A Fish algorithm comments

This commit is contained in:
Robin Clark 2013-08-16 17:17:00 +01:00
parent b3c39d692a
commit 097c23b4e9
3 changed files with 170 additions and 159 deletions

View File

@ -759,11 +759,11 @@ probability theory~\cite{probstat}.
% here.
What is required is to define a property for
a set of failure modes where only one failure mode can be active at a time;
a set of failure modes $F$ where only one failure mode can be active at a time;
or borrowing from the terms of statistics, the failure mode being an event that is mutually exclusive
with a set $F$.
within the set $F$.
We can define a set of failure mode sets called $\mathcal{U}$ to represent this
property for a set of failure modes.
property. % for a set of failure modes.
%
% \begin{definition}
% We can define a set $\mathcal{U}$ which is a set of sets of failure modes, where
@ -817,6 +817,7 @@ we state this formally;
That is to say that it is impossible that any pair of failure modes can be active at the same time
for the failure mode set $F$ to exist in the family of sets $\mathcal{U}$.
%
Note where there are more than two failure~modes,
by banning any pairs from being active at the same time,
we have banned larger combinations as well.

View File

@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
%\label{sec:symptom_abstraction}
\label{sec:algorithmfmmd}
This chapter defines the process for performing one stage of the FMMD process i.e.
This appendix formalises the process for performing one stage of the FMMD process %i.e.
from a given {\fg} to creating a {\dc}.
%
The FMMD process is then examined in greater %levels of
detail and described with set theory in
an algorithmic context.
%
The intention for defining FMMD in algorithmic and set theoretic terms, is to provide
The intention for defining FMMD in algorithmic and set theoretic terms is to provide
a solid specification for the process that could guide a software implementation.% for it.
@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ a solid specification for the process that could guide a software implementation
\nocite{safeware}
\section{Overview of the FMMD analysis Process}
The FMMD process is described in chapter~\ref{sec:chap4},
to re-cap, FMMD has four main stages:
\section{Overview of the FMMD analysis process}
The FMMD process is described in chapter~\ref{sec:chap4}.
To re-cap, FMMD has four main stages:
\begin{itemize}
\item collection of components to form {\fgs},
\item applying FMEA to the {\fg},
\item applying FMEA to the {\fgs},
\item collecting common symptoms from the FMEA results,
\item creating a {\dc} representing the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg}.
\end{itemize}
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ This process allows us to modularise and thus simplify FMEA analysis of systems.
%below.
\paragraph{FMEA applied to the {\fg}: choosing `test~cases'.}
\paragraph{FMEA applied to the {\fg}: choosing test~cases.}
As a {\fg} is a collection of components, the failure~modes
that we have to consider are the failure modes of its components.
%, as
@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ Each test case must also be considered for all %applied/
operational states and
%in the for the case of each applied states or
environmental conditions to which it may be exposed. In this way, all possible
failure mode behaviour due to all the conditions that can be applied for a test case will be examined.
failure mode behaviour, due to all the conditions that can be applied for all the test~cases will be examined.
%
\paragraph{Symptom Identification.}
When all `test~cases' have been analysed, we have a set of FMEA results. % applied.
When all test~cases have been analysed, we have a set of FMEA results for the given {\fg}. % applied.
These results can be viewed as symptoms of failure of the {\fg}.
%
%This looks at the results of the `test~cases' as failure modes from the perspective not of the components, but of the {\fg}/sub-system.
@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ It is possible here for an automated system to flag un-handled failure modes.
%\ref{requirement at the start}
\section{A single stage of the FMMD process}
\section{Expanding on a single stage of the FMMD process}
%\paragraph{To analyse a base level Derived~Component/sub-system}
@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ We can define a function $fm$ which returns the failure modes for a given compo
%$$ fm ( C ) = F $$
We overload the notation for the function $fm$
and define it for the set components within a {\fg} $FG$ (i.e. where $FG \subset \mathcal{C} $) thus:
and define it for the set of components within a {\fg} $FG$ (i.e. where $FG \subset \mathcal{C} $) thus:
\begin{equation}
fm : FG \rightarrow \mathcal{F} .
