diff --git a/presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex b/presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex
index 9a82ffc..338f6fc 100644
--- a/presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex
+++ b/presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex
@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@
 \author{Robin Clark -- Energy Technology Control Ltd}
 \institute{Brighton University}
 \setbeamertemplate{footline}[page number]
+
+
+\newcommand{\fg}{\em functional~group}
+\newcommand{\fgs}{\em functional~groups}
+\newcommand{\dc}{\em derived~component}
+\newcommand{\dcs}{\em derived~components}
+\newcommand{\bc}{\em base~component}
+\newcommand{\bcs}{\em base~components}
+\newcommand{\irl}{in~real~life}
+
 \begin{document}
 
 \section{F.M.E.A.}
@@ -79,8 +89,8 @@ For the sake of example let us choose resistor R1 in the  OP-AMP gain circuitry.
  \frametitle{FMEA Example: Milli-volt reader}
 \begin{itemize}
   \pause \item \textbf{F - Failures of given component} The resistor could fail by going OPEN or SHORT (EN298 definition).
-   \pause \item \textbf{M - Failure Mode} Consider the component failure mode OPEN
-   \pause \item \textbf{E - Effects} This will disconnect the feedback loop in the amplifier, driving the minus input HIGH causing a LOW READING
+   \pause \item \textbf{M - Failure Mode} Consider the component failure mode SHORT
+   \pause \item \textbf{E - Effects} This will drive the minus input HIGH causing a LOW OUTPUT/READING
   \pause \item \textbf{A - Analysis} The reading will be out of normal range, and we will have an erroneous milli-volt reading
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}
@@ -128,7 +138,7 @@ $cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component.
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{Rigorous Single Failure FMEA}
 This would mean an order of $N^2$ number of checks to perform
-to perform `rigorous~FMEA'. Even small systems have typically
+to undertake a `rigorous~FMEA'. Even small systems have typically
 100 components, and they typically have 3 or more failure modes each.
 $100*99*3=29,700$.
 \end{frame}
@@ -352,7 +362,7 @@ and allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking etc.
 It provides guidelines for the design and architecture
 of computer/software systems for the four levels of 
 safety Integrity.
-For Hardware 
+%For Hardware 
 
 FMEDA does force the user to consider all components in a system
 by requiring that a MTTF value is assigned for each failure~mode.
@@ -544,11 +554,11 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
 
 
 The FMMD methodology breaks the analysis down into small stages,
-by making the analyst choose functional groups of components, to which FMEA is applied.
-When analysed, a set of symptoms of failure for the functional group is used create a derived~component.
-The derived components failure modes, are the symptoms of the functional group
+by making the analyst choose {\fgs} of components, to which FMEA is applied.
+When analysed, a set of symptoms of failure for the {\fg} is used create a derived~component.
+The derived components failure modes, are the symptoms of the {\fg}
 from which it was derived.
-We can use derived components to form `higher~level' functional groups.
+We can use derived components to form `higher~level' {\fgs}.
 This creates an analysis hierarchy.
 \end{frame}
 
@@ -557,17 +567,17 @@ This creates an analysis hierarchy.
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Example}
 We can take groups of components that perform a well defined task, and analyse their failure mode behaviour.
-We can call these 'functional groups'.
+We can call these `{\fgs}'.
 
-If we analyse the failure mode behaviour of a functional group we can determine how it will fail, or its symptoms of failure.
-We can represent this by a 'derived component', where its failure modes are the symptoms of the functional group it was derived from.
+If we analyse the failure mode behaviour of a {\fg} we can determine how it will fail, or its symptoms of failure.
+We can represent this by a '{\dc}', where its failure modes are the symptoms of the {\fg} it was derived from.
 \end{frame}
 
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Example}
 We can begin to analyse this by looking for functional groups.
 The resistors would together to perform a fairly common function in electronics, that of the potential divider.
-We can now take the failure modes for the resistors (OPEN and SHORT EN298) and see what effect each of these failures will have on the functional group
+We can now take the failure modes for the resistors (OPEN and SHORT EN298) and see what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg}
 \end{frame}
 
 
diff --git a/style.tex b/style.tex
index 319661a..75affc6 100644
--- a/style.tex
+++ b/style.tex
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 \newcommand{\dcs}{\em derived~components}
 \newcommand{\bc}{\em base~component}
 \newcommand{\bcs}{\em base~components}
-\newcommand{\irl}{in real life}
+\newcommand{\irl}{in~real~life}
 \newcommand{\enc}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{enc}{\longrightarrow}}}
 \newcommand{\pin}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{pi}{\longleftrightarrow}}}
 %\newcommand{\pic}{\em pure~intersection~chain}