tidy up of CH4 after WE removal, CH5 and CH6 next, better check App A too
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ FMMD is in essence a modularised variant of traditional FMEA~\cite{sccs}[pp.34-
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%
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In order to analyse from the bottom-up and apply a modular methodology,
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small groups of components that naturally
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work together to perform a simple function are chosen: these groups are termed `{\fgs}'.
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work together to perform simple functions are chosen: these groups are termed `{\fgs}'.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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%
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@ -60,34 +60,31 @@ All the failure modes of all the components within a {\fg} are collected.
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%A flat set is a set containing just the failure modes and not sets of failure modes~\cite{joyofsets}[p.8].
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%
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Each component failure mode can considered as a `failure~scenario' or 'test~case'
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applied to a {\fg}.
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to be applied applied to the {\fg}.
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%
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Each of these failure modes, and optionally combinations of them, are
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formed into test~cases which
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are analysed for their effect on the failure mode behaviour of the `{\fg}'.
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are analysed for their effect on the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg}.
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%
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Once the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg} is obtained, its symptoms of failure can be determined.
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%,
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%or the failure modes of the {\dc}.
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%for the {\fg}.
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%
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These symptoms are treated as failure modes of the {\fg}.
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These symptoms are then treated as failure modes of the {\fg}.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossSYMPTOM
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%Or in other words
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That is, how the {\fg} can fail has been determined.
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%
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As a set of failure modes has been defined for the {\fg} it can be treated as a component.
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As a set of failure modes has been defined for the {\fg} it can be treated as a component in its own right.
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%
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The {\fg} can be considered as a `{\dc}' % sort of super component
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with its own set of failure modes.
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%
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\fmmdglossDC
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%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% UP TO HERE IN WE REMOVAL 11SEP2013
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%
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%This {\dc} has a set of failure modes: we can thus treat it as a `higher~level' component.
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%
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@ -125,7 +122,7 @@ thus avoiding state explosion).
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%% GARK BEGIN
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The principles of FMMD are demonstrated, by using it to analyse a
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commonly used circuit, a non-inverting amplifier built from an op amp~\cite{aoe}[p.234] and
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common circuit, the non-inverting amplifier built from an op amp~\cite{aoe}[p.234] and
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two resistors; a circuit schematic for this is shown in figure \ref{fig:noninvamp}.
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%
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\begin{figure}[h+]
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@ -201,7 +198,7 @@ a failure in
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the potential~dividers' operation.
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%
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For instance
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if resistor $R_1$ were to become open, then the potential~divider would not be grounded and the
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if resistor $R_1$ were to go open, then the potential~divider would not be grounded and the
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voltage output from it would float high (+ve).
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%
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This would mean the resulting failure of the potential~divider would be voltage high output.
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@ -352,8 +349,8 @@ This {\dc} will have two failure modes, $HighPD$ and $LowPD$.
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% The derived component is defined by its failure modes and
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% the functional group used to derive it.
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% %piss can consider this an an orthogonal WHAT???? Group ???? Collection ????
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With this {\dc} model for a generic potential divider, it can be used
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as a building block for other {\fgs} in the same way the base components $R1$ and $R2$ were.
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This {\dc} model for a generic potential divider can be used
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as a building block for other {\fgs} in the same way that the base components $R1$ and $R2$ were.
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%
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%\clearpage
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%
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@ -411,7 +408,7 @@ These op-amp failure modes are represented on the DAG in figure~\ref{fig:op1dag}
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%\clearpage
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%\paragraph{Modelling the OP amp with the potential divider.}
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The op-amp and the {\dc} {\em PD} now % andrew heavily critised this sentence but it made sense to Chris and I
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form a {\fg} to model the failure mode behaviour of the non-inverting amplifier.
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formed into a {\fg} to model the failure mode behaviour of the non-inverting amplifier.
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%
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%piss have the failure modes of the {\dc} for the potential divider,
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%so we do not need to go back and consider the individual resistor failure modes that defined its behaviour.
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@ -419,7 +416,7 @@ form a {\fg} to model the failure mode behaviour of the non-inverting amplifier.
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%piss can now create a {\fg} for the non-inverting amplifier
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%by bringing together the failure modes from \textbf{opamp} and \textbf{PD}.
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%
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The two components in this new {\fg}, the op-amp and the {\dc} {\em PD} have failure modes, which are used
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The two components in this new {\fg}, the op-amp and the {\dc} {\em PD} have failure modes which are used
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as {\fcs} in table~\ref{tbl:ampfmea1}.
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%Each of these failure modes will be given a {\fc} for analysis,
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%and this is represented in table \ref{tbl:ampfmea1}.
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@ -601,7 +598,7 @@ as {\fcs} in table~\ref{tbl:ampfmea1}.
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%
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For this amplifier configuration there are three {\dc} failure modes; {\em AMP\_High, AMP\_Low, LowPass}. % see figure~\ref{fig:fgampb}.
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% HTR 05SEP2012
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This model now has two stages of analysis, as represented in figure~\ref{fig:eulerfmmd}.
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This model now has two stages of analysis. %, as represented in figure~\ref{fig:eulerfmmd}.
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%
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From the analysis in table \ref{tbl:ampfmea1} the {\dc} {\em NONINVAMP} can be created, which
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represents the failure mode behaviour of the non-inverting amplifier.
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@ -639,7 +636,7 @@ It is possible to traverse this DAG, tracing the top level % symptoms
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failure modes
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down to the base component failure modes, %leaves of the tree (the leaves being {\bc} failure modes),
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and thus determine all possible causes for
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the three high level symptoms, i.e. the failure~modes of the non-inverting amplifier {\dc} {\em INVAMP}.
