arrrghhhhh..... so muh work....

mybib.bib

@@ -269,6 +269,19 @@ Database
 }
 
 
+@article{sanjeev,
+author = {Sanjeev Kumar Appicharla},
+title = {Analysis and modelling of space shuttle challenger accident using management oversight and risk tree(MORT)},
+journal = {7th IET System Safety Conference 2012},
+publisher = {IEEE},
+issn = {},
+url = {},
+doi = {},
+keywords = {System approach to safety, groupthink bias, technology standards, safety critical decision making},
+year = {2012},
+}
+
+
 @article{SMR:SMR580,
 author = {Bachmann, Volker and Messnarz, Richard},
 title = {Improving safety and availability of complex systems by using an integrated design approach in development},

submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 
+%%% CHAPTER 2
+\label{sec:chap2}
 
 The generic and statistical European Safety Standard, EN61508:6\cite{en61508}[B.6.6]
 describes Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) as: 
@@ -141,16 +143,28 @@ approach in looking for system failures.
 
 \section{Theoretical Concepts in FMEA}
 
-
 \paragraph{The unacceptability of a single component failure causing a catastrophe}
-
-FMEA, due to its inductive bottom-up approach, is very good
-at finding potential single component failures that could have catastrophic implications.
+% NEED SOME NICE HISTORICAL REFS HERE
+FMEA, due to its inductive bottom-up approach, is good
+at mapping potential single component failures to system level faults/events.
 Used in the design phase of a project FMEA is an invaluable tool
-for unearthing these  failure scenarios.
-It is less useful for determining catastrophic events for multiple 
+for unearthing potential  failure scenarios.
+FMEA is always performed in the context of the use of the equipment.
+This, put in terms of philosophy, is the subjective and the objective.
+We can using objective reasoning trace a component level failure to a system level event,
+but only in 
+the subjective sense can we determine its severity.
+Failure mode analysis on the leaks possible from the O ring on the space shuttle
+did not link this failure to the catastrophic failure of the spacecraft~\cite{challenger,sanjeev}.
+It is less useful for determining events for multiple 
 simultaneous\footnote{Multiple simultaneous failures are taken to mean failure that occur within the same detection period.} failures.
 
+\paragraph{Failure modes,  dectectable and undetectable}
+Often the effects of  a failure mode may be easy to detect, and our equipment can react by raising an alarm or compensating for the resulting fault.
+Some failure modes may cause undetectable failure, for instance a component that causes
+a measured reading to change could have dire consequences yet not be obvious.
+In fault diagnosis failures are said to be observable and unobservable.
+
 \paragraph{Impracticality of Field Data for modern systems}
 
 Modern electronic components, are generally very reliable, and the systems built from them

submission_thesis/CH5_Examples/copy.tex

@@ -33,29 +33,30 @@ a variety of typical embedded system components including analogue/digital and e
 %
 %This is followed by several example FMMD analyses, 
 \begin{itemize}
- \item The first example applies FMMD to an operational amplifier inverting amplifier (see section~\ref{sec:invamp}) 
+ \item The first example applies FMMD to an operational amplifier inverting amplifier (see section~\ref{sec:invamp}),
 %using an op-amp and two resistors; 
-this demonstrates how the re-use of a potential divider {\dc} from section~\ref{subsec:potdiv}.
+this demonstrates re-use of a potential divider {\dc} from section~\ref{subsec:potdiv}.
 This inverting amplifier is analysed again, but this time with a different
 composition of {\fgs}. The two approaches, i.e. choice of membership for {\fgs},  are then discussed.
 \item Section~\ref{sec:diffamp} analyses a circuit where two op-amps are used 
 to create a differencing amplifier. 
 Building on the two approaches from section~\ref{sec:invamp}, re-use of the non-inverting amplifier {\dc} from section~\ref{sec:invamp}
-is discussed in the context of this circuit, 
-where its re-use is appropriate in the first stage and 
+is examined, 
+where re-use is appropriate in the first stage and 
 not in the second.
 \item Section~\ref{sec:fivepolelp} analyses a Sallen-Key based five pole low pass filter.
-This demonstrates re-use the first Sallen-Key analysis, %encountered as a {\dc}
+It demonstrates re-use the first Sallen-Key analysis, %encountered as a {\dc}
 increasing test efficiency. This example also serves to show a deep hierarchy of {\dcs}.
 \item Section~\ref{sec:bubba} shows FMMD applied to a 
-loop topology---using a `Bubba' oscillator---demonstrating how FMMD id different to fault diagnosis techniques.
+loop topology---using a `Bubba' oscillator---demonstrating how FMMD differs from fault diagnosis techniques.
 %which uses 
 %four op-amp stages with supporting components. 
 Two analysis strategies are employed, one using
-initially identified {\fgs} and the second using a more complex hierarchy of {\fgs} and {\dcs}, showing
+initially identified {\fgs} and the second using a more complex hierarchy of %{\fgs} and 
+{\dcs} showing
 that a finer grained/more de-composed approach offers more re-use possibilities in future analysis tasks.
 \item Section~\ref{sec:sigmadelta} demonstrates FMMD can be applied to mixed analogue and digital circuitry
-using a sigma delta ADC.
+by analysing a sigma delta ADC.
 %shows FMMD analysing the sigma delta 
 %analogue to digital converter---again with a circular signal path---which operates on both 
 %analogue and digital signals.

submission_thesis/CH5_Examples/software.tex

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
  
 
+%%% CHAPTER 6
+\label{sec:chap6}
 
 \section{Software and Hardware Failure Mode Concepts}
 \label{sec:elecsw}
@@ -798,7 +800,9 @@ $$fm (micro-controller) =\{ PROM\_FAULT, RAM\_FAULT, CPU\_FAULT, ALU\_FAULT, CLO
 
 We must start from the bottom-up with the software, and consider the hardware elements
 used (if any) by each software function.
-Starting at the bottom
+Starting at the bottom we form a {\fg} with
+the function read\_ADC.
+