off to juggling, its 20:23
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@ -5,51 +5,53 @@ paper
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describes how the FMMD methodology can be used to refine
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describes how the FMMD methodology can be used to refine
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safety critical designs and identify undetectable and dormant faults.
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safety critical designs and identify undetectable and dormant faults.
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%
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%
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Its uses an industry standard mill-volt amplifier
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As a working example, an industry standard mill-volt amplifier, intended for reading thermocouples,
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circuit, intended for reading thermocouples.
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circuit is analysed.
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It has an inbuilt safety resistor which allows it
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It has an inbuilt `safety~resistor' which allows it
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to detect the thermocouple becoming disconnected/going OPEN.
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to detect the thermocouple becoming disconnected/going OPEN.
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%
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%
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This circuit is analysed from an FMMD perspective and
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This circuit is analysed from an FMMD perspective and
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and two undetectable failure modes are identified.
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and two undetectable failure modes are identified.
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A `safety check' circuit is then proposed and analysed.
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%
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An additional `safety check' circuit is then proposed and analysed.
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This has no undetectable failure modes, but does have one
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This has no undetectable failure modes, but does have one
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`dormant' failure mode.
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`dormant' failure mode.
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%
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%
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This paper shows that once undetectable faults or dormant faults are discovered
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This paper shows that once undetectable faults or dormant faults are discovered
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the design can be altered (or have a safety component added), and the FMMD analysis process re-applied.
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the design can be altered (or have a safety feature added), and the FMMD analysis process can then be re-applied.
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This can be an iterative process applied until the
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This can be an iterative process applied until the
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design has an acceptable level safety. % of dormant or undetectable failure modes.
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design has an acceptable level safety. % of dormant or undetectable failure modes.
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%
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%
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Used in this way, its is a design aide, giving the user
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Used in this way, its is a design aide, giving the user
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the possibility to refine/correct a {\dc} from the perspective
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the possibility to refine a {\dc} from the perspective
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of its failure mode behaviour.
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of its failure mode behaviour.
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}
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}
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}
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}
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{
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{
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\section{Introduction}
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\section{Introduction}
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This chapter
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This chapter
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describes how the FMMD methodology can be used to examine
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describes how the FMMD methodology can be used to refine
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safety critical designs and identify undetectable and dormant faults.
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safety critical designs and identify undetectable and dormant faults.
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%
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%
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Its uses an industry standard mill-volt amplifier
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As a working example, an industry standard mill-volt amplifier, intended for reading thermocouples,
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circuit, intended for reading thermocouples.
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circuit is analysed.
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It has an inbuilt safety resistor which allows it
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It has an inbuilt `safety~resistor' which allows it
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to detect the thermocouple becoming disconnected/going OPEN.
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to detect the thermocouple becoming disconnected/going OPEN.
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%
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%
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This circuit is analysed from an FMMD perspective and
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This circuit is analysed from an FMMD perspective and
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and two undetectable failure modes are identified.
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and two undetectable failure modes are identified.
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A `safety check' circuit is then proposed and analysed.
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%
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An additional `safety check' circuit is then proposed and analysed.
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This has no undetectable failure modes, but does have one
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This has no undetectable failure modes, but does have one
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`dormant' failure mode.
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`dormant' failure mode.
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%
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%
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This paper shows that once undetectable faults or dormant faults are discovered
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This paper shows that once undetectable faults or dormant faults are discovered
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the design can be altered (or have a safety component added), and the FMMD analysis process re-applied.
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the design can be altered (or have a safety feature added), and the FMMD analysis process can then be re-applied.
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This can be an iterative process applied until the
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This can be an iterative process applied until the
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design has an acceptable level safety. % of dormant or undetectable failure modes.
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design has an acceptable level safety. % of dormant or undetectable failure modes.
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%
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%
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Used in this way, its is a design aide, giving the user
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Used in this way, its is a design aide, giving the user
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the possibility to refine/correct a {\dc} from the perspective
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the possibility to refine a {\dc} from the perspective
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of its failure mode behaviour.
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of its failure mode behaviour.
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}
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}
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@ -101,8 +103,8 @@ are the symptoms of the {\fg} we derived it from.
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}
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}
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%
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%
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\paragraph{Undetectable failure modes.}
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\paragraph{Undetectable failure modes.}
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The symptoms will be detectable (like a value out of range)
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Within a functional group failure symptoms will be detectable
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or undetectable (like a logic state or value being incorrect).
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or undetectable.