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the three high level symptoms, i.e. the {\bc} failure~modes of the non-inverting amplifier {\dc} {\em INVAMP}.
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%
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Knowing all possible causes for a top level event/failure~mode
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is extremely useful;
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@ -669,7 +666,7 @@ A component is anything used to build a %a product or
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system.
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It could be something quite complicated
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like an %integrated
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micro-controller/servo motor, or quite simple like the resistor.
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micro-controller/servo motor, or quite simple like a resistor.
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%
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A
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component is usually identified by its name, a manufacturer's part number and perhaps
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@ -691,7 +688,7 @@ in the chip would be considered to be a separate {\bc}.
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% CAN WE FIND SUPPORT FOR THIS IN LITERATURE???
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\fmmdglossBC
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%
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The above definition of a part, needs further refinement, and to be defined as % defining
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The above definition of a part, needs further refinement, i.e. to be defined as % defining
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an atomic entity. % used as a building block.
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%The term component, in American English, can mean a building block or a part.
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%In British-English a component generally is given to mean the definition for part above.
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@ -726,7 +723,7 @@ A component can be viewed as a sub-system that is a part of some larger system.
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%
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A modular system common to many homes is the sound separates audio system or stereo hi-fi.
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%
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This is used as an example to describe the concepts {\fg} and {\dc} found in FMMD.
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This is used as an example to describe the concepts of {\fg} and {\dc} used by FMMD.
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%
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For instance a stereo amplifier separate/slave is a component.
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%The
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@ -739,7 +736,7 @@ CD-player, tuner, amplifier~separate, loudspeakers and ipod~interface.
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%and is the way in which FTA\cite{nucfta} analyses a System
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%and breaks it down.
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\paragraph{Functional Groupings and Components.} % {\fgs} and components.}
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Components can be composed of components, recursively down to
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Components can be composed of components, recursively on down to
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the {\bcs}.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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@ -823,16 +820,18 @@ failure rates)~\cite{mil1991,en298,fmd91}.
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For instance, a simple resistor is generally considered
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to fail in two ways, it can go open circuit or it can short.
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%
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Electrical components have data-sheets associated with them. The data sheets
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supply detailed information on the component as supplied by the manufacturer.
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Electrical components have data-sheets associated with them.
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%
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Data sheets, supplied by the manufacturer,
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are a detailed source of information on the component.
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%
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\fmodegloss
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%
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Because they are written for system designers, and to an extent advertise the product,
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they rarely give %show %clearly detail the
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failure modes of the component.
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they rarely list %show %clearly detail the
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failure modes. % of the component.
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%
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For FMEA purposes, ideally failure modes along with
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For FMEA purposes, ideally, failure modes along with
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with environmental factors and MTTF~\cite{sccs}[p.165] statistics would be presented.
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%
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Given the growing usage of FMEA/FMEDA and the emergence of SIL as a safety benchmark in industry, this may change.
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@ -885,11 +884,9 @@ it is common to term the modules identified as sub-systems.
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\fmmdglossFG
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%
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When modularising failure mode behaviour from the bottom up,
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it is more meaningful to call them `{\dcs}'.
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This is because they have been derived from the bottom-up according to functional
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it is more meaningful to call them `{\dcs}' (i.e. they have been derived from the bottom-up according to functional
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criteria, rather than with the top down approach, de-composed from
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a system into 'sub-systems'.
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a system into 'sub-systems').
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%
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\fmodegloss
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\fmmdglossDC
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@ -907,7 +904,7 @@ of the component.
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The FMEA analyst is not usually concerned with how the component has failed
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internally.
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%
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What the analyst need to know are the symptoms of failure.
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What the analyst needs to know are the symptoms of failure.
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%
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\fmmdglossSYMPTOM
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%
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@ -961,7 +958,7 @@ An advantage of working from the bottom up is that it can be ensured that
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all component failure modes must be considered.
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%
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A top down approach (such as FTA)
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can miss individual failure modes of components~\cite{faa}[Ch.~9],
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can miss~\cite{faa}[Ch.~9] individual failure modes of components,
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especially where there are non-obvious top-level faults.
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%
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\fmmdglossFTA
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@ -1065,7 +1062,7 @@ in a {\fg} higher in the hierarchy.
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The {\em PD} derived component is now placed into a {\fg}
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with the op-amp.
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%
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This {\fg} is now analysed and a {\dc} created to represent the failure mode behaviour
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This {\fg} is analysed and a {\dc} created to represent the failure mode behaviour
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of the {\em INVAMP}\footnote{The results of this analysis are placed into the analysis~report. This will contain
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mapping relationships between the component {\fms} and the {\dc} {\fms} and ideally, descriptions that would
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aid auditors to understand the reasoning behind each analysis test~case.}.
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@ -1182,7 +1179,7 @@ Ensuring this condition is described in section~\ref{sec:completetest}.
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\paragraph{Mutual exclusivity of {\dc} failure modes.}
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It is a desirable feature of a component that its failure modes
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are mutually exclusive.
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are naturally mutually exclusive.
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%
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This also applies to {\dcs} produced in the FMMD process.
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%
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@ -1209,8 +1206,7 @@ has to be made for each component {\fm} in the system.
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\paragraph{State explosion problem of FMEA solved by FMMD.}
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%
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Because FMMD considers failure modes within functional groups;
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the traditional state explosion problem in FMEA where the ideal of exhaustive FMEA (XFMEA)---where each failure
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mode could be considered in the context of all other components in the system---disappears.
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the traditional state explosion problem in FMEA--which lead to the ideal of XFMEA---disappears.
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%
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With FMMD, because the {\fgs} have small numbers of components in them, XFMEA can be easily applied within the {\fgs}.
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%
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