@ -230,7 +230,9 @@ $$
%\section{A Formal Algorithmic Description of `Symptom Abstraction'}
\section{Algorithmic Description}
\section{Algorithmic Description of Symptom Abstraction}
%\section{Algorithmic Description}
\label{sec:symptomabs}
The algorithm for {\em symptom abstraction} is described in
this section
@ -247,12 +249,12 @@ using set theory and procedural descriptions.
% %Thus, ke
% $DC$ can now be treated
% as a component with a known set of failure modes.
%\FORALL { $c \in FG $ } \COMMENT{Find the highest abstraction level of any component in the functional group}
%\ForAll { $c \in FG $ } \Comment{Find the highest abstraction level of any component in the functional group}
% \IF{$c.\abslev > \abslev_{max}$}
% $\abslev_{max} = c.\abslev$
% \ENDIF
%\STATE { $ FM(c) \in FG_{cfm} $ } \COMMENT {Collect all failure modes from each component into the set $FM_{cfm}$}
%\ENDFOR
%\State { $ FM(c) \in FG_{cfm} $ } \Comment {Collect all failure modes from each component into the set $FM_{cfm}$}
%\EndFor
%
By defining the process and describing it using set theory, constraints and
verification checks %in the process
@ -262,28 +264,26 @@ The algorithm, represented by the symbol `$\derivec$', is described using five a
%These are described using the Algorithm environment in the next section \ref{algorithms}.
%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
As a function $\derivec$ has the following signature:
\section{Algorithmic Description of Symptom Abstraction}
%\clearpage
$$ \derivec: \mathcal{FG} \rightarrow \mathcal{DC} $$
\begin{algorithm}[h+]
\caption{Derive new `Component' from {\fg}: $\derivec(FG)$} \label{alg66}
$$ \derivec: \mathcal{FG} \rightarrow \mathcal{DC} .$$
\begin{algorithm}
\caption{Derive new `Component' $DC$ from a given {\fg} $FG$: $\derivec(FG)$}
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
\STATE {F = fm (FG)} \COMMENT{ collect all component failure modes }%from the from the components in the functional~group }
\STATE {TC = dtc (F)} \COMMENT{ determine all test cases giving a set of test cases $TC$ } %to apply to the functional group }
\STATE {R = atc (TC)} \COMMENT{ analyse the test cases giving a set of FMEA results $R$}%, for failure mode behaviour of the functional~group }
\STATE {SP = fcs (R)} \COMMENT{ find common symptoms, aggregate results from R giving a set of symptoms $SP$}%of failure for the functional group }
\STATE {DC = cdc (SP)} \COMMENT{ create a derived component }
\State {F = fm (FG)} \Comment{ collect all component failure modes }%from the from the components in the functional~group }
\State {TC = dtc (F)} \Comment{ determine all test cases giving a set of test cases $TC$ } %to apply to the functional group }
\State {R = atc (TC)} \Comment{ analyse the test cases giving a set of FMEA results $R$}%, for failure mode behaviour of the functional~group }
\State {SP = fcs (R)} \Comment{ find common symptoms, aggregate results from R giving a set of symptoms $SP$}%of failure for the functional group }
\State {DC = cdc (SP)} \Comment{ create a derived component }
\RETURN $DC$
\State \textbf{return} $DC$
\end{algorithmic}
\label{alg66}
\end{algorithm}
The symptom abstraction process allows us to take a {\fg} of components,
@ -299,28 +299,29 @@ from the bottom-up.
%\clearpage
\subsection{ Determine Failure Modes to Examine}
\subsection{Determine Failure Modes to Examine}
The first stage is to find the failure modes to consider for
analysis,
using the earlier definition of the function $fm$.
