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20
.gitignore vendored
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#
#
#
# git ignore for latex
#
*.aux
*.log
*.dvi
*.pdf
*.lof
*.lot
*.toc
*.*~
*.bbl
*.blg
*_paper.tex
*.txt

8
README.md Normal file
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# ARCHIVE OF PhD files
See master branch which is essentially the whole git `thesis`
repository as stoed on 'NovaProspect'
# 30APR2025 RPC

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Your rpc2 user account
Details about your rpc2 user account are shown below.
If you don't want to make any changes, just close this tab in your browser.
Some data used for your computer account is supplied by Registry's Student Database, so changes to that system will affect your user account.
Your student number is 96002640.
Your UniCard number is 00121240 (issue number 01).
Your email address
main email address R.P.Clark@brighton.ac.uk
other email address rpc2@brighton.ac.uk - this is the address you should use to sign into UniMail
email forwarding This account has an Exchange mailbox, which should not combined with email forwarding.

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Write up detailed failure modes essay for R and OPAMP with ref to EN298, FMD-91, EN61508.
Get thesis template, have emailed Aidian on this.
Start writing up approvals backgrounds to static FMEA.

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rm -rf thesis_back_up*
d=`date | sed 's/:/_/g' | sed 's/ /_/g' `
echo $d
t=thesis_back_up.$d.tar
echo $t
tar cvfp $t *
gzip $t
ls -l thesis_back_up*

Binary file not shown.

Before

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Thesis Structure Meeting -- Failure Mode Modular De-Composition
The meeting decided that the thesis should comprise of
seven chapeters with the following subject areas.
1. Introduction - overview of the subject area
2. FMEA - general description, variants and context
3. Weaknesess of FMEA
4. FMMD - proposed solution, modularisation of FMEA
* Hierarchical modelling - functional groups --> derived components etc
* Symptom extraction process
* Unitary State failure modes -- only one failure mode may be active at
a given time in a component -- definition.
5. Examples for various levels of problems,
* using examples set by C Garrett,
* the PT100 temperature sensing circuit (double failures analysed)
* A larger complete electronics example (possible an anbalog PID controller)
6. Evaluation of FMMD
* Unitary State failure modes.
* Complexity Comparison
* Problems in modelling for FMMD.
7. Conclusion and further work.
* Software modelled in terms of failure modes - follow contract programming paradigm
* Hardware modelled in terms of failure modes (perhaps look at a servo motor, linkage, gearbox motor etc).
A goal has been set to submit these chapters, writing the introduction last,
by October 2012.

615
mybib.bib
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% my bib file.
@ARTICLE{fmd91,
AUTHOR = "Reliability Analysis Center",
TITLE = "Failure Mode/Mechanisms Distributions 1991",
JOURNAL = "United States Department of Commerce",
YEAR = "1991"
}
% $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.3 2009/11/28 20:05:52 robin Exp $
@article{Clark200519,
title = "Failure Mode Modular De-Composition Using Spider Diagrams",
journal = "Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science",
volume = "134",
number = "",
pages = "19 - 31",
year = "2005",
note = "Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Euler Diagrams (Euler 2004)",
issn = "1571-0661",
doi = "DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2005.02.018",
url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B75H1-4G6XT71-3/2/0e3a47df2ec15bfba9f85feae81786e3",
author = "R.P. Clark",
keywords = "Failsafe",
keywords = "EN298",
keywords = "gas-safety",
keywords = "burner",
keywords = "control",
keywords = "fault",
keywords = "double-fault",
keywords = "single-fault",
keywords = "fault-tolerance"
}
@ARTICLE{bubba,
AUTHOR = "Ron Mancini",
TITLE = "Design of OP-Amp sine wave oscillators",
JOURNAL = "Analog Applications Journal: Texas Instruments: August",
YEAR = "2000"
}
@ARTICLE{ftahistory,
AUTHOR = "Clifton Ericsson",
TITLE = "Fault Tree Analysis a History",
JOURNAL = "Proceedings of the 17th international safety conference",
YEAR = "1999"
}
@ARTICLE{fafmea,
AUTHOR = "Zigmund Bluvband, Pavel Grabov",
TITLE = "Failure Analysis of FMEA",
JOURNAL = "IEEE 1-4244-2509-9/09/",
YEAR = "2009"
}
@ARTICLE{fmeda,
AUTHOR = "John C. Grebe Dr. William M. Goble",
TITLE = "FMEDA Accurate Product Failure Metrics",
JOURNAL = "EXIDA publication. www.exida.com/articles/FMEDA\%20Development.pdf",
YEAR = "2007"
}
@ARTICLE{canspec,
AUTHOR = "Bosch.",
TITLE = "CAN Specification 2.0",
JOURNAL = "Bosch Technical Standard",
YEAR = "1991"
}
@ARTICLE{caninauto,
AUTHOR = "H. Zeltwanger",
TITLE = "Single Processor implementation of the CANopen Safety Protocol",
JOURNAL = "CAN in Automation (CiA)",
YEAR = "2008"
}
@ARTICLE{valueoflife,
AUTHOR = "W.K. Viscusi",
TITLE = "The value of life: Estimates with risks by occupation and industry",
JOURNAL = "Harvard John M. Olin Canter for Law ISSN 1045-6333",
YEAR = "2003"
}
@ARTICLE{crcembedd,
AUTHOR = "Philip Koopman, Tridib Chakravarty",
TITLE = "Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) Polynomial Selection for Embedded Networks",
JOURNAL = "The International Conference on dependable systems and networks DSN-2004",
YEAR = "2004"
}
@ARTICLE{nucfta,
AUTHOR = "US Nuclear reg commission",
TITLE = "Fault Tree Handbook",
JOURNAL = "Nuclear Safety Analysis Handbook",
YEAR = "1981"
}
@ARTICLE{nasafta,
AUTHOR = "NASA",
TITLE = "Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications",
JOURNAL = "NASA Handbook",
YEAR = "2002"
}
@BOOK{embupsys,
TITLE = "Embedded Microprocessor Systems 3rd Edition ISBN 0-7506-75434-9",
AUTHOR = "Stuart R Ball",
PUBLISHER = "Newnes",
YEAR = "2002"
}
@BOOK{alggraph,
AUTHOR = "Alan Gibbons",
TITLE = "Algorithmic Graph Theory ISBN:978-0521288811 ",
PUBLISHER = "Cambridge University PressCambridge University Press",
YEAR = "1985"
}
@BOOK{git,
AUTHOR = "Jon Loeliger",
TITLE = "Version Control with Git ISBN:978-0-596-52012-0",
PUBLISHER = "O'Reilly Media",
YEAR = "2009"
}
@BOOK{ince,
AUTHOR = "D. C. Ince",
TITLE = "In Introduction to discrete Mathematics, Formal System specification and Z",
PUBLISHER = "Oxford University Press",
YEAR = "1992"
}
@BOOK{safeware,
AUTHOR = "Nancy Leveson",
TITLE = "Safeware: System safety and Computers ISBN: 0-201-11972-2",
PUBLISHER = "Addison-Wesley",
YEAR = "2005"
}
@BOOK{scse,
AUTHOR = "Fortescue, Swinerd, Stark",
TITLE = "Spacecraft Systems Engineering ISBN:978-0-470-75012-4",
PUBLISHER = "Wiley",
YEAR = "2011"
}
@BOOK{bfmea,
AUTHOR = "Robin E McDermot et all",
TITLE = "The Basics of FMEA ISBN: 0-527-76320-9",
PUBLISHER = "Productivity",
YEAR = "1996"
}
@BOOK{mil1991,
AUTHOR = "United~States~DOD",
TITLE = "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment",
PUBLISHER = "DOD",
YEAR = "1991"
}
@BOOK{faa,
AUTHOR = "Federal Aviation Administration",
TITLE = "System Safety Handbook",
PUBLISHER = "http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk\_management/ss\_handbook/",
YEAR = "2008"
}
@BOOK{sccs,
AUTHOR = "Neil~Storey",
TITLE = "Safety-Critical Computer Systems ISBN 0-201-42787-7",
PUBLISHER = "Prentice Hall",
YEAR = "1996"
}
@PHDTHESIS{maikowski,
AUTHOR = "Leo M Maikowski",
TITLE = "Tolreranced Multiple Fault Diagnosis of Analog Circuits",
SCHOOL = " Brighton University, School of Electrical Engineering",
YEAR = "1995"
}
@BOOK{sem,
AUTHOR = "J.~Woodcock,~Martin~Loomes",
TITLE = "Software Engineering Mathematics ISBN 0-273-02673-9",
PUBLISHER = "Pitman",
YEAR = "1988"
}
@BOOK{allfour,
AUTHOR = "Betty Tootell",
TITLE = "All Four Engines Have Failed ISBN 0-233-97758-9",
PUBLISHER = "Andre deutsch",
YEAR = "1985"
}
@BOOK{f77,
AUTHOR = "A.~Balfour D.H.~Marwick",
TITLE = "Programming in Standard Fortran 77 ISBN 0-435-77486-7",
PUBLISHER = "Heinemann Educational Books",
YEAR = "1979"
}
@BOOK{ctw,
AUTHOR = "Gregory~J.E.~Rawlins",
TITLE = "Compared to What ? An introduction to the analysis of algorithms ISBN 0-7167-8243-x",
PUBLISHER = "Computer Science Press",
YEAR = "1991"
}
@BOOK{alg,
AUTHOR = "Alan~Gibbons",
TITLE = "Algorithmic Graph Theory ISBN 0-521-28881-9",
PUBLISHER = "Cambridge University Press",
YEAR = "1985"
}
@BOOK{found,
AUTHOR = "Ian~Stewart, David~Tall",
TITLE = "The Foundations of Mathematics : ISBN 0-19-853165-6",
PUBLISHER = "Oxford University Press",
YEAR = "1977"
}
@BOOK{shin,
AUTHOR = "Sun-Joo~Shin",
TITLE = "The Iconic Logic of Peirces Graphs",
PUBLISHER = "Bradford",
YEAR = "2002"
}
@BOOK{probstat,
AUTHOR = " M~R~Spiegel",
TITLE = "Probability and Statistics Second edition : SHCAUM'S : ISBN 0-07-135004-7",
PUBLISHER = "Oxford University Press",
YEAR = "1988"
}
@BOOK{idmfssz,
AUTHOR = " D~C~Ince",
TITLE = " An Introduction to Discrete Mathematics, Formal System Specification and Z : Oxford : ISBN 0-19-853836-7",
PUBLISHER = "Oxford University Press",
YEAR = "1988"
}
@BOOK{wdycwopt,
AUTHOR = " Richard~P~Feynman",
TITLE = " What do you care what other people think: Harper Collins : ISBN 0-586-21855-6",
PUBLISHER = " harpercollins",
YEAR = "1988"
}
@BOOK{joyofsets,
AUTHOR = " Keith~devlin",
TITLE = " The Joy of Sets: 2nd edition: ISBN 978-0-387-94094-6",
PUBLISHER = " Springer",
YEAR = "1993"
}
@MISC{microchip,
author = "Microchip",
title = "Microchip technology Inc. Home Page",
howpublished = "Available from http://www.microchip.com/",
year = "2009"
}
@MISC{gnuplot,
author = "Various Open~source~Project",
title = "",
howpublished = "Available from http://www.gnuplot.info/",
year = "2005"
}
@MISC{eulerviz,
author = "Peter~Rodgers, John~Howse, Andrew~Fish",
title = "Visualization of Euler Diagrams",
howpublished = "http://www.cmis.bton.ac.uk/research/vmg/papers/EulerViz.pdf",
year = "2005"
}
@MISC{eulerprop,
author = "Peter~Rodgers, John~Howse, Gem~Stapleton",
title = "Properties of Euler Diagrams",
howpublished = "http://www.cmis.bton.ac.uk/research/vmg/papers/",
year = "2007"
}
@MISC{en161,
author = "E N Standard",
title = "EN161:2007 Automatic shutoff valves for gas burners and gas appliances",
howpublished = "British standards Institution http://www.bsigroup.com/",
year = "2003"
}
@MISC{en298,
author = "E N Standard",
title = "EN298:2003 Gas Burner Controllers with forced draft",
howpublished = "British standards Institution http://www.bsigroup.com/",
year = "2003"
}
@MISC{en60730,
author = "E N Standard",
title = "EN60730: Automatic Electrical controls for household and similar use",
howpublished = "British standards Institution http://www.bsigroup.com/",
year = "1994"
}
@MISC{challenger,
author = "U.S. Presidential Commission",
title = "Report of the SpaceShuttle Challanger Accident",
howpublished = "Available from http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/table-of-contents.html",
year = "1986"
}
@MISC{en61508,
author = "E N Standard",
title = "EN61508:2002 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems",
howpublished = "British standards Institution http://www.bsigroup.com/",
year = "2002"
}
@MISC{javaarea,
author = "Sun~Micro~Systems",
title = "Java Area Operations",
howpublished = "Available from http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.3/docs/api/java/awt/geom/Area.html",
year = "2000"
}
@Manual{tlp181,
title = {TLP 181 Datasheet},
key = {TOSHIBA Photocoupler GaAs Ired and PhotoTransistor},
author = {Toshiba inc.},
OPTorganization = {},
address = {http://www.toshiba.com/taec/components2/Datasheet\_Sync//206/4191.pdf},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
year = {2009},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Manual{pic18f2523,
title = {PIC18F2523 Datasheet},
OPTkey = {},
author = {Microchip inc},
OPTorganization = {},
address = {http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/39755c.pdf},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
year = {2009},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Book{wt,
title = {Water Treatment Essentials for Boiler Plant Operation},
publisher = {Mc Graw Hill ISBN 0-07-048291-5},
year = {1997},
author = {Robert G Nunn},
ALTALTeditor = {},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {ISBN 0-07-048291-5},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstracts = {},
}
@TechReport{spiraxsarco,
author = {Spirax Sarco},
title = {http://www.spiraxsarco.com/resources/steam-engineering-tutorials.asp},
institution = {Spirax Sarco},
year = {2010},
OPTkey = {},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Book{aoe,
title = {The Art of Electronics},
publisher = {Cambridge},
year = {1989},
author = {Paul Horowitz, Winfield Hill},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {2nd},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {ISBN 0-521-37095-7},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstracts = {},
}
@TechReport{eurothermtables,
author = {Eurotherm Ltd.},
title = {Thermocouple Emf TABLES and PLATINUM 100 RESISTANCE THERMOMETER TABLES},
institution = {Eurotherm, UK},
year = {1973},
OPTkey = {},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {June},
OPTnote = {Bulletin TT-1},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Book{ldd,
author = {Jonathon Corbet},
ALTeditor = {Alessandro Rubini},
ALTeditor = {Greg Kroah-Hartman},
title = {Linux Device Drivers},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN 0-596-00590-3},
year = {1998},
OPTkey = {ISBN 0-596-00590-3},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {3rd},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{bash,
author = {Carl Albing},
title = {Bash Cookbook},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN 0-596-52678-4},
year = {2007},
OPTkey = {ISBN 0-596-52678-4},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {unix/linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{sedawk,
author = {Dale Dougherty, Arnold Robbins},
title = {Sed and Awk},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN 1-56592-225-5},
year = {1997},
OPTkey = {ISBN 1-56592-225-5},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {unix/linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{bels,
author = {Karim Yaghmour},
title = {Building Embedded LINUX systems},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN ISBN 0-596-00222-X},
year = {2003},
OPTkey = {ISBN 0-596-00222-X},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {3rd},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{can,
author = {Olaf Pfeiffer},
ALTeditor = {Andrew Ayre},
ALTeditor = {Christian Keydel},
title = {Embedded networking with CAN and CANopen},
publisher = {RTC ISBN 0-929392-78-7},
year = {2003},
OPTkey = { },
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {Embedded Systems},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {1st},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.rtcbooks.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Article{article,
author = {dd},
title = {dd},
journal = {dd},
year = {2008},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTpages = {1,2},
OPTmonth = {JAN},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{sqlite,
author = {Micheal Owens},
title = {The definitive guide to SQLite},
publisher = {Apres ISBN 1-59059-673-0},
year = {2006},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {Databases/SQLite},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};

