206 lines
8.0 KiB
TeX
206 lines
8.0 KiB
TeX
%\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
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%\usepackage{graphicx}
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%
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%%opening
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%\title{Electronic Component Failure Analysis}
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%\author{R.P. Clark ~ Energy Technology Control}
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%
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%\bibliographystyle{unsrt}
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%
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%\begin{document}
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%
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%\maketitle
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%
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\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
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{
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\begin{abstract}
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This chapter describes the analysis of electrical components in terms of their operational and failure modes.
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When analysed a component can be represented by a set of `fault modes'.
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The fault modes can be considered as logical states for the component.
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These can be represented as
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logical states (respresented as contours) in a `propositional logic diagram'.
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Components can then be combined by bringing the contours from
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several components onto the same diagram.
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Logical analysis of how the failure modes of the components interact
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in a sub-system or module, can now be undertaken.
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\end{abstract}
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}
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{}
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%
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\section{Introduction}
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Every component in a electrical circuit may fail in several ways.
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The most obvious ways for them to fail are that legs of the
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circuit become disconnected or are shorted.
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Components may fail internally. Some may have failure modes due to environmental factors.
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% SPACE SOLDER EVAPORATING
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% TEMPERATURE EFFECTS SUCH AS INACCURACY, LEAKAGE OF CURRENT ETC
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Each component thus has a set of possible failure modes.
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Looking at this independently of cause, we can in the worst case
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consider that any of these errors could occur at any time.
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In analysing a circuit we should take into consideration
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all possible failure modes, and where appropriate, how
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these failure modes will affect other components in the circuit.
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Safety analysis of components forming critical circuitry,
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is currently performed using scenario based test cases\cite{en298}, % \cite{gastec}, \cite{tuv}.
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These involve experts checking a circuit for failure modes on a circuit and how these will
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affect the system, based on their expertise.
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Because this is a human process,
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this means that unlikely or very rare test cases may not be considered, but also
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that some test cases may be missed.
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By taking all possible failure modes and laying these out in a logic diagram,
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a computer can check that an analysis entry has been made for all
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failure mode combinations deemed possible in the diagram.
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This paper is concerned with the analysis phase that takes a component
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and from it produces a set of failure modes. PLD diagram configurations
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will be dealt with in the chapter \ref{pldconfig}.
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\section{A resistor}
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A resistor is a simple component, and according to MIL1991 has two failure modes OPEN and SHORT.
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Let us consider what can happen to a resistor soldered onto a PCB.
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It could become de-soldered at one pin or the other. The effect would be the same. The resistor would appear to
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be OPEN circuit.This again would create an OPEN circuit.
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It could become shorted by some foreign material, or in the production soldering process.
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This again would have the same effect. It would appear to be a SHORT circuit.
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It could be overstressed and burnt out, (by the application of an out of spec current for instance).
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Resistors typically drift slightly in value with temperature. For some applications this may not be important.
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The manufacturers data-sheet will describe the temperature drift co-effecients and operating ranges.
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\paragraph{discusion on $P\_CHANGE$ as a resistor failure mode.}
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HERE reference EN298 and RAC.
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Talk about the differences, why en298 only looks for OPEN in most cases
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and OPEN AND SHORT in one but not $P\_CHANGE$ .
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RAC gives $P\_CHANGE$ for single resistors but not for resistor networks.
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It is interesting to determine why this is.
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A network of resistors would be less prone to batch
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problems where a parameter drift would all be in the sam direction (with age perhaps)
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.
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But also a network of resistors means a load sharing where resistors will be
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under less electrical stress.
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This is because components in EN298 must be 60\% under any environemntal electrical or mechanical
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stress safe rating as given by a manufacturer.
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Thus a resistor rated for 50V would not be allowed in a ciruit with a 100V rail,
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even though in normal operation, the resistor would never have more than say 30V applied to it.
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For most safety critical applications components are downrated, and for resistors this means $P\_CHANGE$
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does not have to be cosidered.
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We can represent our resistor then to be in four operational states, $R_s = \{ OK, OPEN, SHORT, P\_CHANGE \}$.
