From ee84cdc9c28101b3d00fbd5376b06f53d7bc5d69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Your Name <robin48gx@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 08:45:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] morning edit, and made Makefile

---
 papers/software_fmea/Makefile          | 13 ++++++++++++
 papers/software_fmea/software_fmea.tex | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 papers/software_fmea/Makefile

diff --git a/papers/software_fmea/Makefile b/papers/software_fmea/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c08d631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/papers/software_fmea/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+
+PNG = 
+
+%.png:%.dia
+	dia -t png $<
+
+
+all:
+	pdflatex software_fmea
+	acroread software_fmea.pdf
+
+bib:
+	bibtex software_fmea
diff --git a/papers/software_fmea/software_fmea.tex b/papers/software_fmea/software_fmea.tex
index 4b3b01e..6cf2854 100644
--- a/papers/software_fmea/software_fmea.tex
+++ b/papers/software_fmea/software_fmea.tex
@@ -136,11 +136,12 @@ It is used both as a design tool (to determine weakness), and is a requirement o
 FMEA has been successfully applied to mechanical, electrical and hybrid electro-mechanical systems.
 
 At present no technique for Software FMEA known to the authors exists.
+Software generally, sits on top of most safety critical control systems
+and defines its most important system wide behaviour and communications.
 Standards~\cite{en298}~\cite{en61508} that use FMEA
 do not specify it for Software, but do specify, good practise,
 review processes and language feature constraints.
-Software generally, sits on top of most safety critical control systems
-and 
+ 
 This is a weakness; where FMEA scientifically traces component {\fms}
 to resultant system failures; software has been left in a non-analytical
 limbo of best practises and constraints.
@@ -168,14 +169,37 @@ to existing software\footnote{Existing software excluding recursive code, and un
  
 \section{FMEA Process}
 
+What FMEA is, briefly variants...
+
 \section{Modularising FMEA}
 
+Advantages to modularisation, ref SYS SAFETY 2011 paper,
+
 \section{Software: How can we apply FMEA}
 
+If FMEA can be applied to software we can build complete failure models
+of typical modern safety critical systems.
+With modular FMEA (FMMD) we have the concepts of failure~modes
+of components, {\fgs} and symptoms of failure for a functional group.
+
+A  programatic function is very similar to a functional group.
+It calls other functions, which could be viewed as its `components'.
+It has outputs which will be used by functiona that may call it.
+
+However, we need to define a clear concept of failure modes of a function in order to
+map FMMD to software.
+
 \subsection{Software, a natural hierarchy}
 
 Same as FMMD !
 
+Software written for safety critical systems is usually constrained to
+be modular~\cite{en61508}[bb]~\cite{misra}[cc] and non recursive~\cite{misra}[aa].
+Because of this we can assume a direct call tree.  Functions call functions
+from the top down and eventually call the lowest level library or IO
+functions that interact with hardware/electronics.
+
+
 \subsection{Contract programming description}
 
 \subsubsection{Mapping contract pre-condition violations to failure modes}