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@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
PNG =
pdf:
pdflatex thesis
acroread thesis.pdf &
bib:
bibtex thesis
makeindex thesis.glo -s thesis.ist -t thesis.glg -o thesis.gls
puzzle:
pdflatex puzzle.tex
pdflatex puzzle.tex
acroread puzzle.pdf

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@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
#
#
#
# git ignore for latex
#
*.aux
*.log
*.dvi
*.pdf
*.lof
*.lot
*.toc
*.*~

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@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
#
# Make the propositional logic diagram a paper
#
paper: paper.tex burner_paper.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
okular paper.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
burner_paper.tex: burner.tex
cat burner.tex | sed 's/burner\///' > burner_paper.tex

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@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
%
% Make the revision and doc number macro's then they are defined in one place
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\begin{abstract}
things can get very abstract
\end{abstract}
}
{
\section{Overview}
}
\section{Overview of A Burner Controller : Safety Perspective}
\section{Background to the Industrial Burner Safety Analysis Problem}
An industrial burner is a good example of a safety critical system.
It has the potential for devistating explosions due to boiler overpressure, low water, or
ignition of an explosive mixture, and, because of the large amounts of fuel used,
is also a fire hazard. Industrial boilers are often left running unattended
for long periods of time (typically days).
To add to these problems
Operators are often under pressure to keep them running. A boiler supplying
heat to a large greenhouse complex could ruin crops
should it go off-line. Similarly a production line relying on heat or steam
can be very expensive in production down-time should it fail.
This places extra responsibility on the burner controller.
These are common place and account for a very large proportion of the enery usage
in the world today (find and ref stats)
Industrial burners are common enough to have different specific standards
written for the fuel types they use \ref{EN298} \ref{EN230} \ref{EN12067}.
A modern industrial burner has mechanical, electronic and software
elements, that are all safety critical. That is to say
unhandled failures could create dangerous faults.
A more detailed description of industrial burner controllers
is dealt with in chapter~\ref{burnercontroller}.
Systems such as industrial burners have been partially automated for some time.
A mechanical cam arrangement controls the flow of air and fuel for the range of
firing rate (output of the boiler).
These mechanical systems could suffer failures (such as a mechanical linkage beoming
detached) and could then operate in a potentially dangerous state.
More modern burner controllers use a safety critical computer controlling
motors to operate the fuel and air mixture and to control the safety
valves.
In working in the industrial burner industry and submitting product for
North American and European safety approval, it was apparent that
formal techniques could be applied to aspects of the ciruit design.
Some safety critical circuitry would be subjected to thought experiments, where
the actions of one or more components failing would be examined.
As a simple example a milli-volt input could become disconnected.
A milli-volt input is typically amplified so that its range matches that
of the A->D converter that you are reading. were this signal source to become disconnected
the systems would see a floating, amplified signal.
A high impedance safety resistor can be added to the circuit,
to pull the signal high (or out of nornal range) upon disconnection.
The system then knows that a fault has occurred and will not use
that sensor reading (see \ref{fig:millivolt}).

