PFMEA with ford pinto

presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex

@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ to do this completely (all failure modes against all components).
 This is represented in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp},
 where $N$ is the total number of components in the system, and 
 $cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component.
+\end{frame}
+
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Rigorous Single Failure FMEA}
+
 
 \begin{equation}
   \label{eqn:fmea_single}
@@ -125,6 +131,42 @@ double failure scenarios (for burner lock-out scenarios).
 
 \end{frame}
 
+\section{FMEA used for Saftey Critical Aprovals}
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
+Experts from Approval House and Equipement Manufacturer
+discuss selected component failure modes
+judged to be in critical sections of the product.
+
+
+\begin{figure}[h]
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics[width=100pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./tech_meeting.png}
+ % tech_meeting.png: 350x299 pixel, 300dpi, 2.97x2.53 cm, bb=0 0 84 72
+ \caption{FMEA  Meeting}
+ \label{fig:tech_meeting}
+\end{figure}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
+
+\begin{figure}[h]
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics[width=70pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./tech_meeting.png}
+ % tech_meeting.png: 350x299 pixel, 300dpi, 2.97x2.53 cm, bb=0 0 84 72
+ \caption{FMEA  Meeting}
+ \label{fig:tech_meeting}
+\end{figure}
+
+\begin{itemize}
+  \pause \item Impossible to look at all component failures let alone apply FMEA rigorously.
+  \pause \item In practise, failure scenarios for critical sections are contested, and either justified or extra safety measures implemented.
+   \pause \item Meeting notes or minutes only.
+\end{itemize}
+
+\end{frame}
+
 \section{PFMEA - Production FMEA : 1940's to present}
 
 \begin{frame}
@@ -145,6 +187,34 @@ will return most cost benefit.
 \begin{frame}
 % benign example of PFMEA in CARS - make something up.
 \frametitle{PFMEA Example}
+
+{
+\begin{table}[ht]
+\caption{FMEA Calculations} % title of Table
+%\centering % used for centering table
+\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
+ \textbf{Failure Mode} &   \textbf{P}             & \textbf{Cost}        &  \textbf{Symptom} & \textbf{RPN} \\ \hline \hline
+      relay 1 n/c      & $1*10^{-5}$              &  38.0                & indicators fail   & 0.00038 \\ \hline
+        relay 2 n/c      & $1*10^{-5}$              &  98.0                & doorlocks fail   & 0.00098 \\ \hline
+%       rear end crash    &  $14.4*10^{-6}$         & 267,700              & fatal fire       &  3.855 \\
+%       ruptured f.tank   &                         &                      &                  &        \\ \hline
+
+
+\hline
+\end{tabular}
+\end{table}
+}
+
+%Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles. Unit Cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle.
+%Total Benefit: 180 X ($200,000) + 180 X ($67,000) + $2,100 X ($700) = $49.5 million.
+%COSTS
+%Sales: 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks.
+%Unit Cost: $11 per car, $11 per truck.
+%Total Cost: 11,000,000 X ($11) + 1,500,000 X ($11) = $137 million.
+
+
+ 
+
 \end{frame}
 
 
@@ -152,25 +222,134 @@ will return most cost benefit.
 %\subsection{Production FMEA : Example Ford Pinto : 1975}
 \begin{frame}
  \frametitle{PFMEA Example: Ford Pinto: 1975}
+
+\begin{figure}[h]
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics[width=200pt]{./ad_ford_pinto_mpg_red_3_1975.jpg}
+ % ad_ford_pinto_mpg_red_3_1975.jpg: 720x933 pixel, 96dpi, 19.05x24.69 cm, bb=0 0 540 700
+ \caption{Ford Pinto Advert}
+ \label{fig:fordpintoad}
+\end{figure}
+
 \end{frame}
+
+
+ \begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{PFMEA Example: Ford Pinto: 1975}
+
+\begin{figure}[h]
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics[width=200pt]{./burntoutpinto.png}
+ % burntoutpinto.png: 376x250 pixel, 72dpi, 13.26x8.82 cm, bb=0 0 376 250
+ \caption{Burnt Out Pinto}
+ \label{fig:burntoutpinto}
+\end{figure}
+
+
+\end{frame}
+
+
+\begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{PFMEA Example: Ford Pinto: 1975}
+ {
+\begin{table}[ht]
+\caption{FMEA Calculations} % title of Table
+%\centering % used for centering table
+\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
+ \textbf{Failure Mode} &   \textbf{P}             & \textbf{Cost}        &  \textbf{Symptom} & \textbf{RPN} \\ \hline \hline
+      relay 1 n/c      & $1*10^{-5}$              &  38.0                & indicators fail   & 0.00038 \\ \hline
+        relay 2 n/c      & $1*10^{-5}$              &  98.0                & doorlocks fail   & 0.00098 \\ \hline
+       rear end crash    &  $14.4*10^{-6}$         & 267,700              & fatal fire       &  3.855 \\
+       ruptured f.tank   &                         &                      & allow               &        \\ \hline
+
+     rear end crash    &  $1$                      &  $11$             & fatal fire       &   11.0 \\
+       ruptured f.tank   &                         &                      & fix tank              &        \\ \hline
+
+\hline
+\end{tabular}
+\end{table}
+}
+
  
+ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcNeorjXMrE
+ 
+\end{frame}
+
 
 \section{FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticallity Analysis}
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticallity Analysis}
+Very similar to PFMEA, but instead of cost, a criticallity or
+seriousness factor is ascribed to putative top level incidents.
+FMECA has three probability factors for component failures.
+
+\textbf{FMECA ${\lambda}_{p}$ value.}
+This is the overall failure rate of a base component.
+This will typically be the failure rate per million ($10^6$) or
+billion ($10^9$) hours of operation.
+
+\textbf{FMECA $\alpha$ value.}
+The failure mode probability, usually dentoted by $\alpha$ is the  probability of 
+is the probability of a particular failure
+mode occuring within a component.
+%, should it fail.
+%A component with N failure modes will thus have
+%have an $\alpha$ value associated with each of those modes.
+%As the $\alpha$ modes are probabilities, the sum of all $\alpha$ modes for a component must equal one.
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticallity Analysis}
+\textbf{FMECA $\beta$ value.}
+The second probability factor $\beta$, is the probability that the failure mode
+will cause a given system failure.
+This corresponds to `Baysian' probability, given a particular
+component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure.
+
+\textbf{FMECA `t' Value}
+The time that a system will be operating for, or the working life time of the product is
+represented by the variable $t$. 
+%for probability of failure on demand studies,
+%this can be the number of  operating cycles or demands expected.
+
+\textbf{Severity `s' value}
+A weighting factor to indicate the seriousness of the putative system level error.
+%Typical classifications are as follows:~\cite{fmd91}
+
+\begin{equation}
+ C_m  =  {\beta} .  {\alpha} . {{\lambda}_p} . {t} . {s}
+\end{equation}
+
+Highest $C_m$ values would be at the top of a `to~do' list
+for a project manager.
+\end{frame}
+
+
 
 \section{FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
-
-
-\section{FMEA - Criticism}
 \begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
+FMEDA is the methodology behind statistical (safety integrity level)
+type standards (EN61508/IOC5108).
+It provides a statistical overall level of safety
+and allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking etc.
+\end{frame}
 
 
+\section{FMEA - General Criticism}
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{FMEA - General Criticism}
+
 \begin{itemize}
   \pause \item Reasoning Distance - component failure to system level symptom
    \pause \item State explosion - impossible to perform rigorously
-   \pause \item 
-  \pause \item 
+   \pause \item Difficult to re-use previous analysis work
+  \pause \item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's.
 \end{itemize}
 
+FMEDA is an extension of FMEA, in that it will give higher ratings
+for self checking. It
+
 \end{frame}
 
 
@@ -252,14 +431,14 @@ we must compare each failure mode against the two other components (the `$fgn-1$
 For the one `zero' level FMMD case we are doing the same thing as FMEA type analysis
 (but on a very simple small sub-system).
 We are looking at how each failure~mode can effect the system/top level.
-We can use equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp} to represent 
+We can use equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp44} to represent 
 the number of checks to rigorously perform FMEA, where $N$ is the total
 number of components in the system, and $cfm$ is the number of failures per component.
 
 
 
 Where $N=3$ and $cfm=3$ we can see that  the number of checks for this simple functional 
-group is the same for equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
+group is the same for equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp22}
 and equation~\ref{eqn:anscen}.
 \clearpage
 
@@ -272,7 +451,7 @@ will require 81 base level components.
 
 $$
 %\begin{equation}
-  \label{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
+  \label{eqn:fmea_state_exp22}
   81.(81-1).3 = 19440 % \\
   %(N^2 - N).cfm 
 %\end{equation}