Refernces in the PLD
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*.toc
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*.toc
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*.*~
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*paper.tex
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*.txt
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@ -16,3 +16,7 @@ paper: paper.tex logic_diagram_paper.tex
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#
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#
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logic_diagram_paper.tex: logic_diagram.tex
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logic_diagram_paper.tex: logic_diagram.tex
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cat logic_diagram.tex | sed 's/logic_diagram\///' > logic_diagram_paper.tex
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cat logic_diagram.tex | sed 's/logic_diagram\///' > logic_diagram_paper.tex
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bib: logic_diagram_paper.tex
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bibtex paper
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Propositial Logic Diagrams (PLD) have been designed to provide an intuitive meth
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a specific sub-set of logic equations, to express fault modes in Mechanical and Electronic Systems.
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a specific sub-set of logic equations, to express fault modes in Mechanical and Electronic Systems.
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PLDs are a variant of constraint diagrams. Contours used to express
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PLDs are a variant of constraint diagrams. Contours used to express
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sets represent failure modes and the Symptomatically merged groups
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sets represent failure modes and the Symptomatically merged groups
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are akin to the `spiders' of constraint diagrams\ref{constraint}.
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are akin to the `spiders'\cite{howse:rwsd} of constraint diagrams\cite{gil:tafocd}.
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%To aid hierarchical stages of fault analysis, it has been specifically developed for the purpose of
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%To aid hierarchical stages of fault analysis, it has been specifically developed for the purpose of
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%joining conjunctive conditions with disjuctive conditions
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%joining conjunctive conditions with disjuctive conditions
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%to group the effects of failure modes.
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%to group the effects of failure modes.
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Nearly all modern safety critical systems involve these three disiplines.
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%
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%
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It is intended to be used for analysis of automated safety critical systems.
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It is intended to be used for analysis of automated safety critical systems.
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Many types of safety critical systems now legally
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Many types of safety critical systems now legally
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require fault mode effects analysis\cite{FMEA},
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require fault mode effects analysis\cite{sccs}[pp 38-39],
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but few formal systems exist and wide-spread take-up is
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but few formal systems exist and wide-spread take-up is
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not yet the norm.\cite{takeup}.
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not yet the norm.\cite{takeup}.
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%
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%
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Propositial Logic Diagrams (PLD) have been designed to provide an intuitive meth
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a specific sub-set of logic equations, to express fault modes in Mechanical and Electronic Systems.
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a specific sub-set of logic equations, to express fault modes in Mechanical and Electronic Systems.
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PLDs are a variant of constraint diagrams. Contours used to express
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PLDs are a variant of constraint diagrams. Contours used to express
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sets represent failure modes and the Symptomatically merged groups
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sets represent failure modes and the Symptomatically merged groups
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are akin to the `spiders' of constraint diagrams\ref{constraint}.
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are akin to the `spiders'\cite{howse:rwsd} of constraint diagrams\cite{gil:tafocd}.
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%To aid hierarchical stages of fault analysis, it has been specifically developed for the purpose of
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%To aid hierarchical stages of fault analysis, it has been specifically developed for the purpose of
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%joining conjunctive conditions with disjuctive conditions
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%joining conjunctive conditions with disjuctive conditions
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%to group the effects of failure modes.
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%to group the effects of failure modes.
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@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ Nearly all modern safety critical systems involve these three disiplines.
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%
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%
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It is intended to be used for analysis of automated safety critical systems.
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It is intended to be used for analysis of automated safety critical systems.
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Many types of safety critical systems now legally
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Many types of safety critical systems now legally
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require fault mode effects analysis\cite{FMEA},
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require fault mode effects analysis\cite{sccs}[pp 38-39],
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but few formal systems exist and wide-spread take-up is
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but few formal systems exist to assist in this, and wide-spread take-up is
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not yet the norm.\cite{takeup}.
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not yet the norm.\cite{sccs}[pp 304-305].
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%
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%
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Because of its visual nature, it is easy to manipulate and model
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Because of its visual nature, it is easy to manipulate and model
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complicated conditions that can lead to dangerous failures in
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complicated conditions that can lead to dangerous failures in
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@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ for the analysis of safety critical software and hardware systems.
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}
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}
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Propositional Logic Diagrams (PLDs) have been created
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Propositional Logic Diagrams (PLDs) have been created
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to collect and simplfy fault~modes in safety critical systems undergoing
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to collect and simplfy fault~modes in safety critical systems undergoing
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static analysis\cite{FMEA}\cite{SIL}.
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static analysis.%\cite{sccs}\cite{en61508}.
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%
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%
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This type of analysis treats failure modes within a system as logical
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This type of analysis treats failure modes within a system as logical
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states.
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states.