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Because we are interested in failure analysis we assume that every component has an OK state
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but this is not of interest. When every component on a board is in the $OK$ state
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the sub-system will function correctly.
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We are interested in failures and how that affects the sub-system, so we
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can ignore the $OK$ state and represent our resistor thus for the purpose of fault analysis.
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$$R_s = \{ OPEN, SHORT, P\_CHANGE \}$$
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This can be represented in a PLD thus
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IMAGE HERE
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For a resistor in a safety critical regime demanding rigorous downrating, we can model our
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rsistor with
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IMAGE HERE
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$$R_s = \{ OPEN, SHORT \}$$
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\section{ PNP Transistor }
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Each leg open : each leg shorted all combinations.
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Dud no HFE.
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TEMPERATURE, operating range
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{ \huge Look in MIL 1991}
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Resultant failure modes ==
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\section { IR Photo-diode}
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each leg open, each leg shorted combination.
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NO effect or always on.
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Resultant failure modes ==
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% \section{On / Off Switch}
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% A simple on / off switch can fail in two ways again, OPEN or SHORT.
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%
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% \begin{figure}
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[scale=0.4]{components_as_plds/ir_det.eps}
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% % ir_det.eps: 0x0 pixel, 300dpi, 0.00x0.00 cm, bb=0 0 582 304
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% \caption{IR detector circuit}
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% \label{fig:irdet}
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% \end{figure}
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%
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%
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% \section { Sample circuit : An Infra Red Detector }
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%
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% This circuit for discussion is for a infra-red detector (see figure \ref{fig:ir_det}).
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% It simply draws current through the PNP resistor when infra-red light falls onto the detector.
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% When IR light is detected at the detector, TR1 (IR photo transistor) turns on, lowering the voltage at the base of TR2.
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% This turns on TR2 which raise the voltage at the collector of TR2.
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% A high voltage at the collector of TR2 thus indicates the presence of IR light on the detector.
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% This could be connected to a visible LED or a micro-processor.
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% For the purpose of discussion we are only interested in the detection part of this circuit.
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% By analysing the failure modes for all its components
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% we can can combine the failure modes for all the parts,
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% and analyse how these failures affect the detector.
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% We can also look at how the diagrams can help in the analysis
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% phase.
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%
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% \subsection { IR detector in use }
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%
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% In use the IR photo transistor would be mounted on a probe, used to detect IR.
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% The user would switch the detector on, check that the ON LED was lit,
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% and then use the probe. On detection of IR at the probe the IR detect LED will light.
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% This is a real circuit and has been used for debugging
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% and validating IR position detection circuitry.
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%
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% %\bibliography{vmgbibliography,mybib}
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% %Typeset in \ \ {\huge \LaTeX} \ \ on \ \ \today
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% %\section{}
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% %\end{document}
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%
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% \subsection{ Components and Fault Modes }
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%
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% Below is a list of the failure modes that can occur in the
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% circuit above. A detailed discussion on determing the possible fault modes
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% for components are given in chapter \ref{chapfaultdet}.
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% Failure modes here have been determeined from the MIL 1991\ref{MIL1991} handbook.
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%
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% \begin{itemize}
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% \item TR1 = \{ OPEN\_CE, SHORT\_CE \}
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% \item TR2 = \{ OPEN\_CE, SHORT\_CE, SHORT\_BE SHORT\_BC\}
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% \item R1 = \{ OPEN\_R, SHORT\_R \}
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% \item R2 = \{ OPEN\_R, SHORT\_R \}
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% \item D1 = \{ OPEN\_D, SHORT\_D \}
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% \item D2 = \{ OPEN\_D, SHORT\_D \}
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% \item B1 = \{ OPEN\_B, FLAT\_B \}
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% \item SW1 = \{ ALWAYSOPEN\_SW1, ALWAYSCLOSED\_SW1 \}
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% \end{itemize}
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%
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% With this information we can now begin to analyse the circuit.
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% Firstly we can look at the overall effect of any one component
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% on the rest of the circuit. After that we can look at combinations
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% of component failure modes.
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%
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% \subsection{FMEA : Failure Mode Effcets Analysis}
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%
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