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mybib.bib
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mybib.bib
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@TechReport{steamboilers,
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author = {Nancy Leveson},
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title = {High-Pressure steam Engines and Computer Software},
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institution = {University of Washington},
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year = {1994},
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}
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@Book{aoe,
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title = {The Art of Electronics},
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publisher = {Cambridge},
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@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
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\abstract{
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The ability to assess the safety of man made equipment has been a concern
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since the dawn of the industrial age~\cite{indacc01}~\cite{steamboilers}.
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The philosophy behind safety measure has progressed
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with time, and by world war two~\cite{boffin} we begin to see concepts such as `no single component failure should cause
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a dangerous system failure' emerging.
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The concept of a double failure causing a dangerous condition being unacceptable,
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can be found in the legally binding European standard EN298~\cite{en298}.
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More sophisticated statistically based standards, i.e EN61508~\cite{en61508} and variants thereof,
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governing failure conditions and determining risk levels associated with systems.
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All of these risk assessment techniques are based on variations on the theme of
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Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), which has its roots in the 1940's mass production industry
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and was designed to save large companies money by fixing the most financially
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draining problems in a product first.
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This thesis show that the refinements and additions made to
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FMEA to tailor them for military or statistical commercial use, have common flaws
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which make them unsuitable for the higher safety requirements of the 21st century.
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Problems with state explosion in failure mode reasoning and the impossibility
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of integrating software and hardware failure mode models are the most obvious of these. %flaws.
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The methodologies are explained in chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} and the advantages and drawbacks
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of each FMEA variant are examined in chapter~\ref{sec:chap3}.
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In chapter~\ref{sec:chap4}, a new methodology is then proposed which addresses the state explosion problem
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and, using contract programmed software, allows the modelling of integrated
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software/electrical systems.
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This is followed by two chapters showing examples of the new modular FMEA analysis technique (Failure Mode Modular De-Composition FMMD)
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firstly looking at electronic circuits and then at electronic/software hybrid systems.
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}
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\section{Introduction}
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Msc project Euler/Spider Diagram editor --- Euler/Spider Diagrams
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