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@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ Definitions of concrete and abstract PLD's follow.
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Well-formedness conditions for PLD's are separated from this definition, because of
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Well-formedness conditions for PLD's are separated from this definition, because of
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practical differences between the way they are used to represent software as opposed to
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practical differences between the way they are used to represent software as opposed to
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representing electronics and mechanical systems.
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representing electronics and mechanical systems.
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The concrete definitions for PLD's and Spider Diagrams\cite{howse:sd} share many common features.
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\subsection{Concrete PLD Definition}
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\subsection{Concrete PLD Definition}
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@ -362,7 +364,7 @@ $fmg$ in the diagram, where an SMG is a non empty set of test points
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$$ \mathcal{G}:SMG \rightarrow P_{fmg} $$
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$$ \mathcal{G}:SMG \rightarrow P_{fmg} $$
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The logic equation representing an SMG $p_{fmg}$ can be determined thus.
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The logic equation (using $oplus$ to represent exclusive-or) representing an SMG $p_{fmg}$ can be determined thus.
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$$\mathcal{G}_{fmg}(fmg) = \bigoplus_{t \in fmg} (\; \mathcal{F}_{t} (t) \;) $$
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$$\mathcal{G}_{fmg}(fmg) = \bigoplus_{t \in fmg} (\; \mathcal{F}_{t} (t) \;) $$
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}
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}
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@ -621,7 +623,7 @@ by the FMMD software tool.
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Very often a failure mode can only occur
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Very often a failure mode can only occur
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given a separate environmental condition.
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given a separate environmental condition.
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In Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) this is represented by an inhibit gate.\cite{FTA}[pp41-42],\cite{NUK}
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In Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) this is represented by an inhibit gate.\cite{nasafta}[pp41-42],\cite{nucfta}
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\centering
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@ -641,17 +643,17 @@ The diagram \ref{fig:inhibit} has a test case in the contour $C$.
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Contour $C$ is \textbf{enclosed} by contour $A$. This says
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Contour $C$ is \textbf{enclosed} by contour $A$. This says
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that for failure~mode $C$ to occur failure mode $A$
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that for failure~mode $C$ to occur failure mode $A$
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must have occurred.
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must have occurred.
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A well known example of this is the space shuttle `O' ring failure that
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A famous example of this is the space shuttle `O' ring failure that
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caused the 1986 Challenger disaster\cite{wdycwopt}.
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caused the 1986 Challenger disaster\cite{wdycwopt}.
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For the failure mode to occur, the ambient temperature had to
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For the failure mode to occur, the ambient temperature had to
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be below a critical value.
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be below a critical value.
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If we take the failure mode of the `O' ring to be $C$
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If we take the failure mode of the `O' ring to be $C$
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and the temperature below critical to be $A$, we can see that
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and the temperature below critical to be $A$, we can see that
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the low temperature failure~mode $C$ can only occur if $A$ is true.
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the low temperature failure~mode $C$ can only occur if $A$ is true.
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The `O' ring could fail in a different way independant of the critical temperature and this is
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The `O' ring could fail in a different way independent of the critical temperature and this is
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represented, for the sake of this example, by contour $D$.
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represented, for the sake of this example, by contour $D$.
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In terms of propositional logic, the inhibit gate of FTA, and the contour enclosure
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In terms of propositional logic, the inhibit gate of FTAi\cite{nasafta}[pp 41-42], and the contour enclosure
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of PLD represent {\em implication}.
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of PLD represent {\em implication}.
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\\
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\\
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% \tiny
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% \tiny
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@ -777,7 +779,7 @@ it will not lead to a dangerous failure~mode of the subsystem.
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% F & F & T \\ \hline
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% F & F & T \\ \hline
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% F & T & T \\ \hline
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% F & T & T \\ \hline
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% T & F & F \\ \hline
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% T & F & F \\ \hline
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% T & T & T \\ \hline \hline
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% T & T & T \\ \hline \hline:
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% \end{tabular}
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% \end{tabular}
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% %\vspace{0.3cm}
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% %\vspace{0.3cm}
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% \normalsize
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% \normalsize
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@ -908,6 +910,14 @@ The test case AFE represents the condition where all four engines have failed.
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%\begin{verbatim}
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%\begin{verbatim}
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%CVS Revision Identity $Id: logic_diagram.tex,v 1.17 2010/01/06 13:41:32 robin Exp $
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%CVS Revision Identity $Id: logic_diagram.tex,v 1.17 2010/01/06 13:41:32 robin Exp $
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%\end{verbatim}
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%\end{verbatim}
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%\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
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%{
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% \bibliographystyle{plain}
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% \bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
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%
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%}
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%{
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%}
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Compiled last \today
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Compiled last \today
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%\end{document}
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%\end{document}
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