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Friday work....

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Robin Clark 2011-10-07 14:29:51 +01:00
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commit fda862cb60
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19
presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex
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@ -19,12 +19,12 @@
\section{F.M.E.A.} \section{F.M.E.A.}
\begin{frame} \begin{frame}
\frametitle{Outline} \frametitle{FMEA}
\tableofcontents[currentsection] %\tableofcontents[currentsection]
\end{frame} \end{frame}
\begin{frame} \begin{frame}
\frametitle{FMEA}
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\pause \item Failure \pause \item Failure
\pause \item Mode \pause \item Mode
@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ will return most cost benefit.
\label{fig:f16missile} \label{fig:f16missile}
\end{figure} \end{figure}
Emphasis on determining criticality of failure. Emphasis on determining criticality of failure.
Applies some Bayesian statistics (probabilities of component failures and those causing given system level failures). Applies some Bayesian statistics (probabilities of component failures and those thereby causing given system level failures).
\end{frame} \end{frame}
@ -340,13 +340,13 @@ The second probability factor $\beta$, is the probability that the failure mode
will cause a given system failure. will cause a given system failure.
This corresponds to `Bayesian' probability, given a particular This corresponds to `Bayesian' probability, given a particular
component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure. component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure.
\pause
\textbf{FMECA `t' Value} \textbf{FMECA `t' Value}
The time that a system will be operating for, or the working life time of the product is The time that a system will be operating for, or the working life time of the product is
represented by the variable $t$. represented by the variable $t$.
%for probability of failure on demand studies, %for probability of failure on demand studies,
%this can be the number of operating cycles or demands expected. %this can be the number of operating cycles or demands expected.
\pause
\textbf{Severity `s' value} \textbf{Severity `s' value}
A weighting factor to indicate the seriousness of the putative system level error. A weighting factor to indicate the seriousness of the putative system level error.
%Typical classifications are as follows:~\cite{fmd91} %Typical classifications are as follows:~\cite{fmd91}
@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ A weighting factor to indicate the seriousness of the putative system level erro
\begin{equation} \begin{equation}
C_m = {\beta} . {\alpha} . {{\lambda}_p} . {t} . {s} C_m = {\beta} . {\alpha} . {{\lambda}_p} . {t} . {s}
\end{equation} \end{equation}
\pause
Highest $C_m$ values would be at the top of a `to~do' list Highest $C_m$ values would be at the top of a `to~do' list
for a project manager. for a project manager.
\end{frame} \end{frame}
@ -533,10 +533,12 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
\frametitle{FMEA - General Criticism} \frametitle{FMEA - General Criticism}
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\pause \item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's.
\pause \item Reasoning Distance - component failure to system level symptom \pause \item Reasoning Distance - component failure to system level symptom
\pause \item State explosion - impossible to perform rigorously \pause \item State explosion - impossible to perform rigorously
\pause \item Difficult to re-use previous analysis work \pause \item Difficult to re-use previous analysis work
\pause \item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's. \pause \item Very Difficult to model simultaneous failures.
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
% %
@ -555,6 +557,7 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
\pause \item Rigorous (total coverage) \pause \item Rigorous (total coverage)
\pause \item Reasoning Traceable \pause \item Reasoning Traceable
\pause \item Re-useable \pause \item Re-useable
\pause \item Simultaneous failures
%\pause \item %\pause \item
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}