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The `undetectable' failure modes understandably, are the most worrying for the safety critical designer.
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The `undetectable' failure modes understandably, are the most worrying for the safety critical designer.
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EN61058~\cite{en61508}, the statistically based failure mode European Norm, using ratios
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EN61058~\cite{en61508}, the statistically based failure mode European Norm, using ratios
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of detected and undetected system failure modes to
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of detected and undetected system failure modes to
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@ -206,12 +208,14 @@ Choosing the common Nickel-Chromium v. Nickel Aluminium `K' type thermocouple,
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Multiplying these by 184 and adding the 1.86mV offset gives
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Multiplying these by 184 and adding the 1.86mV offset gives
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342.24mV and 2563.12mV. This is now in a suitable range to be read by
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342.24mV and 2563.12mV. This is now in a suitable range to be read by
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an analogue digital converter, which will have a voltage span
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an analogue digital converter, which will have a voltage span
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typically between 3.3V and 5V on modern micro-controllers/ADC (Analogue Digital Converter) chips.
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typically between 3.3V and 5V~\cite{pic18f2523}.% on modern micro-controllers/ADC (Analogue Digital Converter) chips.
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Note that this also leaves a margin or error on both sides of the range.
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Note that this also leaves a margin or error on both sides of the range.
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If the thermocouple were to become colder than {{0}\oc} it would supply
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If the thermocouple were to become colder than {{0}\oc} it would supply
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a negative voltage, which would subtract from the offset.
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a negative voltage, which would subtract from the offset.
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At around {{-47}\oc} the amplifier output would be zero;
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At around {{-47}\oc} the amplifier output would be zero;
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but anything under 342.24mV is considered out of range.
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but anything under say 10mV is considered out of range\footnote{We need some negative range
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to cope with cold junction compensation~\cite{aoe},
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which is a subject beyond the scope of this paper}.
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Thus the ADC can comfortably read out of range values
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Thus the ADC can comfortably read out of range values
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but controlling software can determine it as invalid.
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but controlling software can determine it as invalid.
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Similarly anything over 2563.12mV would be considered out of range
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Similarly anything over 2563.12mV would be considered out of range
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@ -284,8 +288,8 @@ if the reading is considered critical, or we are aiming for a high integrity lev
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this may be unacceptable.
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this may be unacceptable.
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We will need to add some type of detection mechanism to the circuit to
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We will need to add some type of detection mechanism to the circuit to
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test $R_{off}$ periodically.
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test $R_{off}$ periodically.
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For instance were we to check $R_off$ every $\tau = 20mS$ work out detection
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%For instance were we to check $R_{off}$ every $\tau = 20mS$ work out detection
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allowance according to EN61508~\cite{en61508}.
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%allowance according to EN61508~\cite{en61508}.
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\section{Proposed Checking Method}
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\section{Proposed Checking Method}
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@ -298,7 +302,7 @@ With the new resistor switched in we would expect
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the voltage added by the potential divider
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the voltage added by the potential divider
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to increase.
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to increase.
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The circuit in figure \ref{fig:mvamp2} shows an FET transistor
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The circuit in figure \ref{fig:mvamp2} shows an bi-polar transistor % yes its menally ill and goes on mad shopping spreees etc
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controlled by the `test line' connection, which can switch in the resitor R36
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controlled by the `test line' connection, which can switch in the resitor R36
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also with a value of \ohms{820}.
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also with a value of \ohms{820}.
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@ -357,7 +361,7 @@ and the reading is assumed to be valid.
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\centering % used for centering table
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\centering % used for centering table
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\begin{tabular}{||l|l|c|l|c||}
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\begin{tabular}{||l|l|c|l|c||}
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\hline \hline
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\hline \hline
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\textbf{test line } & \textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \textbf{MTTF} \\
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\textbf{test line } & \textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \\ %\textbf{MTTF} \\
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\textbf{status} & \textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
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\textbf{status} & \textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
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% R & wire & res + & res - & description
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% R & wire & res + & res - & description
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\hline
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\hline
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@ -373,16 +377,16 @@ $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:2 $R36$ OPEN & dormant failure
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\hline
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\hline
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%
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%
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%% TR1 OFF so R36 should be in series. Because TR1 is ON because it is faulty, R36 is not in series
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%% TR1 OFF so R36 should be in series. Because TR1 is ON because it is faulty, R36 is not in series
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ LINE ON & TC:3 $TR1$ ALWAYS ON & No added resistance & NO TEST EFFECT & XX 1.38 \\ \hline
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ LINE ON & TC:3 $TR1$ ALWAYS ON & No added resistance & NO TEST EFFECT & 3 \\ \hline
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%%
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%%
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%% TR1 ON R36 should be bypassed by TR1, and it is, but as TR1 is always on we have a dormant failure.