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@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
%
%
% $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.5 2008/12/18 17:05:23 robin Exp $
%
%
@TechReport{db,
author = {R Clark, D Legge},
title = {ETC6000 Daughterboard Design notes},
institution = {ETC HR221850},
year = {2004},
key = {},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
issn = {HR221850},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@TechReport{mil1991,
author = {U.S. Department of Defence},
title = {Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment},
institution = {DOD},
year = {1991},
key = {MIL-HDBK-217F},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Manual{tlp181,
title = {TLP 181 Datasheet},
key = {TOSHIBA Photocoupler GaAs Ired & PhotoTransistor},
author = {Toshiba inc.},
OPTorganization = {},
%address = {http://www.toshiba.com/taec/components2/Datasheet\_Sync//206/4191.pdf},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
year = {2009},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Manual{pic18f2523,
title = {PIC18F2523 Datasheet},
OPTkey = {},
author = {Microchip inc},
OPTorganization = {},
address = {http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/39755c.pdf},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
year = {2009},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Book{wt,
title = {Water Treatment Essentials for Boiler Plant Operation},
publisher = {Mc Graw Hill ISBN 0-07-048291-5},
year = {1997},
author = {Robert G Nunn},
ALTALTeditor = {},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {},
OPTaddress = {},
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OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {ISBN 0-07-048291-5},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstracts = {},
}
@TechReport{pcbAI222562,
author = {C Talmay},
title = {Circuit Schematic TDS Daughterboard AI222562},
institution = {ETC},
year = {2010},
OPTkey = {},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {AI222562},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
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OPTabstract = {},
}
@TechReport{spiraxsarco,
author = {Spirax Sarco},
title = {http://www.spiraxsarco.com/resources/steam-engineering-tutorials.asp},
institution = {Spirax Sarco},
year = {2010},
OPTkey = {},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@Book{aoe,
title = {The Art of Electronics},
publisher = {Cambridge},
year = {1989},
author = {Paul Horowitz, Winfield Hill},
%author = {},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {2nd},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {ISBN 0-521-37095-7},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstracts = {},
}
@TechReport{eurothermtables,
author = {},
title = {Thermocouple Emf TABLES and PLATINUM 100 RESISTANCE THERMOMETER TABLES},
institution = {Eurotherm},
year = {1973},
OPTkey = {},
OPTtype = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTmonth = {June},
OPTnote = {Bulletin TT-1},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {},
}
@MISC{iso639-1,
title = "ISO 639-1: Code for the Representation of Names of Languages",
author = "International Standardization Organization",
howpublished = "http://www.loc.gov/standards/iso639-2/criteria1.html"
year = "1998"
}
@MISC{nano-x,
title = "The nano-X windowing system",
author = "Greg Haerr",
howpublished = "http://www.microwindows.org/"
year = "2003"
}
@MISC{X11,
title = "The XFree86 Project, Inc",
author = "Open Source",
howpublished = "http://www.xfree86.org/"
year = "1992"
}
http://www.xfree86.org/
@MISC{iso639-2,
title = "ISO 639-2: Code for the Representation of Names of Languages",
author = "International Standardization Organization",
howpublished = "http://www.loc.gov/standards/iso639-2/criteria1.html"
year = "1998"
}
@misc{ touchscreenprod,
author = "M. Thirsk",
title = "Touchscreen Production Procedure : HR~222165",
howpublished = "Internal ETC Document",
year = "2008" };
@misc{ touchscreensoftware,
author = "ETC Software Dept.",
title = "Touchscreen Software released to Production : HR~222162",
howpublished = "Internal ETC Software (medium: 2 MMC cards)",
year = "2008" };
@misc{ touchscreengui,
author = "D.J. Legge, R.P.Clark",
title = "Touchscreen GUI Design Document : HR~222163",
howpublished = "Internal ETC Document",
year = "2008" };
@misc{ gumstix,
author = "Gumstix Inc",
title = "Gumstix Home Page",
howpublished = "WEB http://www.gumstix.com/",
year = "2008" };
@misc{ fltk,
author = "FLTK open Source Developers",
title = "Fast Light Toolkit",
howpublished = "WEB http://www.fltk.org/",
year = "2008" };
@Book{ldd,
author = {Jonathon Corbet},
ALTeditor = {Alessandro Rubini},
ALTeditor = {Greg Kroah-Hartman},
title = {Linux Device Drivers},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN 0-596-00590-3},
year = {1998},
OPTkey = {ISBN 0-596-00590-3},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {3rd},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{bash,
author = {Carl Albing},
title = {Bash Cookbook},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN 0-596-52678-4},
year = {2007},
OPTkey = {ISBN 0-596-52678-4},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {unix/linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{sedawk,
author = {Dale Dougherty, Arnold Robbins},
title = {Sed and Awk},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN 1-56592-225-5},
year = {1997},
OPTkey = {ISBN 1-56592-225-5},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {unix/linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{bels,
author = {Karim Yaghmour},
title = {Building Embedded LINUX systems},
publisher = {O'Reilly ISBN ISBN 0-596-00222-X},
year = {2003},
OPTkey = {ISBN 0-596-00222-X},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {linux},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {3rd},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.oreilly.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{can,
author = {Olaf Pfeiffer},
ALTeditor = {Andrew Ayre},
ALTeditor = {Christian Keydel},
title = {Embedded networking with CAN and CANopen},
publisher = {RTC ISBN 0-929392-78-7},
year = {2003},
OPTkey = { },
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {Embedded Systems},
OPTaddress = {},
OPTedition = {1st},
OPTmonth = {},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {www.rtcbooks.com},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Article{article,
author = {dd},
title = {dd},
journal = {dd},
year = {2008},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTpages = {1,2},
OPTmonth = {JAN},
OPTnote = {},
OPTannote = {},
OPTurl = {},
OPTdoi = {},
OPTissn = {},
OPTlocalfile = {},
OPTabstract = {}
};
@Book{sqlite,
author = {Micheal Owens},
title = {The definitive guide to SQLite},
publisher = {Apres ISBN 1-59059-673-0},
year = {2006},
OPTkey = {},
OPTvolume = {},
OPTnumber = {},
OPTseries = {Databases/SQLite},
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};

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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
\usepackage{ifthen}
\newboolean{paper}
\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
\input{../style}
%\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
\begin{document}
\pagestyle{fancy}
\outerhead{{\small\bf PT100 FMMD analysis}}
%\innerfoot{{\small\bf R.P. Clark } }
% numbers at outer edges
\pagenumbering{arabic} % Arabic page numbers hereafter
\author{R.P.Clark}
\title{PT100 FMMD analysis}
\maketitle
\input{burner_paper}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{vmgbibliography,mybib}
\today
\end{document}

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@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
#
paper: paper.tex common_mode_paper.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
mv paper.pdf common_mode.pdf
okular common_mode.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
common_mode_paper.tex: common_mode.tex paper.tex
cat common_mode.tex | sed 's/common_mode\///' > common_mode_paper.tex
bib:
bibtex paper

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@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\abstract{
This paper describes how the Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD) methodology
can be applied to the problems of common mode failure
analysis.
%
Common mode failures are often difficult to
determine in embedded real time systems.
%
Environmental effects can lead to component failure
modes, that can occur in separate sub-systems
in a system, but interact to create unexpected fault.
% WHAT IS DID
The FMMD methodology can model and warn for two types of common mode failures.
Failures caused by separate sub-systems relying on
a common component, and environmental effects that can induce failure
modes in components in separate sub-systems.
% WHAT I FOUND
From the FMMD data model it is possible to link the environmental effects
and ensure determine the weak points in a design, where the failure modes may interact.
For the component dependency case, the dependent component
can be automatically highlighted by traversing the data model.
% WHY YOU WOULD WANT TO READ IT
This feature of FMMD proides another tool in the safety engineers
repotiore, one that can shake out difficult to find common mode failure
effects.
}
}
{
\paragraph{Chapter overview}
This chapter describes how the % Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD)
FMMD methodology
can be applied to the problems of common mode failure
analysis.
%
Common mode failures are often difficult to
determine in embedded real time systems.
%
Environmental effects can lead to component failure
modes, that can occur in separate sub-systems
in a system, but interact to create unexpected fault.
% WHAT IS DID
The FMMD methodology can model and warn for two types of common mode failures.
Failures caused by separate sub-systems relying on
a common component, and environmental effects that can induce failure
modes in components in separate sub-systems.
% WHAT I FOUND
From the FMMD data model it is possible to link the environmental effects
and ensure determine the weak points in a design, where the failure modes may interact.
For the component dependency case, the dependent component
can be automatically highlighted by traversing the data model.
% WHY YOU WOULD WANT TO READ IT
This feature of FMMD proides another tool in the safety engineers
repotiore, one that can shake out difficult to find common mode failure
effects.
}
\section{Introduction}
{\huge MIGHT BECOME A PAPER IN ITS OWN RIGHT. WILL PROB BE PART OF DATA MODEL CHAPTER FOR NOW 22NOV2010 }
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
paper
}
{
chapter
}
Outline the fmmd process.
Show modules with common dependencies (like on a power supply, a powersupply could have a fault
like nopisy output)
Trace a theoretical example and show how FMMD detects this (common dependency - like two
{\dc}s being depemdent on the same failure mode.
Then show an environmental effect, such as temperature and how
it can induce faults in sepatate modulkes that
would not be obviously related.
Trace a theoretical example and show how FMMD detects this
i.e. the environmental factor affecting both systems and causing a problem.
what about the third way it can be affected.
Like a chain of relays...... all could get welded .... think about that one.....

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@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
\input{../style}
\usepackage{ifthen}
\newboolean{paper}
\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
%\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
\begin{document}
\pagestyle{fancy}
%\outerhead{{\small\bf Statistical Basis for Current Static Analysis Methodologies}}
%\innerfoot{{\small\bf R.P. Clark } }
% numbers at outer edges
\pagenumbering{arabic} % Arabic page numbers hereafter
\author{R.P.Clark}
\title{Modelling and Uncovering Common Mode Failures using FMMD}
\maketitle
\input{common_mode_paper}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
\today
\end{document}

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@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
#
#
#
# git ignore for latex
#
*.aux
*.log
*.dvi
*.pdf
*.lof
*.lot
*.toc
*.*~

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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
#
# Make the propositional logic diagram a paper
#
paper: paper.tex component_failure_modes_definition_paper.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
mv paper.pdf component_failure_modes_definition_paper.pdf
okular component_failure_modes_definition_paper.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
component_failure_modes_definition_paper.tex: component_failure_modes_definition.tex paper.tex
cat component_failure_modes_definition.tex | sed 's/component_failure_modes_definition\///' > component_failure_modes_definition_paper.tex
bib:
bibtex paper

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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
\usepackage{lastpage}
\usepackage{ifthen}
\newboolean{paper}
\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
\input{../style}
%\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
\begin{document}
\pagestyle{fancy}
\fancyhf{}
%\renewcommand{\chaptermark}[1]{\markboth{ \emph{#1}}{}}
\fancyhead[LO]{}
\fancyhead[RE]{\leftmark}
%\fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
\cfoot{Page \thepage\ of \pageref{LastPage}}
\rfoot{\today}
\lhead{Definitions, Components, Functional Groups and Unitary State Failure Mode Sets}
%\outerhead{{\small\bf Definitions, Components, Functional Groups and Unitary State Failure Mode Sets}}
%\innerfoot{{\small\bf R.P. Clark } }
% numbers at outer edges
\pagenumbering{arabic} % Arabic page numbers hereafter
\author{R.P.Clark}
\title{Definitions, Components, Functional Groups and Unitary State Failure Mode Sets}
\maketitle
\input{component_failure_modes_definition_paper}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
\today
\end{document}

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@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
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%% Robin 01AUG2008
%%
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\newcounter{definitionc}
\newcounter{summaryc}
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% \stepcounter{examplec} \vspace{10pt} \normalfont\bfseries Example:\normalfont\[{\arabic{chapter}.\arabic{examplec}}\]
% \normalfont \begin{quote}}{\end{quote}\par}
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\newtheorem{example}{Example:}
\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
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%

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@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
# NOT FINISHED YET !!!!
# define a factorial function
# gives 1 for negative values as well
define f(x) {
if (x>1) {
return (x * f (x-1))
}
return (1)
}
# determine how many combinations would be dis-allowed
# from a cardinality constrained powerset
# given unitary state failure mode conditions
define uc(c,k,x) {
aa = 0;
#for(i=2; i<=c; i++) aa += k * f(k)/(f(i)*f(k-i));
if ( c>2 ) {
return aa + uc(c-1,k,x);
}
return aa;
}
# cardinality constrained powerset
# how many combinations of cardinality k
# can we have from c number of components
# with x number of failure modes
define ccps(c,k,x) {
return f(k*x)/(f(c)*f(k*x-c))
}
define us(c,k,x) {
a=0;
for(i=1;i<=c;i++) a += ccps(i,c,x);
# a now holds all combinations
# we must now subtract those combinations
# dis-allowed under unitary state conditions.
a -= uc(cc,c,x);
return a;
}
us(2,3,3);

View File

@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
#
#
#
# git ignore for latex
#
*.aux
*.log
*.dvi
*.pdf
*.lof
*.lot
*.toc
*.*~