%
The function $fm$ applied to a component returns the failure modes for that component.
Thus its domain is the set of all components $\mathcal{C}$ and its range
is the powerset of all failure modes $\mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{F}$.
%
$$ fm : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{F} $$
%
A {\fg} is a collection of components $G$ such that $\mathcal{G} \in \mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{C}$.
%
The function $fm$ can be overloaded with a {\fg} $\mathcal{G}$ as its domain
and the power-set of all failure modes as its range.
%
%
$$ fm: \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{F} $$
%
%
using the earlier definition of the function $fm$ applied to
all components within the given {\fg}.
%
% The function $fm$ applied to a component returns the failure modes for that component.
% Thus its domain is the set of all components $\mathcal{C}$ and its range
% is the powerset of all failure modes $\mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{F}$.
% %
% $$ fm : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{F} $$
% %
% A {\fg} is a collection of components $G$ such that $\mathcal{G} \in \mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{C}$.
% %
% The function $fm$ can be overloaded with a {\fg} $\mathcal{G}$ as its domain
% and the power-set of all failure modes as its range.
% %
% %
% $$ fm: \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\,\mathcal{F} $$
% %
% %
% %
The next task is to formulate `test~cases'. These are a collection of combinations of these {\fms} and will be used
in the analysis stages.
@ -362,89 +363,92 @@ all failure modes in components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~c
%
%%
%
%{ \footnotesize
\begin{algorithm}[h+]
~\label{alg2}
\caption{Determine Test Cases: dtc: (F) } \label{alg22}
\caption{Determine Test Cases: dtc: (F)}
%\label{alg22}
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
\REQUIRE {F is a non empty flat set of failure modes }
\STATE { All test cases are chosen by the investigating engineer(s). Typically all single
\Require {F is a non empty flat set of failure modes}
\State { All test cases are chosen by the investigating engineer(s). Typically all single
component failures are investigated
with some specially selected combination faults}
\STATE { Let $TC$ be the set of test cases }
\STATE { Let $tc_j$ be set of component failure modes where $j$ is an index of $J$}
\COMMENT { Each set $tc_j$ is a `test case' }
%\STATE { $ \forall j \in J | tc_j \in TC $ } \COMMENT {Ensure the test cases are complete and unique}
\State { Let $TC$ be the set of test cases }
\State { Let $tc_j$ be a set of component failure modes where $j$ is an index of $J$}
\Comment { Each set $tc_j$ is a `test~case' and $TC = \bigcup_{j \in J} \{tc_j\}$ where $J \in \mathbb{N}_{+}$}
\State { $ TC := \emptyset $ } \Comment{Initialise set of test cases}
\State { $ j := 1 $ } \Comment{Initialise index of test cases}
\STATE { $ TC := \emptyset $ } \COMMENT{Initialise set of test cases}
\STATE { $ j := 1 $ } \COMMENT{Initialise index of test cases}
\ForAll { $ f \in F $ } \Comment{ Assign one test case per single fault mode }
\State{$ tc_j := f $}
\State { $ TC := TC \cup tc_j $ } \Comment{ place this test case into the set TC }
\State{ $ j := j + 1 $}
\EndFor
\FORALL { $ f \in F $ }
\STATE{$ tc_j := f $} \COMMENT{ Assign one test case per single fault mode }
\STATE{ $ j := j + 1 $}
\ENDFOR
%\STATE { Let $ptc$ be a provisional test case } \COMMENT{ Determine Test cases with simultaneous failure modes }
%\State { Let $ptc$ be a provisional test case } \Comment{ Determine Test cases with simultaneous failure modes }
\IF{DoubleFaultChecking}
%\STATE { Let $ptc$ be a provisional test case }
\FORALL { $ f1,f2 \in F $ }
\STATE { $ ptc := \{ f1,f2 \} $ } \COMMENT{Make $ptc$ a provisional test case}
%\STATE { FINDING ERRORS IN LATEX SOURCE IS FUCKING ANNOYING}
% ESCPECIALLY IN THIS FUCKING ENVIRONMENT 22OCT2010
\If{DoubleFaultChecking} \Comment{ Assign one test case per valid double fault mode } %\State { Let $ptc$ be a provisional test case }
\ForAll { $ f_1,f_2 \in F $ }
\State { $ ptc := \{ f_1,f_2 \} $ } \Comment{Make $ptc$ a provisional test case}
%\State { FINDING ERRORS IN LATEX SOURCE IS challenging}
% ESCPECIALLY IN THIS ENVIRONMENT 22OCT2010
%% OK maybe you can't have comments after IF: half an hour wasted...