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%% TR1 ON R36 should be bypassed by TR1, and it is, but as TR1 is always on we have a dormant failure.
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:3 $TR1$ ALWAYS ON & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & XX 1.38 \\ \hline
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:3 $TR1$ ALWAYS ON & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 3 \\ \hline
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%%
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%%
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%% TR1 should be off as overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is ON. As TR1 is faulty it is always off and we have a dormant failure.
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%% TR1 should be off as overline{TEST\_LINE}$ is ON. As TR1 is faulty it is always off and we have a dormant failure.
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ LINE ON & TC:4 $TR1$ ALWAYS OFF & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 1.38 \\ \hline
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ LINE ON & TC:4 $TR1$ ALWAYS OFF & dormant failure & NO SYMPTOM & 8 \\ \hline
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%%
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%%
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%% TR1 should be ON, but is off due to TR1 failure. The resistance R36 will always be in series therefore
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%% TR1 should be ON, but is off due to TR1 failure. The resistance R36 will always be in series therefore
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:4 $TR1$ ALWAYS OFF & resistance always added & NO TEST EFFECT & 1.38 \\ \hline
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$\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ OFF & TC:4 $TR1$ ALWAYS OFF & resistance always added & NO TEST EFFECT & 8 \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\end{tabular}
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\label{tab:testaddition}
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\label{tab:testaddition}
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@ -502,23 +506,30 @@ giving an out of range reading from the op-amp output.
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We can group `low~reading' with `out~of~range'.
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We can group `low~reading' with `out~of~range'.
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The `low~reading' will now becomes either `no~test~effect' or `out~of~range' depending on the $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ state.
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The `low~reading' will now becomes either `no~test~effect' or `out~of~range' depending on the $\overline{TEST\_LINE}$ state.
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%
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% NB: the calculate MTTF here we have to traverse down the DAG
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% adding XOR conditions and multiplying AND conditions
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% 16MAR2011
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%
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\caption{Testable Milli Volt Amplifier Single Fault FMMD} % title of Table
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\caption{Testable Milli Volt Amplifier Single Fault FMMD} % title of Table
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\centering % used for centering table
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\centering % used for centering table
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\begin{tabular}{||l|c|l|c||}
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\begin{tabular}{||l|c|l|c||}
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\hline \hline
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\hline \hline
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\textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \textbf{MTTF} \\
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\textbf{Test} & \textbf{Failure } & \textbf{Symptom } & \\ % \textbf{MTTF} \\
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\textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
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\textbf{Case} & \textbf{mode} & \textbf{ } & \\ % \textbf{per $10^9$ hours of operation} \\
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% R & wire & res + & res - & description
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% R & wire & res + & res - & description
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\hline
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\hline
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\hline
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\hline
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TC:1 $testcircuit$ & open potential divider & Out of range & XX 1.38 \\ \hline
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TC:1 $testcircuit$ & open potential divider & Out of range & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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TC:2 $testcircuit$ & no test effect & no test effect & XX 1.38 \\ \hline
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TC:2 $testcircuit$ & no test effect & no test effect & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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TC:3 $mvamp$ & out of range & Out of Range & XX 1.38 \\
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TC:3 $mvamp$ & out of range & Out of Range & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\
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\hline
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\hline
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TC:4 $mvamp$ & low reading & Out of range \& no test effect & XX 1.38 \\
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TC:4 $mvamp$ & low reading & Out of range \& no test effect & \\ \hline % XX 1.38 \\
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\hline
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\end{tabular}
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@ -598,6 +609,78 @@ and well within 50\% of its maximum voltage. We can also assume a benign
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temperature environment of $ < 60^{o}C$.
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temperature environment of $ < 60^{o}C$.
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MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1992}[6-25] gives an exmaple
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MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1992}[6-25] gives an exmaple
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transistor in these environmental conditions, and assigns an FIT value of 11.
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transistor in these environmental conditions, and assigns an FIT value of 11.
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%
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The RAC failure mode distributuions manual~\cite{fmd91}[2-25] entry for
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bi-polar transistors, gives a 0.73 probability of them failing shorted, and a 0.23 probability of them failing OPEN.