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@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
%\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
%\usepackage{graphicx}
%
%%opening
%\title{Electronic Component Failure Analysis}
%\author{R.P. Clark ~ Energy Technology Control}
%
%\bibliographystyle{unsrt}
%
%\begin{document}
%
%\maketitle
%
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\begin{abstract}
This chapter describes the analysis of electrical components in terms of their operational and failure modes.
When analysed a component can be represented by a set of `fault modes'.
The fault modes can be considered as logical states for the component.
These can be represented as
logical states (respresented as contours) in a `propositional logic diagram'.
Components can then be combined by bringing the contours from
several components onto the same diagram.
Logical analysis of how the failure modes of the components interact
in a sub-system or module, can now be undertaken.
\end{abstract}
}
{}
%
\section{Introduction}
Every component in a electrical circuit may fail in several ways.
The most obvious ways for them to fail are that legs of the
circuit become disconnected or are shorted.
Components may fail internally. Some may have failure modes due to environmental factors.
% SPACE SOLDER EVAPORATING
% TEMPERATURE EFFECTS SUCH AS INACCURACY, LEAKAGE OF CURRENT ETC
Each component thus has a set of possible failure modes.
Looking at this independently of cause, we can in the worst case
consider that any of these errors could occur at any time.
In analysing a circuit we should take into consideration
all possible failure modes, and where appropriate, how
these failure modes will affect other components in the circuit.
Safety analysis of components forming critical circuitry,
is currently performed using scenario based test cases\cite{en298}, % \cite{gastec}, \cite{tuv}.
These involve experts checking a circuit for failure modes on a circuit and how these will
affect the system, based on their expertise.
Because this is a human process,
this means that unlikely or very rare test cases may not be considered, but also
that some test cases may be missed.
By taking all possible failure modes and laying these out in a logic diagram,
a computer can check that an analysis entry has been made for all
failure mode combinations deemed possible in the diagram.
This paper is concerned with the analysis phase that takes a component
and from it produces a set of failure modes. PLD diagram configurations
will be dealt with in the chapter \ref{pldconfig}.
\section{A resistor}
A resistor is a simple component, and according to MIL1991 has two failure modes OPEN and SHORT.
Let us consider what can happen to a resistor soldered onto a PCB.
It could become de-soldered at one pin or the other. The effect would be the same. The resistor would appear to
be OPEN circuit.This again would create an OPEN circuit.
It could become shorted by some foreign material, or in the production soldering process.
This again would have the same effect. It would appear to be a SHORT circuit.
It could be overstressed and burnt out, (by the application of an out of spec current for instance).
Resistors typically drift slightly in value with temperature. For some applications this may not be important.
The manufacturers data-sheet will describe the temperature drift co-effecients and operating ranges.
\paragraph{discusion on $P\_CHANGE$ as a resistor failure mode.}
HERE reference EN298 and RAC.
Talk about the differences, why en298 only looks for OPEN in most cases
and OPEN AND SHORT in one but not $P\_CHANGE$ .
RAC gives $P\_CHANGE$ for single resistors but not for resistor networks.
It is interesting to determine why this is.
A network of resistors would be less prone to batch
problems where a parameter drift would all be in the sam direction (with age perhaps)
.
But also a network of resistors means a load sharing where resistors will be
under less electrical stress.
This is because components in EN298 must be 60\% under any environemntal electrical or mechanical
stress safe rating as given by a manufacturer.
Thus a resistor rated for 50V would not be allowed in a ciruit with a 100V rail,
even though in normal operation, the resistor would never have more than say 30V applied to it.
For most safety critical applications components are downrated, and for resistors this means $P\_CHANGE$
does not have to be cosidered.
We can represent our resistor then to be in four operational states, $R_s = \{ OK, OPEN, SHORT, P\_CHANGE \}$.
Because we are interested in failure analysis we assume that every component has an OK state
but this is not of interest. When every component on a board is in the $OK$ state
the sub-system will function correctly.
We are interested in failures and how that affects the sub-system, so we
can ignore the $OK$ state and represent our resistor thus for the purpose of fault analysis.
$$R_s = \{ OPEN, SHORT, P\_CHANGE \}$$
This can be represented in a PLD thus
IMAGE HERE
For a resistor in a safety critical regime demanding rigorous downrating, we can model our
rsistor with
IMAGE HERE
$$R_s = \{ OPEN, SHORT \}$$
\section{ PNP Transistor }
Each leg open : each leg shorted all combinations.
Dud no HFE.
TEMPERATURE, operating range
{ \huge Look in MIL 1991}
Resultant failure modes ==
\section { IR Photo-diode}
each leg open, each leg shorted combination.
NO effect or always on.
Resultant failure modes ==
% \section{On / Off Switch}
% A simple on / off switch can fail in two ways again, OPEN or SHORT.
%
% \begin{figure}
% \centering
% \includegraphics[scale=0.4]{components_as_plds/ir_det.eps}
% % ir_det.eps: 0x0 pixel, 300dpi, 0.00x0.00 cm, bb=0 0 582 304
% \caption{IR detector circuit}
% \label{fig:irdet}
% \end{figure}
%
%
% \section { Sample circuit : An Infra Red Detector }
%
% This circuit for discussion is for a infra-red detector (see figure \ref{fig:ir_det}).
% It simply draws current through the PNP resistor when infra-red light falls onto the detector.
% When IR light is detected at the detector, TR1 (IR photo transistor) turns on, lowering the voltage at the base of TR2.
% This turns on TR2 which raise the voltage at the collector of TR2.
% A high voltage at the collector of TR2 thus indicates the presence of IR light on the detector.
% This could be connected to a visible LED or a micro-processor.
% For the purpose of discussion we are only interested in the detection part of this circuit.
% By analysing the failure modes for all its components
% we can can combine the failure modes for all the parts,
% and analyse how these failures affect the detector.
% We can also look at how the diagrams can help in the analysis
% phase.
%
% \subsection { IR detector in use }
%
% In use the IR photo transistor would be mounted on a probe, used to detect IR.
% The user would switch the detector on, check that the ON LED was lit,
% and then use the probe. On detection of IR at the probe the IR detect LED will light.
% This is a real circuit and has been used for debugging
% and validating IR position detection circuitry.
%
% %\bibliography{vmgbibliography,mybib}
% %Typeset in \ \ {\huge \LaTeX} \ \ on \ \ \today
% %\section{}
% %\end{document}
%
% \subsection{ Components and Fault Modes }
%
% Below is a list of the failure modes that can occur in the
% circuit above. A detailed discussion on determing the possible fault modes
% for components are given in chapter \ref{chapfaultdet}.
% Failure modes here have been determeined from the MIL 1991\ref{MIL1991} handbook.
%
% \begin{itemize}
% \item TR1 = \{ OPEN\_CE, SHORT\_CE \}
% \item TR2 = \{ OPEN\_CE, SHORT\_CE, SHORT\_BE SHORT\_BC\}
% \item R1 = \{ OPEN\_R, SHORT\_R \}
% \item R2 = \{ OPEN\_R, SHORT\_R \}
% \item D1 = \{ OPEN\_D, SHORT\_D \}
% \item D2 = \{ OPEN\_D, SHORT\_D \}
% \item B1 = \{ OPEN\_B, FLAT\_B \}
% \item SW1 = \{ ALWAYSOPEN\_SW1, ALWAYSCLOSED\_SW1 \}
% \end{itemize}
%
% With this information we can now begin to analyse the circuit.
% Firstly we can look at the overall effect of any one component
% on the rest of the circuit. After that we can look at combinations
% of component failure modes.
%
% \subsection{FMEA : Failure Mode Effcets Analysis}
%

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#
# Make the propositional logic diagram a paper
#
SOURCE = eulerg.tex
paper: paper.tex eulerg_paper.tex $(SOURCE)
#cat introduction.tex | sed s/chapter/paper/ > introduction.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
mv paper.pdf eulerg_paper.pdf
okular eulerg_paper.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
eulerg_paper.tex: eulerg.tex paper.tex $(SOURCE)
cat eulerg.tex | sed 's/eulerg\///' > eulerg_paper.tex
bib: $(SOURCE)
bibtex paper