\IF { $ {isunitarystate}(ptc) $ } % \COMMENT{Ensure the chosen failure mode set is unitary state compliant}
\STATE{ $ j := j + 1 $} % latex bug hunt game what fun ! #2
\STATE { $ tc_j := ptc $}
\STATE { $ TC := TC \cup tc_j $ }
\ENDIF
\ENDFOR
\ENDIF
\FORALL { $ ptc \in \mathcal{P}(F) $ } %%\mathcal{P} F $ }
%%\STATE { $ ptc \in \mathcal{P} F $ } \COMMENT{Make a provisional test case}
\IF { ${chosen}(ptc) \wedge ptc \not\in TC \wedge {isunitarystate}(ptc)$ } %%% \COMMENT{IF this combination of faults is chosen as an additional Test case include it in TC}
\STATE{ $ j := j + 1 $} % latex bug hunt game #1
\STATE { $ tc_j := ptc $}
\STATE { $ TC := TC \cup tc_j $ }
\ENDIF
\ENDFOR
\If { $ {isunitarystate}(ptc) $ } % \Comment{Ensure the chosen failure mode set is unitary state compliant}
\State{ $ j := j + 1 $} % latex bug hunt game what fun ! #2
\State { $ tc_j := ptc $}
\State { $ TC := TC \cup tc_j $ } \Comment{ place this test case into the set TC }
\EndIf
\EndFor
\EndIf
%
% \ForAll { $ ptc \in \mathcal{P}(F) $ } \Comment{for all subsets of F} %%\mathcal{P} F $ }
% \State { $ ptc \in \mathcal{P} F $ } \Comment{Make a provisional test case}
% \If { ${chosen}(ptc) \wedge ptc \not\in TC \wedge {isunitarystate}(ptc)$ } %%% \Comment{IF this combination of faults is chosen as an additional Test case include it in TC}
% \State{ $ j := j + 1 $} % latex bug hunt game #1
% \State { $ tc_j := ptc $}
% \State { $ TC := TC \cup tc_j $ }
% \ENDIF
% \EndFor
%\FORALL { $tc_j \in TC$ }
%\ForAll { $tc_j \in TC$ }
%\ENSURE {$ tc_j \in \bigcap FG_{cfm} $}
%
% Lone commoents like the one below causing incredibly annoying very difficult to trace errors: cunt
%\COMMENT { require that the test case is a member of the powerset of $F$ }
%\Comment { require that the test case is a member of the powerset of $F$ }
%\ENSURE { $ \forall \; j2 \; \in J ( \forall \; j1 \; \in J | tc_{j1} \neq tc_{j2} \; \wedge \; j1 \neq j2 ) $}
%\COMMENT { Test cases must be unique }
%\ENDFOR
%\Comment { Test cases must be unique }
%\EndFor
%
% \IF{Single fault checking}
% \STATE { let $f$ represent a component failure mode }
% %\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
% \ENSURE { $ \forall f \;such\;that\; (f \in F)) \wedge (f \in \bigcup TC) $ }
% \COMMENT { This corresponds to checking that at least each failure mode is considered at
% least once in the analysis; more rigorous cardinality constraint
% checks may be required for some safety standards}
% \ENDIF
%\algstore
%\algrestore
%
% \IF{Double fault checking}
% \STATE { let $f1,f2$ represent component failure modes, and $c$ any component in the functional group }
% %\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
% \ENSURE { $ \forall f1,f2 \;where\; (f1,f2) \not\in c\;such\;that\; (f1,f2 \in F)) \wedge ( \{f1,f2\} \in \bigcup TC) $ }
% \COMMENT { This corresponds to checking that each possible double failure mode is considered
% as a test case; more rigorous cardinality constraint
% checks may be required for some safety standards. Note if both failure modes
% in the check are sourced from the same component $c$, the test case is impossible