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%
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For this exmaple, we can therefore use a FIT value of 8 ($0.73 \times 11$) the transistor failing
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SHORT and a FIT of 3 ($0.27 \times 11$) failing OPEN.
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\subsection{Resistors}
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\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
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{
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The formula for given in MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1991}[9.2] for a generic fixed film non-power resistor
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is reproduced in equation \ref{resistorfit}. The meanings
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and values assigned to its co-efficients are described in table \ref{tab:resistor}.
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\glossary{name={FIT}, description={Failure in Time (FIT). The number of times a particular failure is expected to occur in a $10^{9}$ hour time period.}}
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\fmodegloss
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\begin{equation}
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% fixed comp resistor{\lambda}_p = {\lambda}_{b}{\pi}_{R}{\pi}_Q{\pi}_E
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resistor{\lambda}_p = {\lambda}_{b}{\pi}_{R}{\pi}_Q{\pi}_E
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\label{resistorfit}
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\end{equation}
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\caption{Fixed film resistor Failure in time assessment} % title of Table
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\centering % used for centering table
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\begin{tabular}{||c|c|l||}
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\hline \hline
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\em{Parameter} & \em{Value} & \em{Comments} \\
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& & \\ \hline \hline
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${\lambda}_{b}$ & 0.00092 & stress/temp base failure rate $60^o$ C \\ \hline
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%${\pi}_T$ & 4.2 & max temp of $60^o$ C\\ \hline
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${\pi}_R$ & 1.0 & Resistance range $< 0.1M\Omega$\\ \hline
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${\pi}_Q$ & 15.0 & Non-Mil spec component\\ \hline
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${\pi}_E$ & 1.0 & benign ground environment\\ \hline
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\hline \hline
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\end{tabular}
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\label{tab:resistor}
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\end{table}
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Applying equation \ref{resistorfit} with the parameters from table \ref{tab:resistor}
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give the following failures in ${10}^6$ hours:
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\begin{equation}
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0.00092 \times 1.0 \times 15.0 \times 1.0 = 0.0138 \;{failures}/{{10}^{6} Hours}
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\label{eqn:resistor}
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\end{equation}
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While MIL-HDBK-217F gives MTTF for a wide range of common components,
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it does not specify how the components will fail (in this case OPEN or SHORT). {Some standards, notably EN298 only consider resistors failing in OPEN mode}.
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%FMD-97 gives 27\% OPEN and 3\% SHORTED, for resistors under certain electrical and environmental stresses.
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% FMD-91 gives parameter change as a third failure mode, luvvverly 08FEB2011
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This example
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compromises and uses a 90:10 ratio, for resistor failure.
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Thus for this example resistors are expected to fail OPEN in 90\% of cases and SHORTED
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in the other 10\%.
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A standard fixed film resistor, for use in a benign environment, non military spec at
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temperatures up to 60\oc is given a probability of 13.8 failures per billion ($10^9$)
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hours of operation (see equation \ref{eqn:resistor}).
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This figure is referred to as a FIT\footnote{FIT values are measured as the number of
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failures per Billion (${10}^9$) hours of operation, (roughly 114,000 years). The smaller the
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FIT number the more reliable the fault~mode} Failure in time.
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}
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{ % CHAPTER
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Resistors for this example are considered to have a FIT of 13.8, and are expected to fail OPEN in 90\% of cases and SHORTED
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in the other 10\%.
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This is described in detail with supporting references in \ref{resistorfit}.
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}
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\section{Conclusions}
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\section{Conclusions}
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@ -605,14 +688,12 @@ With the safety addition the undetectable failure mode of \textbf{low~reading}
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disappears.
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disappears.
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However, the overall reliability though goes down !
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However, the overall reliability though goes down !
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This is simply because we have more components that {\em can} fail.
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This is simply because we have more components that {\em can} fail.
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%% Safety vs. reliability paradox.
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%% Safety vs. reliability paradox.
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%The sum of the MTTF's for the original circuit is DAH, and for the new one
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The sum of the MTTF's for the original circuit is DAH, and for the new one
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%DAH.
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DAH. The circuit is arguably safer now
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The circuit is arguably safer now
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but statistically less reliable.
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but statistically less reliable.
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\paragraph{Practical side effect of checking for thermocouple disconnection}
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\paragraph{Practical side effect of checking for thermocouple disconnection}
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Because the potential divider provides an offset as a side effect of detecting a disconnection
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Because the potential divider provides an offset as a side effect of detecting a disconnection
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