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@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\abstract{
This paper discusses representing Euler Diagrams as graphs, or sets of relationships.
By representing Euler diagrams in this way,
algorithms to investigate properties of the diagrams, are possible, without
having to resort
to extra unnecessary CPU expensive area operations on the concrete diagrams.
The graph representations presented here form the basis for several algorithms
and time saving procedures, implemented in the FMMD analysis tool.
}
}
{ %% Introduction
\section{Introduction}
This chapter discusses representing Euler Diagrams as graphs, or sets of relationships.
By representing Euler diagrams in this way,
algorithms to investigate properties of the diagrams, are possible, without
having to resort
to extra unnecessary CPU expensive area operations on the concrete diagrams.
The graph representations presented here form the basis for several algorithms
and time saving procedures, implemented in the FMMD analysis tool.
}
\section{Introduction : Euler Diagram }
Classical Euler diagrams consist of closed curves in the plane which are used to represent sets.
The spatial relationship between the curves defines the set theoretic relationships, as defined below.
\begin{itemize}
\item Intersection - if the curves defining the area within curves overlap
\item Sub-set - if a curve is enclosed by another
\item disjoint - if the curves are separate
\end{itemize}
The definitions above allow us to read an Euler diagram
and write down set theory equations.
The interest here though, is to define relationships between the contours, that allow
processing and parsing of the diagram without resorting to extra area operations in the concrete plane.
\section{Defining `pair-wise intersection' \\ and `enclosure'}
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\subfigure[Euler Diagram]{
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg1.jpg}
\label{fig:subfig1}
}
\subfigure[Graph Representation]{
\includegraphics[width=50pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg_g.jpg}
\label{fig:subfig2}
}
% \subfigure[Subfigure 3 caption]{
% \includegraphics[width=100pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg1.jpg}
% \label{fig:subfig3}
% }
\caption{An Euler Diagram showing enclosure and Pair-wise Intersection}
\label{fig:eulerg1}
\end{figure}
The set theory term `intersection' can apply to both the curves overlapping and to the sub-set case.
Intersection in a concrete diagram can mean two curves bisecting.
For instance in figure \ref{fig:eulerg1} the set theoretic intersection between
$A$ and $B$ exists, even though the curves do not bisect in the concrete plane.
$$ A \cap B \neq \emptyset $$
as does the intersection $D$ and $E$
$$ D \cap E \neq \emptyset $$
Clearly though these intersections are different, because
in the $A$, $B$ case
$ A \backslash B = \emptyset \wedge B \backslash A \neq \emptyset $
This is not the case for $D$, $E$ where:
$ D \backslash E \neq \emptyset \wedge E \backslash D \neq \emptyset $.
Another way of expressing this is that $D \cap E \neq \emptyset$ and
$ A \subset B$.
\paragraph{Enclosure}
To distinguish between these we can term the $A$, $B$ case to be
$A$ `enclosed' by $B$. We can express this as a directed relationship.
$$ B {\enc} A $$
%\clearpage
\paragraph{Pair-wise Intersection}
In the $D$, $E$ case we have
We can say that where the areas defined by the curves intersect but no one curve encloses the
other, we can term this `pair-wise intersection'.
We can express this as a non directed relationship.
$$ D \pin E $$
\paragraph{Mutual exclusivity of `pair-wise intersection' and `enclosure'}
Clearly these two properties are mutually exclusive. No
contour can be both pair-wisely intersected and enclosed with the same contour.
Also enclosure, is transitive. That is to say if B encloses A, and A encloses C
then B encloses C, see figure \ref{fig:eulerg_enc}.
\begin{definition}
\label{def:mutex}
No contour can be both pair-wisely intersected and enclosed with the same contour.
\end{definition}
\clearpage
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\subfigure[Euler Diagram]{
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg_enc.jpg}
% eulerg_enc.jpg: 315x269 pixel, 72dpi, 11.11x9.49 cm, bb=0 0 315 269
\label{eulerenc}
}
\subfigure[Graph Representation]{
\includegraphics[width=100pt,bb=0 0 240 43,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg_enc_g.jpg}
% eulerg_enc_g.jpg: 240x43 pixel, 72dpi, 8.47x1.52 cm, bb=0 0 240 43
\label{graphenc}
}
\caption{Enclosure, a transitive relationship}
\label{fig:eulerg_enc}
\end{figure}
$$ B {\enc} A \wedge A {\enc} C \implies B {\enc} C $$
\begin{definition}
\label{def:enctrans}
Enclosure relationships are transitive.
\end{definition}
\pagebreak[1]
\section{Representing Euler Diagrams \\ as sets of relationships}
The diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg1} can be represented by the following relationships.
$$ B {\enc} A $$
$$ D {\pin} E $$
The diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg_enc} can be represented by the following relationships.
$$ B {\enc} A $$
$$ A {\enc} C $$
\section{Representing Euler diagrams as graphs}
As the relationships {\em enclosure} and {\em pair-wise intersection} are mutually exclusive
and {\em enclosure} is transitive and {\em pair-wise intersection} is not, we can represent
an {\em enclosure} relationship as a directed vertice and
{\pic} as non-directed on the same graph.
Figures \ref{fig:eulerg1} and \ref{fig:eulerg_enc} show Euler diagrams with corresponding
graphs. The next section will introduce the concept of a {\pic}
and will present graphs where both enclosure and pair-wise
intersection are represented on the same graph.
\pagebreak[1]
\section{The {\pic}}
In graph theory a node is said to be reachable from another node
if you can start at the one node, travel via the edges
and arrive at the other.
Contours may be connected via `pair-wise intersection' relationships to form
`chains' of contours reachable by pair-wise intersection.
These are termed {\pic}s.
Figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic} shows a {\pic} consisting of contours $M,N,O,P$ and $Q$.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=400pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg_pic.jpg}
% eulerg_pic.jpg: 955x286 pixel, 72dpi, 33.69x10.09 cm, bb=0 0 955 286
\caption{{\pic} with Enclosure}
\label{fig:eulerg_pic}
\end{figure}
%\textbf{rule:}
\begin{definition}
\label{def:encpic}
If any contour in a {\pic} is enclosed by any contour not belonging to the chain,
all the contours within the
{\pic} will be enclosed by it.
\end{definition}
Note that any contour
which bisects another contour in a {\pic}
becomes part of the pair-wise~intersection~chain.
% Hmmmm thats true but a better way to say it ????
%The diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg_enc} can be represented by the following relationships.
\vbox{
The diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic} can be represented by the following relationships.
$$ M {\pin} N $$
$$ N {\pin} O $$
$$ O {\pin} P $$
$$ O {\pin} Q $$
$$ Q {\enc} P $$
$$ A {\enc} M $$
$$ A {\enc} N $$
$$ A {\enc} O $$
$$ A {\enc} P $$
$$ A {\enc} Q $$
}
To form the {\pic} we can follow
reachable pair-wise intersection relationships.
$ M {\pin} N {\pin} O {\pin} P $ are part of the same chain.
following from $O$, $O {\pin} Q$.
Thus by the definition of being reachable by pair-wise intersection relationships,$M,N,O,P,Q$
are in the same {\pic}, even though $Q$ encloses $P$.
We can define this {\pic} as $PIC1$ as a set of contours.
$$ PIC1 = \{ M,N,O,P,Q \} $$
Contour $A$, by virtue of not bisecting any contour in the pair-wise intersection
chain $PIC1$, does not belong to $PIC1$. Because it encloses one of the contours, it
encloses all contours in the chain.
Knowing this can save on unnecessary area operations on the concrete diagram.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,bb=0 0 330 158,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg_pic_g.jpg}
% eulerg_pic_g.jpg: 330x158 pixel, 72dpi, 11.64x5.57 cm, bb=0 0 330 158
\caption{Pair-wise Intersection chain PIC1 as a graph}
\label{fig:eulerg_pic_g}
\end{figure}
% \subsection{The Pair-wise intersection chain PIC1}
% \begin{figure}[h]
% \centering
% \includegraphics[width=200pt,bb=0 0 955 286,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg_pic_g.jpg}
% % eulerg_pic.jpg: 955x286 pixel, 72dpi, 33.69x10.09 cm, bb=0 0 955 286
% \caption{The pair-wise Intersection PIC1 as a graph}
% \label{fig:eulerg_pic1}
% \end{figure}
Figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic_g} only shows the {\pic}, but does not show the contour ($A$)
enclosing $PIC1$. Figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic_g_a}
shows contour A enclosing all elements in $PIC1$
\pagebreak[1]
\subsection{Enclosure and pair-wise \\ intersection in the graph}
Because enclosure is a directed relationship and {\em pair-wise intersection} is non-directed
we can represent them both on the same graph, see figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic_g_a}.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,bb=0 0 330 162,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg/eulerg_pic_g_a.jpg}
% eulerg_pic_g_a.jpg: 330x162 pixel, 72dpi, 11.64x5.72 cm, bb=0 0 330 162
\caption{Graph of Euler diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic}.}
\label{fig:eulerg_pic_g_a}
\end{figure}
\pagebreak[1]
\subsection{Reducing clutter in the graph}
Contour A encloses the pure intersection chain $PIC1$;
using definition \ref{def:encpic}, we can draw this in a less cluttered way,
by only drawing one enclosure relationship to the {\pic}
(see figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic_g_a_unc}).
We only need to show contour A enclosing one member of the {\pic} $PIC1$
in order to show that contour A encloses all contours in $PIC1$.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,bb=0 0 330 162]{./eulerg/eulerg_pic_g_a_unc.jpg}
% eulerg_pic_g_a_unc.jpg: 330x162 pixel, 72dpi, 11.64x5.72 cm, bb=0 0 330 162
\caption{Uncluttered graph of Euler diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic}.}
\label{fig:eulerg_pic_g_a_unc}
\end{figure}
%\pagebreak[9]
\clearpage
\section{Reduction of searches \\ for available zones}
Another property of any {\pic} $P$, is that
the maximum number of Euler zones within it is
$$ MaxZones = 2^{|P|} $$
Because no contours external to the {\pic}
bisect any in it, no extra zones can be formed.
By enclosing a {\pic} with
a contour, we change the nature of the zones within
the {\pic}, but the number of zones contributed by the {\pic}
stays the same.
\begin{definition}
\label{picreduction}
The number of available zones within a {\pic} $P$ does not change
when other contours are added or removed from the diagram
that are not, or would not become members of the {\pic} $P$.
\end{definition}
That is to say, the the number of zones within a {\pic} is not affected by changes in the diagram
that do not alter the {\pic}.
This allows us to analyse {\pic}s separately, thus reducing the $2^N$ overhead of analysing an Euler diagram for available zones.
\pagebreak[3]
\subsection{Available Zone Searching}
The available zones in an Euler diagram represent set theoretic combinations
that can be used in the diagram.
%For FMMD analyis, the test~cases
Searching for an available zone involves finding out if the intersection exists, and then determining whether it is covered up
by any other contours.
A brute force search for available zones using area operations
is therefore of the order $N.2^N$ (where N is the number of contours in the diagram).
Using $|P|$ to represent the number of contours within a {\pic}
and $K$ to represent the number of {\pic}s in a diagram,
using the result in definition \ref{picreduction}, we can break the diagram into small segments
(the {\pic}s) which have an order $K.2^{|P|}$.
The exponential $2^N$ overhead is thus broken down into several smaller $2^{|P|}$ operations.
The order of area operations is generally\footnote{In the case where the diagram is not comprised of just one {\pic}, which has no enclosing contours.}
reduced by requiring several $K.|P|.2^{|P|}$
instead of $N.2^N$ as $K < N$.
This has effectively reduced the order of the searching algorithm from exponential to polynomial order.
\vspace{40pt}

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\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\abstract{
This paper discusses representing Euler Diagrams as graphs, or sets of relationships.
By representing Euler diagrams in this way,
algorithms to invesigate properties of the diagrams, are possible, without
having to resort
to CPU expensive area operations on the concrete diagrams.
}
}
{ %% Introduction
\section{Introduction}
This paper discusses representing Euler Diagrams as graphs, or sets of relationships.
By representing Euler diagrams in this way,
algorithms to invesigate properties of the diagrams, are possible, without
having to resort
to CPU expensive area operations on the concrete diagrams.
}
\section{Introduction : Euler Diagram }
Classical Euler diagrams consist of closed curves in the plane which are used to represent sets.
The spaitial relationship between the curves defines the set theoretic relationships, as defined below.
\begin{itemize}
\item Intersection - if the curves defining the area within curves overlap
\item Sub-set - if a curve is enclosed by another
\item disjoint - if the curves are separate
\end{itemize}
\section{Defining `pure intersection' and `enclosure'}
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg1.jpg}
% eulerg1.jpg: 513x215 pixel, 72dpi, 18.10x7.58 cm, bb=0 0 513 215
\caption{An Euler Diagram showing enclosure and Pure Intersection}
\label{fig:eulerg1}
\end{figure}
The set theory term `intersection' can apply to both the curves overlapping and to the sub-set case.
For instance in diagram \ref{fig:euler1} the intersection between
$A$ and $B$ exists.
$$ A \cup B \neq \emptyset $$
as does the intersection $D$ and $E$
$$ D \cup E \neq \emptyset $$
Clearly though these intersections are different, because
in the $A$, $B$ case
$$ A \backslash B = \emptyset \wedge B \backslash A \neq \emptyset $$.
This is not the case for $D$, $E$ where:
$$ D \backslash E \neq \emptyset \wedge E \backslash D \neq \emptyset $$
\paragraph{Enclosure}
To distinguish between these we can term the $A$, $B$ case to be
$A$ `enclosed' by $B$. We can express this as a directed relationship.
$$ B {\enc} A $$
\paragraph{Pure Intersection}
In the $D$, $E$ case we have
We can say that where the areas defined by the curves intersect but no one curve encloses the
other, we can term this `pure intersection'.
We can express this as a non directed relationship.
$$ D \pin E $$
\paragraph{Mutual exclusivity of `pure intersection' and `enclosure'}
Clearly these two properties are mutually exclusive. No
contour can be both purely intersected and enclosed with the same contour.
Also enclosure, is transitive. That is to say if B encloses A, and A encloses C
then B encloses C, see figure \ref{fig:eulerg_enc}.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./eulerg_enc.jpg}
% eulerg_enc.jpg: 315x269 pixel, 72dpi, 11.11x9.49 cm, bb=0 0 315 269
\caption{Enclosure, a transitive relationship}
\label{fig:eulerg_enc}
\end{figure}
$$ B {\enc} A \wedge A {\enc} C \implies B {\enc} C $$
\section{Representing Euler Diagrams as sets of relationships}
The diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg1} can be represented by the foillowing relationships.
$$ B {\enc} A $$
$$ D {\pin} E $$
The diagram in figure \ref{fig:eulerg_enc} can be represented by the following relationships.
$$ B {\enc} A $$
$$ A {\enc} C $$
\section{The Pure Intersection chain}
Contours may be connected via `pure intersection' relationships to form
`chains' of contours reachable by pure intersection.
Figure \ref{fig:eulerg_pic} shows a pure intersection chain consisting of contours $M,N,O,P$ and $Q$.
\textbf{rule:}
If any contour in a pure intersection chain is enclosed by any contour, all countours within the
pure intersection chain will be enclosed by it.

