lunchtime edit (geddit!)
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@ -5,6 +5,16 @@
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\author{Robin Clark -- Energy Technology Control Ltd}
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\institute{Brighton University}
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\setbeamertemplate{footline}[page number]
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\newcommand{\fg}{\em functional~group}
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\newcommand{\fgs}{\em functional~groups}
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\newcommand{\dc}{\em derived~component}
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\newcommand{\dcs}{\em derived~components}
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\newcommand{\bc}{\em base~component}
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\newcommand{\bcs}{\em base~components}
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\newcommand{\irl}{in~real~life}
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\begin{document}
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\section{F.M.E.A.}
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@ -79,8 +89,8 @@ For the sake of example let us choose resistor R1 in the OP-AMP gain circuitry.
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\frametitle{FMEA Example: Milli-volt reader}
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\begin{itemize}
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\pause \item \textbf{F - Failures of given component} The resistor could fail by going OPEN or SHORT (EN298 definition).
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\pause \item \textbf{M - Failure Mode} Consider the component failure mode OPEN
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\pause \item \textbf{E - Effects} This will disconnect the feedback loop in the amplifier, driving the minus input HIGH causing a LOW READING
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\pause \item \textbf{M - Failure Mode} Consider the component failure mode SHORT
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\pause \item \textbf{E - Effects} This will drive the minus input HIGH causing a LOW OUTPUT/READING
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\pause \item \textbf{A - Analysis} The reading will be out of normal range, and we will have an erroneous milli-volt reading
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}
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@ -128,7 +138,7 @@ $cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component.
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\begin{frame}
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\frametitle{Rigorous Single Failure FMEA}
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This would mean an order of $N^2$ number of checks to perform
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to perform `rigorous~FMEA'. Even small systems have typically
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to undertake a `rigorous~FMEA'. Even small systems have typically
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100 components, and they typically have 3 or more failure modes each.
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$100*99*3=29,700$.
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\end{frame}
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@ -352,7 +362,7 @@ and allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking etc.
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It provides guidelines for the design and architecture
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of computer/software systems for the four levels of
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safety Integrity.
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For Hardware
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%For Hardware
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FMEDA does force the user to consider all components in a system
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by requiring that a MTTF value is assigned for each failure~mode.
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@ -544,11 +554,11 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
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The FMMD methodology breaks the analysis down into small stages,
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by making the analyst choose functional groups of components, to which FMEA is applied.
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When analysed, a set of symptoms of failure for the functional group is used create a derived~component.
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The derived components failure modes, are the symptoms of the functional group
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by making the analyst choose {\fgs} of components, to which FMEA is applied.
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When analysed, a set of symptoms of failure for the {\fg} is used create a derived~component.
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The derived components failure modes, are the symptoms of the {\fg}
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from which it was derived.
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We can use derived components to form `higher~level' functional groups.
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We can use derived components to form `higher~level' {\fgs}.
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This creates an analysis hierarchy.
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\end{frame}
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@ -557,17 +567,17 @@ This creates an analysis hierarchy.
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\begin{frame}
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\frametitle{FMMD - Example}
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We can take groups of components that perform a well defined task, and analyse their failure mode behaviour.
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We can call these 'functional groups'.
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We can call these `{\fgs}'.
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If we analyse the failure mode behaviour of a functional group we can determine how it will fail, or its symptoms of failure.
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We can represent this by a 'derived component', where its failure modes are the symptoms of the functional group it was derived from.
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If we analyse the failure mode behaviour of a {\fg} we can determine how it will fail, or its symptoms of failure.
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We can represent this by a '{\dc}', where its failure modes are the symptoms of the {\fg} it was derived from.
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}
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\frametitle{FMMD - Example}
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We can begin to analyse this by looking for functional groups.
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The resistors would together to perform a fairly common function in electronics, that of the potential divider.
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We can now take the failure modes for the resistors (OPEN and SHORT EN298) and see what effect each of these failures will have on the functional group
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We can now take the failure modes for the resistors (OPEN and SHORT EN298) and see what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg}
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\end{frame}
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
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\newcommand{\dcs}{\em derived~components}
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\newcommand{\bc}{\em base~component}
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\newcommand{\bcs}{\em base~components}
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\newcommand{\irl}{in real life}
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\newcommand{\irl}{in~real~life}
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\newcommand{\enc}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{enc}{\longrightarrow}}}
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\newcommand{\pin}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{pi}{\longleftrightarrow}}}
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%\newcommand{\pic}{\em pure~intersection~chain}
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