Friday work....

presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex

@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@
 
 \section{F.M.E.A.}
 \begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Outline}
-\tableofcontents[currentsection]
+\frametitle{FMEA}
+%\tableofcontents[currentsection]
 \end{frame}
 
 \begin{frame}
-
+\frametitle{FMEA}
 \begin{itemize}
   \pause \item Failure
    \pause \item Mode
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ will return most cost benefit.
  \label{fig:f16missile}
 \end{figure}
 Emphasis on determining criticality of failure.
-Applies some Bayesian statistics (probabilities of component failures and those causing given system level failures).
+Applies some Bayesian statistics (probabilities of component failures and those thereby causing given system level failures).
 \end{frame}
 
 
@@ -340,13 +340,13 @@ The second probability factor $\beta$, is the probability that the failure mode
 will cause a given system failure.
 This corresponds to `Bayesian' probability, given a particular
 component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure.
-
+\pause
 \textbf{FMECA `t' Value}
 The time that a system will be operating for, or the working life time of the product is
 represented by the variable $t$. 
 %for probability of failure on demand studies,
 %this can be the number of  operating cycles or demands expected.
-
+\pause
 \textbf{Severity `s' value}
 A weighting factor to indicate the seriousness of the putative system level error.
 %Typical classifications are as follows:~\cite{fmd91}
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ A weighting factor to indicate the seriousness of the putative system level erro
 \begin{equation}
  C_m  =  {\beta} .  {\alpha} . {{\lambda}_p} . {t} . {s}
 \end{equation}
-
+\pause
 Highest $C_m$ values would be at the top of a `to~do' list
 for a project manager.
 \end{frame}
@@ -533,10 +533,12 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
 \frametitle{FMEA - General Criticism}
 
 \begin{itemize}
+  \pause \item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's.
   \pause \item Reasoning Distance - component failure to system level symptom
   \pause \item State explosion - impossible to perform rigorously
   \pause \item Difficult to re-use previous analysis work
-  \pause \item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's.
+  \pause \item Very Difficult to model simultaneous failures.
+  
 \end{itemize}
 
 %
@@ -555,6 +557,7 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
   \pause \item  Rigorous (total coverage)
    \pause \item Reasoning Traceable  
    \pause \item Re-useable
+ \pause \item Simultaneous failures
   %\pause \item  
 \end{itemize}