OK cosmetic herin after?
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@ -224,7 +224,10 @@ failure.
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With an FMMD model, all the causes of system failures
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down can be traced to the base component level.
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This would be enough to create a fault causation tree, but FTA introduces
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The DAG produced from an FMMD analysis could be considered %%% THANKS ANDREW !
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as a unification of all FTA trees of a system.
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This would in fact, be enough to create all fault causation trees, but FTA introduces
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concepts of operational and environmental states, and inhibit gates.
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The FMEA philosophy in relation to these three concepts are to assume that they are worst cases, that they
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@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ components, where $\abslev$ is a natural number, ($\abslev \in \mathbb{N}_0$).
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For a base component, let the abstraction level be zero.
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The symptom abstraction process is applied giving a $\derivec$,
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The symptom abstraction process is applied giving a $\dc$,
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this derived~component will have an $\abslev$ value
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one higher than the highest $\abslev$ value of any of the components
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in the {\fg} used to derive it.
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