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@ -346,15 +346,15 @@ The following gives an outline of the procedure.
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\subsubsection{Two statistical perspectives}
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he Statistical Analysis method is used from two perspectives,
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FMEDA is a statistical analysis methodology is used from one of two perspectives,
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Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD), and Probability of Failure
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in continuous Operation, Failure in Time (FIT).
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in continuous Operation, or Failure in Time (FIT).
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\paragraph{Failure in Time (FIT).} Continuous operation is measured in failures per billion ($10^9$) hours of operation.
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For a continuously running nuclear powerstation
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we would be interested in its operational FIT values.
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\paragraph{Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD).} For instance with the anti-lock system on a automobile braking
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system, we would be interested in PFD.
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\paragraph{Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD).} For instance with an anti-lock system in
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automobile braking, we would be interested in PFD.
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That is to say the ratio of it failing
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to succeeding on demand.
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@ -364,44 +364,47 @@ to succeeding on demand.
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The first stage is to apply FMEA to the SYSTEM.
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%
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Each component is analysed in terms of how its failure
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would affact the system.%
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would affect the system.
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Failure rates of individual components in the SYSTEM
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are calculated based on component type and
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environmental conditions.
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%
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Statistical data exists for most component types \cite{mil1992}.
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%
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This phase is typically implemented on a spreadsheet. Along with a components
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type, placing in the system, part number, environmental stress factors etc.
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This phase is typically implemented on a spreadsheet
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with rows representing each component. A typical component spreadshet row would
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comprise of
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component type, placing in the system, part number, environmental stress factors, MTTF etc.
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%will be a determination of whether the component failing will lead to a `safe'
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%or `unsafe' condition.
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\paragraph{Overall SYSTEM failure rate.}
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Product failure rate is the sum of all component
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failure rates. This is the sum of safe and unsafe
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failures.
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The product failure rate is the sum of all component
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failure rates.
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%This is the sum of safe and unsafe
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%failures.
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\paragraph{Self Diagnostics}
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We next evaluate the SYSTEMS’s self-diagnostic ability.
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We next evaluate the SYSTEM's self-diagnostic ability.
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Each component’s failure modes and failure rate are now available.
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%Each component’s failure modes and failure rate are now available.
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Failure modes are now classified as safe or dangerous.
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This is done by taking a component failure mode and determining
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how it will react with any other components in the SYSTEM and taking a decision
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based on hueristics.
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how it may react with any other components in the SYSTEM, and taking a final decision
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based on hueristics or field data.
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Detectable failure probabilities are labelled `$\lambda_D$' (for
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dangerous) and `$\lambda_S$' (for safe) \cite{EN61508}.
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\paragraph{Determine Detectable and Undetecable Failures}
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Each safe and dangerous failure mode is now
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determined as detectable or un-detectable by the SYSTEMS’s
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determined as detectable or un-detectable by the SYSTEM’s
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self checking features.
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%
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This gives us four failure mode classifications:
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This gives us four level failure mode classifications:
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Safe-Detected (SD), Safe-Undetected (SU), Dangerous-Detected (DD) or Dangerous-Undetected (DU),
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and the failure rate of each classification
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and the probablistic failure rate of each classification
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is represented by lambda variables
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($\lambda_{SD}$, $\lambda_{SU}$, $\lambda_{DD}$, $\lambda_{DU}$).
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(i.e. $\lambda_{SD}$, $\lambda_{SU}$, $\lambda_{DD}$, $\lambda_{DU}$).
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Because some failure modes may not be discovered theoretically during the static
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analysis, the
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@ -409,11 +412,11 @@ analysis, the
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% and guess how it will affect an ENTIRE complex SYSTEM
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next step is to investigate using an actual working SYSTEM.
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Failures are deliberately caused (by physical intervetion), and any new SYSTEM level
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Failures are deliberately caused (by physical intervention), and any new SYSTEM level
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failures are added to the model.
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Hueristics and MTTF failure rate for the components
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Hueristics and MTTF failure rates for the components
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are used to calculate probabilities for these new failure modes
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according to their saefty and detectability classifications (i.e.
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along with their safety and detectability classifications (i.e.
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$\lambda_{SD}$, $\lambda_{SU}$, $\lambda_{DD}$, $\lambda_{DU}$).
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These new failures are added to the model.
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%SD, SU, DD, DU.
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@ -441,7 +444,7 @@ $$ SF = \frac{\Sigma\lambda_SD}{\Sigma\lambda_S} $$
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\paragraph{Safe Failure Fraction.}
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A key concept in FMEDA is Safe Failure Fraction (SFF).
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This is the ratio of safe and dangerous detected failures
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against the safe and dangerous failure probabilities.
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against all safe and dangerous failure probabilities.
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Again this is usually expressed as a percentage.
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$$ SFF = \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_{DD} \big) / \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_D \big) $$
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@ -476,20 +479,26 @@ have threshold bands beoming stricter for each level.
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Software techniques and constraints are
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also become stricter for each SIL level.
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FMEDA uses MTFF and other statistical models to determine the probability of
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failures occurring, and provide an adaquate risk level.
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Thus FMEDA uses statistical methods to determine
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a safety level (SIL), typically used to meet an acceptable risk
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value, specified for the environment the SYSTEM must work in.
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%the probability of
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%failures occurring, and provide an adaquate risk level.
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%
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%A component failure mode, given its MTTF
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%the probability of detecting the fault and its safety relevant validation time $\tau$,
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%contributes a simple risk factor that is summed
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%in to give a final risk result.
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%
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Thus a statistical
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Thus an FMEDA
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model can be implemented on a spreadsheet, where each component
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has a calculated risk, a fault detection time (if any), an estimated risk importance
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and other factors such as de-rating and environmental stress.
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With one component failure mode per row,
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all the statistical factors for SIL rating can be produced\footnote{A SIL rating will apply to an installed plant, i.e. A complete SYSTEM. SIL ratings for individual components or sub-systems are meaningless, and the nearest equivalent would be the FIT/PFD and SFF and diagnostic coverage figures}.
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all the statistical factors for SIL rating can be produced\footnote{A SIL rating will apply
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to an installed plant, i.e. A complete SYSTEM. SIL ratings for individual components or
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sub-systems are meaningless, and the nearest equivalent would be the FIT/PFD and SFF and diagnostic coverage figures.}.
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