% under unitary state failure mode conditions}
% \ENDIF
%
\ENSURE { $ \forall j1,j2 \in J \; such\; that\; j1 \neq j2 \big( tc_{j1} \neq tc_{j2} \big) $}
\ENSURE { $ \forall tc \in TC \big( tc \in \mathcal{P}(F) \big) $ }
\RETURN $TC$
\algstore{myalg}
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
\begin{algorithm}
\begin{algorithmic} [1]
\algrestore{myalg}
\Ensure { $ \forall j_1,j_2 \in J \; such\; that\; j_1 \neq j_2 \big( tc_{j_1} \neq tc_{j_2} \big) $} \Comment{Ensure test cases are distinct}
\Ensure { $ \forall tc \in TC \big( tc \in \mathcal{P}(F) \big) $ } \Comment{Ensure each test case is a subset of F}
\If{Single fault checking}
\State { let $f$ represent a component failure mode }
%\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
\Ensure { $ \forall f \;such\;that\; (f \in F)) \wedge (f \in \bigcup TC) $ }
\Comment { This corresponds to checking that at least each single failure mode is
included as a test case.}
\EndIf
\If{Double fault checking}
\State { let $f1,f2$ represent component failure modes, and $c$ any component in the functional group }
%\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
\Ensure { $ \forall f1,f2 \;where\; (f1,f2) \not\in c\;such\;that\; (f1,f2 \in F)) \wedge ( \{f1,f2\} \in \bigcup TC) $ }
\Comment { This corresponds to checking that each possible double failure mode (see section~\ref{sec:unitarystate}) is included
as a test case.}
\EndIf
\State \textbf{return} $TC$
% some european standards
% imply checking all double fault combinations\cite{en298} }
@ -452,6 +456,7 @@ all failure modes in components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~c
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
%} % end footnotesize
Algorithm \ref{alg22} has taken the set of failure modes $ F=fm(FG) $ and returned a set of test cases $TC$.
The next stage is to analyse the effect of each test case on the {\fg}.
@ -477,17 +482,19 @@ $$ atc(TC) = R .$$
~\label{alg3}
\caption{Analyse Test Cases: atc(TC) } \label{alg33}
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
\STATE { let r be a `test case result'}
\STATE { Let the function $Analyse : tc \rightarrow r $ } \COMMENT { This analysis is a human activity, examining the component failure~modes in the test case and determining how the functional~group will fail under those conditions}
\STATE { $ R $ is a set of test case results $r_j \in R$ where the index $j$ corresponds to $tc_j \in TC$}
\FORALL { $tc_j \in TC$ }
\FORALL { Environmental and Specific Applied States }
\STATE { $ rc_j = Analyse(tc_j) $} \COMMENT {this is Failure Mode Effects Analysis applied in the context of the {\fg}}
%\STATE { $ rc_j \in R $ } \COMMENT{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
\STATE{ $ R := R \cup rc_j $ } \COMMENT{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
\ENDFOR
\ENDFOR
\RETURN $R$
\State { let r be a `test case result'}
\State { define the function $Analyse : tc \rightarrow r $ }
\Comment { This analysis is a human activity, FMEA, i.e. examining the component failure~modes
in the test case and determining how the functional~group will fail under those conditions.}
