diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
index cd18629..f9f1de1 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
@@ -224,7 +224,10 @@ failure.
 With an FMMD model, all the causes of system failures
 down can be traced to the base component level.
 %
-This would be enough to create a fault causation tree, but FTA introduces 
+The DAG produced from an FMMD analysis could be considered %%% THANKS ANDREW !
+as a unification of all FTA trees of a system.
+%
+This would in fact,  be enough to create all fault causation trees, but FTA introduces 
 concepts of operational and environmental states, and inhibit gates.
 %
 The FMEA philosophy in relation to these three concepts are to assume that they are worst cases, that they
diff --git a/submission_thesis/appendixes/algorithmic.tex b/submission_thesis/appendixes/algorithmic.tex
index 9811c66..536ecf4 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/appendixes/algorithmic.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/appendixes/algorithmic.tex
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ components, where $\abslev$ is a natural number, ($\abslev \in \mathbb{N}_0$).
 %
 For a base component, let the abstraction level be zero.
 %
-The symptom abstraction process is applied giving  a $\derivec$,
+The symptom abstraction process is applied giving  a $\dc$,
 this derived~component will have an $\abslev$ value
 one higher than the highest $\abslev$ value of any of the components
 in the {\fg} used to derive it.