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\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{subfigure}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
\usepackage{algorithm}
\usepackage{algorithmic}
\usepackage{ifthen}
\newboolean{paper}
\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
\input{../style}
%\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
\begin{document}
\pagestyle{fancy}
%\outerhead{{\small\bf Symptom Extraction Process}}
%\innerfoot{{\small\bf R.P. Clark } }
% numbers at outer edges
\pagenumbering{arabic} % Arabic page numbers hereafter
\author{R.P.Clark}
\title{Euler Diagrams as Graphs}
\maketitle
\input{eulerg_paper}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
\today
\end{document}

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#
paper: paper.tex fmmd_concept_paper.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
cp paper.pdf fmmd_concept_paper.pdf
okular fmmd_concept_paper.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
fmmd_concept_paper.tex: fmmd_concept.tex paper.tex
cat fmmd_concept.tex | sed 's/fmmd_concept\///' > fmmd_concept_paper.tex
bib:
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\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usetikzlibrary{shapes,snakes}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
\input{../style}
\usepackage{ifthen}
\usepackage{lastpage}
\newboolean{paper}
\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
%\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
\begin{document}
\pagestyle{fancy}
\fancyhf{}
%\renewcommand{\chaptermark}[1]{\markboth{ \emph{#1}}{}}
\fancyhead[LO]{}
\fancyhead[RE]{\leftmark}
%\fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
\cfoot{Page \thepage\ of \pageref{LastPage}}
\rfoot{\today}
\lhead{Developing a rigorous bottom-up modular static failure mode modelling methodology}
%\outerhead{{\small\bf Developing a rigorous bottom-up modular static failure mode modelling methodology}}
%\innerfoot{{\small\bf R.P. Clark } }
% numbers at outer edges
\pagenumbering{arabic} % Arabic page numbers hereafter
\author{R.P.Clark}
\title{Developing a rigorous bottom-up modular static failure mode modelling methodology}
\maketitle
\input{fmmd_concept_paper}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
\today
\end{document}

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#
paper: paper.tex fmmd_data_model_paper.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
cp paper.pdf fmmd_data_model_paper.pdf
okular fmmd_data_model_paper.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
fmmd_data_model_paper.tex: fmmd_data_model.tex paper.tex
cat fmmd_data_model.tex | sed 's/fmmd_data_model\///' > fmmd_data_model_paper.tex
bib:
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\documentclass[a4paper,10pt]{article}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{tikz}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
\input{../style}
\usepackage{ifthen}
\usepackage{lastpage}
\usetikzlibrary{shapes,snakes}
\newboolean{paper}
\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
%\newtheorem{definition}{Definition:}
\begin{document}
\pagestyle{fancy}
\fancyhf{}
%\renewcommand{\chaptermark}[1]{\markboth{ \emph{#1}}{}}
\fancyhead[LO]{}
\fancyhead[RE]{\leftmark}
%\fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
\cfoot{Page \thepage\ of \pageref{LastPage}}
\rfoot{\today}
\lhead{FMMD Data Model}
%\outerhead{{\small\bf Developing a rigorous bottom-up modular static failure mode modelling methodology}}
%\innerfoot{{\small\bf R.P. Clark } }
% numbers at outer edges
\pagenumbering{arabic} % Arabic page numbers hereafter
\author{R.P.Clark}
\title{FMMD Data Model}
\maketitle
\input{fmmd_data_model_paper}
\bibliographystyle{plain}
\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
\today
\end{document}

