last few first person refs found by grep

submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex

@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ failure modes as an intrinsic part of its process, which can be considered a wea
 \label{sec:detectable}
 \fmmdglossOBS
 Often the effects of  a failure mode may be easy to detect, 
-and our equipment can react by raising an alarm or compensating for the resulting fault.
+and  equipment can react by raising an alarm or compensating for the resulting fault.
 %
 Some failure modes may cause undetectable failures, for instance a component that causes
 a measured reading to change could have adverse consequences yet not be flagged as a failure.

submission_thesis/CH4_FMMD/copy.tex

@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ The above definition of a part, needs further refinement, i.e. to be defined as
 an atomic entity. % used as a building block.
 %The term component, in American English, can mean a building block or a part.
 %In British-English a component generally is given to mean the definition for part above.
-{\Bc} is defined as the lowest level entity ---an entity with which we begin our analysis---a component 
+{\Bc} is defined as the lowest level entity --- an entity with which to begin analysis --- a component 
 used as a starting bottom-up building block.
 %This is a choice made by the analyst, often guided by the standards to which the analysis is being performed. % to. 
 %
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ to see how they could be caused.
 \fmeagloss
 %
 The aim of FMMD analysis is to produce complete\footnote{Completeness dependent upon the completeness/correctness of the {\fms} supplied by the germane standard 
- for our {\bcs}.} failure
+ for the {\bcs}.} failure
 models of safety critical systems  from the bottom-up,
 starting where possible with known base~component failure~modes.
 %
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ component used to build the functional group it was derived from plus 1.
 So a derived component built from base level components
 would have an $\abslev$ value of 1.
 %
-In our example the resistors and op-amp are level zero ({\bcs}, $\abslev=0$), the {\em PD} a level 1 {\dc} ($\abslev=1$) and the {\em INVAMP}
+In this example the resistors and op-amp are level zero ({\bcs}, $\abslev=0$), the {\em PD} a level 1 {\dc} ($\abslev=1$) and the {\em INVAMP}
 a level 2 {\dc} ($\abslev=2$).
 %\clearpage
 Because {\fgs} may include components at varying levels 
@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ The abstraction level concept is formally defined in appendix~\ref{sec:abstracti
 %Tie into wish list at end of chapter 3. Solves state explosion, completeness, traceability, models for related such as FMECA
 \paragraph{Failure model Completeness.}
 It is undesirable to miss any component {\fm} in the analysis process; were this to
-happen our failure model would be incomplete.
+happen the failure model would be incomplete.
 %
 Given the starting conditions of base component {\fms} from the literature,
 it can be ensured that all these {\fms} are traceable to subsequent {\dc} {\fms}

submission_thesis/CH6_Software_Examples/software.tex

@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ by stating:
 %
 $$ fm(\cf{Read\_ADC}) = \{ CHAN\_NO, VREF, VV\_ERR \} $$
 %
-With the failure mode model for our function, it is used in conjunction
+With the failure mode model for this function, it is used in conjunction
 with the ADC hardware {\dc} CMATV, to form a {\fg} $G_2$, where $G_2 =\{ CMATV, \cf{Read\_ADC} \}$.
 %
 This {\fg} is analysed in table~\ref{tbl:radc}. %{ hardware/software combined {\fg}.
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ can fail. An $OUT\_OF\_RANGE$ condition will be flagged by the error flag variab
 The $VAL\_ERR$ will simply mean that the value read is incorrect: an undetectable {\fm}
 and therefore undesirable condition.
 %
-Finally a {\dc} is created to represent a failure mode model for our 
+Finally a {\dc} is created to represent a failure mode model for the 
 combined hardware and software {\ft} input. % failure mode model.
 %
 This can be named $ R420I $, for {\em read {\ft} input}.