caption{Derive new `Component' $DC$ from a given {\fg} $FG$: $\derivec(FG)$}
|
\caption{Derive new `Component' $DC$ from a given {\fg} $FG$: $\derivec(FG)$}
|
||||||
@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ all components within the given {\fg}.
|
|||||||
% %
|
% %
|
||||||
% %
|
% %
|
||||||
% %
|
% %
|
||||||
The next task is to formulate `test~cases'. These are a collection of combinations of these {\fms} and will be used
|
%The next task is to formulate `test~cases'. These are a collection of combinations of these {\fms} and will be used
|
||||||
in the analysis stages.
|
%in the analysis stages.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ all failure modes in components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~c
|
|||||||
%{ \footnotesize
|
%{ \footnotesize
|
||||||
\begin{algorithm}[h+]
|
\begin{algorithm}[h+]
|
||||||
\caption{Determine Test Cases: dtc: (F)}
|
\caption{Determine Test Cases: dtc: (F)}
|
||||||
%\label{alg22}
|
\label{alg22}
|
||||||
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
|
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
|
||||||
\Require {F is a non empty flat set of failure modes}
|
\Require {F is a non empty flat set of failure modes}
|
||||||
\State { All test cases are chosen by the investigating engineer(s). Typically all single
|
\State { All test cases are chosen by the investigating engineer(s). Typically all single
|
||||||
@ -423,23 +423,23 @@ all failure modes in components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~c
|
|||||||
%\algstore
|
%\algstore
|
||||||
%\algrestore
|
%\algrestore
|
||||||
%
|
%
|
||||||
\algstore{myalg}
|
% \algstore{myalg}
|
||||||
\end{algorithmic}
|
% \end{algorithmic}
|
||||||
\end{algorithm}
|
% \end{algorithm}
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
\begin{algorithm}
|
% \begin{algorithm}
|
||||||
\begin{algorithmic} [1]
|
% \begin{algorithmic} [1]
|
||||||
\algrestore{myalg}
|
% \algrestore{myalg}
|
||||||
\Ensure { $ \forall j_1,j_2 \in J \; such\; that\; j_1 \neq j_2 \big( tc_{j_1} \neq tc_{j_2} \big) $} \Comment{Ensure test cases are distinct}
|
\Ensure { $ \forall j_1,j_2 \in J \; such\; that\; j_1 \neq j_2 \big( tc_{j_1} \neq tc_{j_2} \big) $} \Comment{Ensure test cases are distinct}
|
||||||
\Ensure { $ \forall tc \in TC \big( tc \in \mathcal{P}(F) \big) $ } \Comment{Ensure each test case is a subset of F}
|
\Ensure { $ \forall tc \in TC \big( tc \in \mathcal{P}(F) \big) $ } \Comment{Ensure each test case is a subset of F}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\If{Single fault checking}
|
% \If{Single fault checking}
|
||||||
\State { let $f$ represent a component failure mode }
|
\State { let $f$ represent a component failure mode }
|
||||||
%\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
|
%\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
|
||||||
\Ensure { $ \forall f \;such\;that\; (f \in F)) \wedge (f \in \bigcup TC) $ }
|
\Ensure { $ \forall f \;such\;that\; (f \in F)) \wedge (f \in \bigcup TC) $ }
|
||||||
\Comment { This corresponds to checking that at least each single failure mode is
|
\Comment { This corresponds to checking that at least each single failure mode is
|
||||||
included as a test case.}
|
included as a test case.}
|
||||||
\EndIf
|
%\EndIf
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\If{Double fault checking}
|
\If{Double fault checking}
|
||||||
\State { let $f1,f2$ represent component failure modes, and $c$ any component in the functional group }
|
\State { let $f1,f2$ represent component failure modes, and $c$ any component in the functional group }
|
||||||
@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ When all the test cases have been analysed,
|
|||||||
we will have a `result' for each `test case'.
|
we will have a `result' for each `test case'.
|
||||||
%
|
%
|
||||||
Each result will be described from the perspective of %{\wrt} to
|
Each result will be described from the perspective of %{\wrt} to
|
||||||
the {\fg}, not the components failure modes.
|
the {\fg}, not the members of it i.e. the components. % failure modes.
|
||||||
%in its test case.
|
%in its test case.
|
||||||
%
|
%
|
||||||
%In the case of a simple
|
%In the case of a simple
|
||||||
@ -647,13 +647,13 @@ new {\fgs} at higher levels of fault abstraction.
|
|||||||
Let $DC$ be a derived component with its own set of failure~modes.
|
Let $DC$ be a derived component with its own set of failure~modes.
|
||||||
We define the function $cdc$ thus:
|
We define the function $cdc$ thus:
|
||||||
$$ cdc: \mathcal{SP} \rightarrow \mathcal{DC} , $$
|
$$ cdc: \mathcal{SP} \rightarrow \mathcal{DC} , $$
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
given by
|
given by
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
$$ cdc(SP) = DC . $$
|
$$ cdc(SP) = DC . $$
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
The new component will have a set of failure modes that correspond to the common symptoms collected from the $FG$.
|
The new component will have a set of failure modes that correspond to the common symptoms collected from the $FG$.
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
%\begin{algorithm}[h+]
|
%\begin{algorithm}[h+]
|
||||||
% ~\label{alg5}
|
% ~\label{alg5}
|
||||||
%
|
%
|
||||||
@ -674,9 +674,10 @@ The new component will have a set of failure modes that correspond to the common
|
|||||||
%
|
%
|
||||||
%\end{algorithmic}
|
%\end{algorithmic}
|
||||||
%\end{algorithm}
|
%\end{algorithm}
|
||||||
|
%
|
||||||
%Algorithm \ref{alg55}
|
%Algorithm \ref{alg55}
|
||||||
The function $cdc$ is the final stage in the process. We now have a
|
%The function $cdc$ is the final stage in the process.
|
||||||
|
We now have a
|
||||||
derived~component $DC$, which has its own set of failure~modes. This can now be
|
derived~component $DC$, which has its own set of failure~modes. This can now be
|
||||||
used in with other components (or derived~components)
|
used in with other components (or derived~components)
|
||||||
to form functional~groups at higher levels of failure~mode~abstraction.
|
to form functional~groups at higher levels of failure~mode~abstraction.
|
||||||
@ -739,7 +740,8 @@ in FMMD analysis hierarchies.
|
|||||||
These trees can be also traversed to produce
|
These trees can be also traversed to produce
|
||||||
minimal cut sets\cite{nasafta} or entire FTA trees\cite{nucfta}, and by
|
minimal cut sets\cite{nasafta} or entire FTA trees\cite{nucfta}, and by
|
||||||
analysing the statistical likelihood of the component failures,
|
analysing the statistical likelihood of the component failures,
|
||||||
the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) and SIL\cite{en61508} levels can be automatically calculated.
|
the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) and Failure in Time(FIT)\cite{en61508}
|
||||||
|
levels can be automatically calculated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user