\State { $ R $ is a set of test case results $r_j \in R$ where the index $j$ corresponds to $tc_j \in TC$}
\ForAll { $tc_j \in TC$ }
\ForAll { Environmental and Specific Applied States }
\State { $ rc_j = Analyse(tc_j) $} \Comment {this is FMEA applied in the localised context of the {\fg}}
%\State { $ rc_j \in R $ } \Comment{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
\State{ $ R := R \cup rc_j $ } \Comment{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
\EndFor
\EndFor
\State \textbf{return} $R$
%\hline
\end{algorithmic}
@ -562,38 +569,38 @@ $$ fcs(R) = SP .$$
%
%
% %\REQUIRE {All failure modes for the components in $fm_i = fm(fg_i)$}
% \STATE {Let $sp_l$ be a set of `test cases results' where $l$ is an index set $L$}
% \STATE {Let $SP$ be a set whose members are the indexed `symptoms' $sp_l$}
% \COMMENT{ $SP$ is the set of `fault symptoms' for the sub-system}
% \STATE{$SP := 0$} \COMMENT{ initialise the `symptom family set'}
% \State {Let $sp_l$ be a set of `test cases results' where $l$ is an index set $L$}
% \State {Let $SP$ be a set whose members are the indexed `symptoms' $sp_l$}
% \Comment{ $SP$ is the set of `fault symptoms' for the sub-system}
% \State{$SP := 0$} \Comment{ initialise the `symptom family set'}
%%
% %\COMMENT{This corresponds to a fault symptom of the functional group $FG$}
% %\COMMENT{where double failure modes are required the cardinality constrained powerset of two must be applied to each failure mode}
% %\Comment{This corresponds to a fault symptom of the functional group $FG$}
% %\Comment{where double failure modes are required the cardinality constrained powerset of two must be applied to each failure mode}
%\REPEAT
%
% \STATE{$sp_l := 0$} \COMMENT{ initialise the `symptom'}
% \STATE{$Let \; sp_l \in \mathcal{P} R$ such that R is in a common symptom group } \COMMENT{determine common symptoms from the results set}
% \STATE{$ R := R \backslash sp_l $} \COMMENT{remove the results used from the results set}
% \STATE{$ SP := SP \cup sp_l$} \COMMENT{collect the symptom into the symtom family set SP}
% \STATE{$ l := l + 1 $} \COMMENT{move the index up for the next symptom to collect}
% \State{$sp_l := 0$} \Comment{ initialise the `symptom'}
% \State{$Let \; sp_l \in \mathcal{P} R$ such that R is in a common symptom group } \Comment{determine common symptoms from the results set}
% \State{$ R := R \backslash sp_l $} \Comment{remove the results used from the results set}
% \State{$ SP := SP \cup sp_l$} \Comment{collect the symptom into the symtom family set SP}
% \State{$ l := l + 1 $} \Comment{move the index up for the next symptom to collect}
%
%\UNTIL{ $ R = \emptyset $ } \COMMENT{continue until all results belong to a symptom}
%\UNTIL{ $ R = \emptyset $ } \Comment{continue until all results belong to a symptom}
%
%%% \FORALL { $ r_j \in R$ }
%%% \STATE { $sp_l \in \mathcal{P} R \wedge sp_l \in SP$ }
%%% %\STATE { $sp_l \in \bigcap R \wedge sp_l \in SP$ }
%%% \COMMENT{ Collect common symptoms.
%%% \ForAll { $ r_j \in R$ }
%%% \State { $sp_l \in \mathcal{P} R \wedge sp_l \in SP$ }
%%% %\State { $sp_l \in \bigcap R \wedge sp_l \in SP$ }
%%% \Comment{ Collect common symptoms.