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#
paper: paper.tex fmmd_design_aide_paper.tex
#latex paper.tex
#dvipdf paper pdflatex cannot use eps ffs
pdflatex paper.tex
mv paper.pdf fmmd_design_aide_paper.pdf
okular fmmd_design_aide_paper.pdf
# Remove the need for referncing graphics in subdirectories
#
fmmd_design_aide_paper.tex: fmmd_design_aide.tex paper.tex
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\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\abstract{ This
paper
describes how the FMMD methodology can be used to refine
safety critical designs and identify undetectable and dormant faults.
%
As a working example, an industry standard mill-volt amplifier, intended for reading thermocouples,
circuit is analysed.
It has an inbuilt `safety~resistor' which allows it
to detect the thermocouple becoming disconnected/going OPEN.
%
This circuit is analysed from an FMMD perspective and
and two undetectable failure modes are identified.
%
An additional `safety check' circuit is then proposed and analysed.
This has no undetectable failure modes, but does have one
`dormant' failure mode.
%
This paper shows that once undetectable faults or dormant faults are discovered
the design can be altered (or have a safety feature added), and the FMMD analysis process can then be re-applied.
This can be an iterative process applied until the
design has an acceptable level safety. % of dormant or undetectable failure modes.
%
Used in this way, its is a design aide, giving the user
the possibility to refine a {\dc} from the perspective
of its failure mode behaviour.
}
}
{
\section{Introduction}
This chapter
describes how the FMMD methodology can be used to refine
safety critical designs and identify undetectable and dormant faults.
%
As a working example, an industry standard mill-volt amplifier, intended for reading thermocouples,
circuit is analysed.
It has an inbuilt `safety~resistor' which allows it
to detect the thermocouple becoming disconnected/going OPEN.
%
This circuit is analysed from an FMMD perspective and
and two undetectable failure modes are identified.
%
An additional `safety check' circuit is then proposed and analysed.
This has no undetectable failure modes, but does have one
`dormant' failure mode.
%
This paper shows that once undetectable faults or dormant faults are discovered
the design can be altered (or have a safety feature added), and the FMMD analysis process can then be re-applied.
This can be an iterative process applied until the
design has an acceptable level safety. % of dormant or undetectable failure modes.
%
Used in this way, its is a design aide, giving the user
the possibility to refine a {\dc} from the perspective
of its failure mode behaviour.
}
\section{How FMMD Analysis can reveal design flaws w.r.t. failure behaviour }
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
\paragraph{Overview of FMMD Methodology}
The principle of FMMD analysis is a five stage process,
the collection of components into {\fg}s,
which are analysed w.r.t. their failure mode behaviour,
the failure mode behaviour is then viewed from the
{\fg} perspective (i.e. as a symptoms of the {\fg}) and
common symptoms are then collected. The final stage
is to create a {\dc} which has the symptoms of the {\fg}
it was sourced from, as its failure modes.
%
%From the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg} common symptoms are collected.
These common symptoms are % in effect
the failure mode behaviour of
the {\fg} viewed as an % single
entity, or a `black box' component.
%
From the analysis of the {\fg} we can create a {\dc}, where the failure modes
are the symptoms of the {\fg} we derived it from.
}
{
\paragraph{Overview of FMMD Methodology}
To re-cap from chapter \ref{symptomex},
the principle of FMMD analysis is a five stage process,
the collection of components into {\fg}s,
which are analysed w.r.t. their failure mode behaviour,
the failure mode behaviour is then viewed from the
{\fg} perspective (i.e. as a symptoms of the {\fg}),
common symptoms are then collected. The final stage
is to create a {\dc} which has the symptoms of the {\fg}
it was sourced from, as its failure modes.
%
%From the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg} common symptoms are collected.
These common symptoms are % in effect
the failure mode behaviour of
the {\fg} viewed as an % single
entity, or a `black box' component.
%
From the analysis of the {\fg} we can create a {\dc}, where the failure modes
are the symptoms of the {\fg} we derived it from.
}
%
\paragraph{Undetectable failure modes.}
Within a functional group failure symptoms will be detectable
or undetectable.
The `undetectable' failure modes understandably, are the most worrying for the safety critical designer.
EN61058~\cite{en61508}, the statistically based failure mode European Norm, using ratios
of detected and undetected system failure modes to
classify the systems safety levels and describes sub-clasifications
for detected and undetected failure modes.
%\gloss{DU}
%\gloss{DD}
%It is these that are, generally the ones that stand out as single
%failure modes.
For instance, out of range values, are easy to detect by
systems using the {\dc} supplying them.
Undetectable faults are ones that supply incorrect information or states
where we have no way of knowing whether they are correct or not.
% we know we can cope with; they
%are an obvious error condition that will be detected by any modules
%using the {\dc}.
%
Undetectable failure modes can introduce serious
errors into a SYSTEM.
\paragraph{Dormant faults.}
A dormant fault is one
which can manifest its-self in conjunction with
another failure mode becoming active, or an environmental
condition changing (for instance temperature).
Some
component failure modes may lead to dormant failure modes.
For instance a transistor failing OPEN when it is meant
to be in an OFF state would be a dormant fault.
Even though the fault is active, the transistor
is, for the time being, behaving correctly.
%
If we examine the circuit from both operational states,
i.e. the transistor when is is both meant to be ON and OFF
we can determine all the consequences of that particular failure.
%
More generally, by examining test cases from a functional group against all
operational states and germane environmental conditions
we can determine all the failure modes of the {\fg}.
\subsection{Iterative Design Example}
By applying FMMD analysis to a {\fg} we can determine which failure
modes of a {\dc} are undetectable or dormant.
We can then either modify the circuit and iteratively
apply FMMD to the design again, or we could add another {\fg}
that specifically tests for the undetectable/dormant conditions.
This
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
paper
}
{
chapter
}
describes a milli-volt amplifier (see figure \ref{fig:mv1}), with an inbuilt safety\footnote{The `safety resistor' also acts
as a potential divider to provide a mill-volt offset. An offset is often required to allow for negative readings from the
milli-volt source.}
resistor (R18). The circuit is analysed and it is found that all but one component failure modes
are detectable.
We then design a circuit to test for the `undetectable' failure modes
and analyse this with FMMD.
The test circuit addition can now be represented by a {\dc}.
With both {\dcs} we then use them to form a {\fg} which we can call our `self testing milli-volt amplifier'.
We then analsye the {\fg} and the resultant {\dc} failure modes/symptoms are discussed.
\section{An example: A Millivolt Amplifier}
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,bb=0 0 678 690,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_design_aide/mv_opamp_circuit.png}
% mv_opamp_circuit.png: 678x690 pixel, 72dpi, 23.92x24.34 cm, bb=0 0 678 690
\caption{Milli-Volt Amplifier with Safety/Offset Resistor}
\label{fig:mv1}
\end{figure}
\subsection{Brief Circuit Description}
This circuit amplifies a milli-volt input by a gain of $\approx$ 184 ($\frac{150E3}{820}+1$)
\footnote{The resistors used to program the gain of the op-amp would typically be of a $ \le 1\%$ guaranteed
tolerance. In practise, the small variations would be corrected with software constants programmed during production
test/calibration.}.
An offset is applied to the input by R18 and R22 forming a potential divider
of $\frac{820}{2.2E6+820}$. With 5V applied as Vcc this gives an input offset of $1.86\,mV$.
This amplified offset
can be termed a $\Delta V$, an addition to the mV value provided by the sensor.
So the amplified offset is $\approx 342 \, mV$.
We can determine the output of the amplifier
by subtracting this amount from the reading. We can also define an acceptable
range for the readings. This would depend on the characteristics of milli-volt source, and also on the
thresholds of the voltages considered out of range. For the sake of example let us
consider this to be a type K thermocouple amplifier, with a range of temperatures
expected to be within {{0}\oc} and {{300}\oc}.
\paragraph{Voltage range for {{0}\oc} to {{300}\oc}.}
Choosing the common Nickel-Chromium v. Nickel Aluminium `K' type thermocouple,
{{0}\oc} provides an EMF of 0mV, and {{300}\oc} 12.207.
Multiplying these by 184 and adding the 1.86mV offset gives
342.24mV and 2563.12mV. This is now in a suitable range to be read by
an analogue digital converter, which will have a voltage span
typically between 3.3V and 5V~\cite{pic18f2523}.% on modern micro-controllers/ADC (Analogue Digital Converter) chips.
Note that this also leaves a margin or error on both sides of the range.
If the thermocouple were to become colder than {{0}\oc} it would supply
a negative voltage, which would subtract from the offset.
At around {{-47}\oc} the amplifier output would be zero;
but anything under say 10mV is considered out of range\footnote{We need some negative range
to cope with cold junction compensation~\cite{aoe},
which is a subject beyond the scope of this paper}.
Thus the ADC can comfortably read out of range values
but controlling software can determine it as invalid.
Similarly anything over 2563.12mV would be considered out of range
but would be still within comfortable reading range for an ADC.
\section{FMMD Analysis}
\begin{table}[h+]
\caption{Milli Volt Amplifier Single Fault FMMD} % title of Table
\centering % used for centering table
\begin{tabular}{||l|c|l|c||}
\hline \hline
\textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \textbf{MTTF} \\
\textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
% R & wire & res + & res - & description
\hline
\hline
TC:1 $R18$ SHORT & Amp plus input high & Out of range & 1.38 \\ \hline
TC:2 $R18$ OPEN & No Offset Voltage & \textbf{Low reading} & 12.42\\ \hline
\hline
TC:3 $R22$ SHORT & No offset voltage & \textbf{Low reading} & 1.38 \\ \hline
TC:4 $R22$ OPEN & Amp plus high input & Out of Range & 1.38 \\ \hline
\hline
TC:5 $R26$ SHORT & No gain from amp & Out of Range & 1.38 \\
TC:6 $R26$ OPEN & Very high amp gain & Out of Range & 12.42 \\ \hline
\hline
TC:5 $R30$ SHORT & Very high amp gain & Out of range & 1.38 \\
TC:6 $R30$ OPEN & No gain from amp & Out of Range & 12.42 \\ \hline
\hline
TC:7 $OP\_AMP$ LATCH UP & high amp output & Out of range & 1.38 \\
TC:8 $OP\_AMP$ LATCH DOWN & low amp output & Out of Range & 12.42 \\ \hline
\end{tabular}
\label{tab:fmmdaide1}
\end{table}
This analysis process, which given the components R18,R22,R26,R30,IC1, has derived
the component "milli-volt amplifier" with two failure modes, `Out of Range' and
`Low reading'.
we can represent this in an FMMD hierarchy diagram, see figure \ref{fig:mvamp_fmmd}.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_design_aide/mvamp_fmmd.jpg}
% mvamp_fmmd.jpg: 281x344 pixel, 72dpi, 9.91x12.14 cm, bb=0 0 281 344
\caption{FMMD analysis Hierarchy for Milli-Volt Amplifier}
\label{fig:mvamp_fmmd}
\end{figure}
The table \ref{tab:fmmdaide1} shows two possible causes for an undetectable
error, that of a low reading due to the loss of the offset millivolt signal.
The loss of the $\Delta V$ would mean an incorrect temperature
reading would be made.
Typically this type of circuit would be used to read a thermocouple
and this error symptom, `low\_reading' would mean our plant could
beleive that the temperature reading is lower than it actually is.
To take an example from a K type thermocouple, the offset of 1.86mV
%from the potential divider represents amplified to
would represent $\approx \; 46\,^{\circ}{\rm C}$~\cite{eurothermtables}~\cite{aoe}.
%\clearpage
\subsection{Undetected Failure Mode: Incorrect Reading}
Although statistically, this failure is unlikely (get stats for R short FIT etc from pt100 doc)
if the reading is considered critical, or we are aiming for a high integrity level
this may be unacceptable.
We will need to add some type of detection mechanism to the circuit to
test $R_{off}$ periodically.
%For instance were we to check $R_{off}$ every $\tau = 20mS$ work out detection
%allowance according to EN61508~\cite{en61508}.
\section{Proposed Checking Method}
Were we to able to switch a second resistor in series with the
820R resistor (R22) and switch it out again, we could test
that the safety resistor (R18) still functioning correctly.
With the new resistor switched in we would expect
the voltage added by the potential divider
to increase.
The circuit in figure \ref{fig:mvamp2} shows an bi-polar transistor % yes its menally ill and goes on mad shopping spreees etc
controlled by the `test line' connection, which can switch in the resitor R36
also with a value of \ohms{820}.
We could detect the effect on the reading with the potential divider
according to the following formula.
%% check figures
The potential divider is now $\frac{820R+820R}{2M2+820R+820R}$ over 5V ci this gives
3.724mV, amplified by 184 this is 0.685V \adcten{140}.
%
The potential divider with the second resistor
switched out is $\frac{820R}{2M2+820R}$ over 5V gives 1.86mV,
amplified by 184 gives 0.342V \adcten{70}.
This is a difference of \adcten{70} in the readings.
So periodically, perhaps even as frequently as once every few seconds
we can apply the checking resistor and look for a corresponding
change in the reading.
Lets us analyse this in more detail to prove that we are indeed checking for
the failure of the safety resistor, and that we are not introducing
any new problems.
First let us look at the new transistor and resistor and
treat these as a functional group.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_design_aide/test_circuit.png}
% test_circuit.png: 239x144 pixel, 72dpi, 8.43x5.08 cm, bb=0 0 239 144
\caption{Test circuit functional group}
\label{fig:test_circuit}
\end{figure}
In our analysis of the failure modes we have to consider the operational
states of this circuit, which are
the transistor being switched ON and OFF.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_design_aide/mv_opamp_circuit2.png}
% mv_opamp_circuit2.png: 577x479 pixel, 72dpi, 20.35x16.90 cm, bb=0 0 577 479
\caption{Amplifier with check circuit addition}
\label{fig:mvamp2}
\end{figure}
\section{FMMD analysis of Safety Addition}
This test circuit has two operational states, in that it
can be switched on to apply the test series resistance, and
off to obtain the correct reading.
%
We must examine each test case from these two perspectives.
For $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON the transistor is turned OFF
and we are in a test mode and expect the reading to go up by around \adcten{70}.
For $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF the tranistor is on and R36 is by-passed,
and the reading is assumed to be valid.
\begin{table}[h+]
\caption{Test Addition Single Fault FMMD} % title of Table
\centering % used for centering table
\begin{tabular}{||l|l|c|l|c||}
\hline \hline