%%% Analyse the sub-system's fault behaviour under the failure modes in $tc_j$ and determine the symptoms $sp_l$ that it
%%%causes in the functional group $FG$}
%%% %\ENSURE { $ \forall l2 \in L ( \forall l1 \in L | \exists a \in sp_{l1} \neq \exists b \in sp_{l2} \wedge l1 \neq l2 ) $}
%%%
%%% \ENSURE {$ \forall a \in sp_l \;such\;that\; \forall sp_i \in \bigcap_{i=1..L} SP ( sp_i = sp_l \implies a \in sp_i)$}
%%% \COMMENT { Ensure that the elements in each $sp_l$ are not present in any other $sp_l$ set }
%%% \Comment { Ensure that the elements in each $sp_l$ are not present in any other $sp_l$ set }
%%%
%%% \ENDFOR
% \STATE { The Set $SP$ can now be considered to be the set of fault modes for the sub-system that $FG$ represents}
%%% \EndFor
% \State { The Set $SP$ can now be considered to be the set of fault modes for the sub-system that $FG$ represents}
%
% \RETURN $SP$
% \Return $SP$
%%\hline
%
%\end{algorithmic}
@ -654,15 +661,15 @@ The new component will have a set of failure modes that correspond to the common
%
%\begin{algorithmic}[1]
%
% \STATE { Let $DC$ be a derived component with failure modes $f$ indexed by $l$ }
% \FORALL { $sp_l \in SP$ }
% \STATE { $ f_l = ConvertToFaultMode(sp_l) $}
% %\STATE { $ f_l \in DC $} \COMMENT{ this is saying place $f_l$ into $DC$'s collection of failure modes}
% \STATE { $DC := DC \cup f_l$ } \COMMENT{ this is saying place $f_l$ into $DC$'s collection of failure modes}
% \State { Let $DC$ be a derived component with failure modes $f$ indexed by $l$ }
% \ForAll { $sp_l \in SP$ }
% \State { $ f_l = ConvertToFaultMode(sp_l) $}
% %\State { $ f_l \in DC $} \Comment{ this is saying place $f_l$ into $DC$'s collection of failure modes}
% \State { $DC := DC \cup f_l$ } \Comment{ this is saying place $f_l$ into $DC$'s collection of failure modes}
%
% \ENDFOR
% \ENSURE { $fm(DC) \neq \emptyset$ } \COMMENT{Ensure that DC has a known set of failure modes}
% \RETURN DC
% \EndFor
% \ENSURE { $fm(DC) \neq \emptyset$ } \Comment{Ensure that DC has a known set of failure modes}
% \Return DC
%%\hline
%
%\end{algorithmic}
@ -702,12 +709,13 @@ naturally formed with the abstraction levels increasing with each tier.
\subsection{Hierarchical Simplification}
Because symptom abstraction aggregates fault modes, the number of faults to handle should decrease
Since symptom abstraction aggregates fault modes, the number of faults to handle should decrease
as the hierarchy progresses upwards.
%This is seen by casual observation of real life Systems. NEED A GOOD REF HERE
At the highest levels the number of faults
is significantly less than the sum of its component failure modes.
A sound system might have, for instance only four faults at its highest or system level,
To go back to the sound system analogy (see section~\ref{sec:cdplayer}), it may have
only four faults at its highest or system level,
\small
$$ SoundSystemFaults = \{TUNER\_FAULT, CD\_FAULT, SOUND\_OUT\_FAULT, IPOD\_FAULT\}$$
\normalsize
@ -720,7 +728,7 @@ as is found in practise in real world systems.
\subsection{Traceable Fault Modes}
Because the fault modes are determined from the bottom-up, the causes
Since the fault modes are determined from the bottom-up, the causes
for all high level faults naturally form trees.
%
That is to say from the bottom-up causes become symptoms, which in the next level become causes as we traverse up the tree.

View File

@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
\usetikzlibrary{shapes.gates.logic.US,trees,positioning,arrows}
\usepackage{subfigure}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
%\usepackage{algcompatible}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algorithmic}
%\usepackage{algorithmicx}
\usepackage{algpseudocode}
\usepackage{lastpage}
\usepackage{glossary}
\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.5}