\textbf{test line } & \textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \\ %\textbf{MTTF} \\
\textbf{status} & \textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
% R & wire & res + & res - & description
\hline
\hline
%% OK TR1 OFF , and so 36 in series. R36 has shorted so
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON & TC:1 $R36$ SHORT & No added resistance & NO TEST EFFECT & 1.38 \\ \hline
%%
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:1 $R36$ SHORT & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 1.38 \\ \hline
%% here TR1 should be OFF, as R36 is open we now have an open circuit
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON & TC:2 $R36$ OPEN & open circuit & OPEN CIRCUIT & 12.42\\ \hline
%% here TR1 should be ON and R36 by-passed, the fact it has gone OPEN means no symptom here, a dormant failure.
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:2 $R36$ OPEN & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 12.42\\ \hline
\hline
%
%% TR1 OFF so R36 should be in series. Because TR1 is ON because it is faulty, R36 is not in series
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ LINE ON & TC:3 $TR1$ ALWAYS ON & No added resistance & NO TEST EFFECT & 3 \\ \hline
%%
%% TR1 ON R36 should be bypassed by TR1, and it is, but as TR1 is always on we have a dormant failure.
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:3 $TR1$ ALWAYS ON & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 3 \\ \hline
%%
%% TR1 should be off as overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is ON. As TR1 is faulty it is always off and we have a dormant failure.
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ LINE ON & TC:4 $TR1$ ALWAYS OFF & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 8 \\ \hline
%%
%% TR1 should be ON, but is off due to TR1 failure. The resistance R36 will always be in series therefore
$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:4 $TR1$ ALWAYS OFF & resistance always added & NO TEST EFFECT & 8 \\ \hline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\label{tab:testaddition}
\end{table}
\subsection{Test Cases Analysis in detail}
The purpose of this circuit is to switch a resistance in when we want to test the circuit
and to switch it out for normal operation.
The control is provided by a line called $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$.
Thus to apply the test conditions we set $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ to OFF or false
and to order normal operation we set it to ON or true.
\subsubsection{TC 1}
This test case looks at the shorted resistor failure mode of R36.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON}
Here TR1 should be off and R36 should be in series. As R36 is shorted, this means that
no resistance will be contributed to the circuit by R36.
In the terms of the behaviour
of the functional group, this means that it will provide no test effect.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF}
Here TR1 will be on and by-pass R36, so it does not make any difference if
R36 is shorted. This is a dormant failure, we can only detect this failure
when $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is ON.
\subsubsection{TC 2}
This test case looks at the open circuit resistor failure mode of R36.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON}
Here TR1 should be off and R36 should be in series. As R36 is open, this means that
the test circuit is no open.
In the terms of the behaviour
of the functional group, this means that it will cause an open circuit failure.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF}
Here TR1 will be on and by-pass R36, so it does not make any difference if
R36 is open. This is a dormant failure, we can only detect this failure
when $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is ON.
\subsubsection{TC 3}
This test case looks at the transistor failure mode where TR1 is always ON.
\footnote{The transistor is being used as a switch, and so we can model it as having two failure modes ALWAYS ON or ALWAYS OFF.}
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON}
Here TR1 should be off and R36 should be in series. As TR1 is always ON, this means that
R36 will always be by-passed. Thus there will be no test effect.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF}
Here TR1 should be on and by-pass R36.
This is a dormant failure, we can only detect this failure
when $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is ON.
\subsubsection{TC 4}
This test case looks at the transistor failure mode where TR1 is always OFF.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON}
Here TR1 should be OFF and R36 should be in series.
This is a dormant failure, we can only detect this failure
when the $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is OFF.
\paragraph{$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF}
Here TR1 should be ON, but is OFF due to failure.
The resistance R36 will always be in series.
As a symptom for this circuit, it means that there would be no test effect.
\subsection{conclusion of FMMD analysis on safety addition}
This test circuit has from its four component failure modes,
3 failure symptoms $\{ NO TEST EFFECT, NO SYMPTOM, OPEN CIRCUIT \}$
For the FMMD analysis in table \ref{tab:testaddition} we have two failure modes for its derived component
`no~test~effect' or `open~circuit'. There
$NO SYMPTOM$ failure mode is dormant, but will be revealed when the test~line changes state.
The next stage is to combine the two derived components we have made into
a higher level functional group, see figure \ref{fig:testable_mvamp}.
\section{FMMD Hierarchy, with milli-volt amp and safety addition}
We have created two derived components, the amplifier, and the test~circuit, we
now place them into a new functional group.
We can now analyse this functional
group w.r.t the failure modes of the two derived components.
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=300pt,bb=0 0 698 631,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_design_aide/testable_mvamp.jpg}
% testable_mvamp.jpg: 698x631 pixel, 72dpi, 24.62x22.26 cm, bb=0 0 698 631
\caption{Testable milli-volt amplifier}
\label{fig:testable_mvamp}
\end{figure}
\subsection{Analysis of FMMD Derived component `testable milli-volt amp'}
The failure mode of most concern is the undetectable failure `low~reading'. This has two potential
causes in the unmodified circuit, R22\_SHORT and R18\_OPEN.
\paragraph{R22\_SHORT with safety addition}
With the modified circuit, in the $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ ON condition
TR1 will be off and we will have a reading + test $\Delta V$.
However with $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF we have no potential divider.
R18 will pull the +ve terminal on the op-amp up, pushing the result out of range.
The failure is thus detectable.
\paragraph{R18\_OPEN with safety addition}
Here there is no potential divider. The $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ will have no effect
which ever way it is switched. The failure mode is thus detectable.
\paragraph{Symptom Extraction for the Functional Group `testable mill-volt amplifier'}
We have four failure modes to consider in the functional group `testable mill-volt amplifier'.
These are
\begin{itemize}
\item failure mode: open~potential~divider
\item failure mode: no~test~effect
\item failure mode: out~of~range
\item failure mode: low~reading
\end{itemize}
We can now collect symptoms; `open~potential~divider' from test will cause R18 to pull the +ve input of the opamp high
giving an out of range reading from the op-amp output.
We can group `low~reading' with `out~of~range'.
The `low~reading' will now becomes either `no~test~effect' or `out~of~range' depending on the $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ state.
%
% NB: the calculate MTTF here we have to traverse down the DAG
% adding XOR conditions and multiplying AND conditions
% 16MAR2011
%
\begin{table}[h+]
\caption{Testable Milli Volt Amplifier Single Fault FMMD} % title of Table
\centering % used for centering table
\begin{tabular}{||l|c|l|c||}
\hline \hline
\textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \\ % \textbf{MTTF} \\
\textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
% R & wire & res + & res - & description
\hline
\hline
TC:1 $testcircuit$ & open potential divider & Out of range & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\ \hline
\hline
TC:2 $testcircuit$ & no test effect & no test effect & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\ \hline
\hline
TC:3 $mvamp$ & out of range & Out of Range & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\
\hline
TC:4 $mvamp$ & low reading & Out of range \& no test effect & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\label{tab:fmmdaide2}
\end{table}
We now have two symptoms, `out~of~range' or `no~test~effect'. So for single component failures
we now have a circuit where there are no undetectable failure modes.
We can surmise the symptoms in a list.
\begin{itemize}
\item symptom: \textbf{out~of~range} caused by the failure modes: open~potential~divider, low~reading.
\item symptom: \textbf{no~test~effect} caused by the failure modes: no~test~effect, low~reading.
\end{itemize}
\section{MTTF Reliability statistics}
%\clearpage
\subsection{OP-AMP FIT Calculations}
The DOD electronic reliability of components
document MIL-HDBK-217F~\cite{mil1991}[5.1] gives formulae for calculating
the
%$\frac{failures}{{10}^6}$
${failures}/{{10}^6}$ % looks better
hours for a wide range of generic components.
These figures are based on components from the 1980's and MIL-HDBK-217F
gives very conservative reliability figures when applied to
modern components. The formula for a generic packaged micro~circuit
is reproduced in equation \ref{microcircuitfit}.
The meanings of and values assigned to its co-efficients are described in table \ref{tab:opamp}.
\begin{equation}
{\lambda}_p = (C_1{\pi}_T+C_2{\pi}_E){\pi}_Q{\pi}_L
\label{microcircuitfit}
\end{equation}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% SIL assessment 8 PIN GENERAL OP-AMP
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{table}[ht]
\caption{OP AMP FIT assessment} % title of Table
\centering % used for centering table
\begin{tabular}{||c|c|l||}
\hline \hline
\em{Parameter} & \em{Value} & \em{Comments} \\
& & \\ \hline \hline
$C_1$ & 0.040 & $300 \ge 1000$ BiCMOS transistors \\ \hline
${\pi}_T$ & 1.4 & max temp of $60^o$ C\\ \hline
$C_2$ & 0.0026 & number of functional pins(8) \\ \hline
${\pi}_E$ & 2.0 & ground fixed environment (not benign)\\ \hline
${\pi}_Q$ & 2.0 & Non-Mil spec component\\ \hline
${\pi}_L$ & 1.0 & More than 2 years in production\\ \hline
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}
\label{tab:opamp}
\end{table}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Taking these parameters and applying equation \ref{microcircuitfit},
$$ 0.04 \times 1.4 \times 0.0026 \times 2.0 \times 2.0 \times 1.0 = .0005824 $$
we get a value of $0.0005824 \times {10}^6$ failures per hour.
This is a worst case FIT\footnote{where FIT (Failure in Time) is defined as
failures per Billion (${10}^9$) hours of operation} of 1.
\subsection{Switching Transistor}
The switching transistor will be operating at a low frequency
and well within 50\% of its maximum voltage. We can also assume a benign
temperature environment of $ < 60^{o}C$.
MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1992}[6-25] gives an exmaple
transistor in these environmental conditions, and assigns an FIT value of 11.
%
The RAC failure mode distributuions manual~\cite{fmd91}[2-25] entry for
bi-polar transistors, gives a 0.73 probability of them failing shorted, and a 0.23 probability of them failing OPEN.
%
For this exmaple, we can therefore use a FIT value of 8 ($0.73 \times 11$) the transistor failing
SHORT and a FIT of 3 ($0.27 \times 11$) failing OPEN.
\subsection{Resistors}
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{
The formula for given in MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1991}[9.2] for a generic fixed film non-power resistor
is reproduced in equation \ref{resistorfit}. The meanings
and values assigned to its co-efficients are described in table \ref{tab:resistor}.
\glossary{name={FIT}, description={Failure in Time (FIT). The number of times a particular failure is expected to occur in a $10^{9}$ hour time period.}}
\fmodegloss
\begin{equation}
% fixed comp resistor{\lambda}_p = {\lambda}_{b}{\pi}_{R}{\pi}_Q{\pi}_E
resistor{\lambda}_p = {\lambda}_{b}{\pi}_{R}{\pi}_Q{\pi}_E
\label{resistorfit}
\end{equation}
\begin{table}[ht]
\caption{Fixed film resistor Failure in time assessment} % title of Table
\centering % used for centering table
\begin{tabular}{||c|c|l||}
\hline \hline
\em{Parameter} & \em{Value} & \em{Comments} \\
& & \\ \hline \hline
${\lambda}_{b}$ & 0.00092 & stress/temp base failure rate $60^o$ C \\ \hline
%${\pi}_T$ & 4.2 & max temp of $60^o$ C\\ \hline
${\pi}_R$ & 1.0 & Resistance range $< 0.1M\Omega$\\ \hline
${\pi}_Q$ & 15.0 & Non-Mil spec component\\ \hline
${\pi}_E$ & 1.0 & benign ground environment\\ \hline
\hline \hline
\end{tabular}
\label{tab:resistor}
\end{table}
Applying equation \ref{resistorfit} with the parameters from table \ref{tab:resistor}
give the following failures in ${10}^6$ hours:
\begin{equation}
0.00092 \times 1.0 \times 15.0 \times 1.0 = 0.0138 \;{failures}/{{10}^{6} Hours}
\label{eqn:resistor}
\end{equation}
While MIL-HDBK-217F gives MTTF for a wide range of common components,
it does not specify how the components will fail (in this case OPEN or SHORT). {Some standards, notably EN298 only consider resistors failing in OPEN mode}.
%FMD-97 gives 27\% OPEN and 3\% SHORTED, for resistors under certain electrical and environmental stresses.
% FMD-91 gives parameter change as a third failure mode, luvvverly 08FEB2011
This example
compromises and uses a 90:10 ratio, for resistor failure.
Thus for this example resistors are expected to fail OPEN in 90\% of cases and SHORTED
in the other 10\%.
A standard fixed film resistor, for use in a benign environment, non military spec at
temperatures up to 60\oc is given a probability of 13.8 failures per billion ($10^9$)
hours of operation (see equation \ref{eqn:resistor}).
This figure is referred to as a FIT\footnote{FIT values are measured as the number of
failures per Billion (${10}^9$) hours of operation, (roughly 114,000 years). The smaller the
FIT number the more reliable the fault~mode} Failure in time.
}
{ % CHAPTER
Resistors for this example are considered to have a FIT of 13.8, and are expected to fail OPEN in 90\% of cases and SHORTED
in the other 10\%.
This is described in detail with supporting references in \ref{resistorfit}.
}
\section{Conclusions}
With the safety addition the undetectable failure mode of \textbf{low~reading}
disappears.
However, the overall reliability though goes down !
This is simply because we have more components that {\em can} fail.
%% Safety vs. reliability paradox.
%The sum of the MTTF's for the original circuit is DAH, and for the new one
%DAH.
The circuit is arguably safer now
but statistically less reliable.
\paragraph{Practical side effect of checking for thermocouple disconnection}
Because the potential divider provides an offset as a side effect of detecting a disconnection
resistance in the thermocouple extension or compensation cable will have an effect.
For a `k' type thermocouple this would be of the order of $0.5 { }^{o}C$ for $10\Omega$ of
cable loop impedance. Therefore, accuracy constraints and cable impedance should be considered
to determine specified maximum compensation/extension lengths.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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