Added some refs for quality and diagnostics
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mybib.bib
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mybib.bib
@ -149,6 +149,35 @@ Database
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keywords = "fault-tolerance"
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keywords = "fault-tolerance"
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}
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}
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@article{iso9001,
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title = "ISO 9001 Quality",
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journal = "British Standards Institute",
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volume = " ",
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number = "",
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pages = " ",
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year = "2012",
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note = "Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Euler Diagrams (Euler 2004)",
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issn = "1571-0661",
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doi = "DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2005.02.018",
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url = "http://www.bsigroup.com/en/assessment-and-certification-services/management-systems/standards-and-schemes/iso-9001/",
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author = "BSI",
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keywords = "quality",
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keywords = "ISO9001"
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}
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@article{dbamafta,
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title = "Diagnosis by Algebraic Modelling and Fault Tree Induction",
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journal = "Sixth International Workshop on principles of diagnosis",
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volume = " ",
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number = "",
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pages = " ",
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year = "1995",
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note = "Working papers of DX-95: Sixth International Workshop on principles of diagnosis",
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author = "Maus, Jakob and Neumann, Bernd",
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keywords = "FTA",
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keywords = "DIAGNOSTICS"
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}
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@article{syssafe2011,
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@article{syssafe2011,
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title = "Developing a rigorous bottom-up modular static failure modelling methodology",
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title = "Developing a rigorous bottom-up modular static failure modelling methodology",
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journal = "6th IET International Conference on System Safety, 2011",
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journal = "6th IET International Conference on System Safety, 2011",
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related_papers_books/07SEP2012/diagnosis_from_FTA.pdf
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related_papers_books/07SEP2012/diagnosis_from_FTA.pdf
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@ -1006,14 +1006,7 @@ from which we can trace top level failure modes to the base component failure mo
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that can cause them.
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that can cause them.
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That is, we can trace failure mode effects
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That is, we can trace failure mode effects
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from base component level to the top and vice versa.
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from base component level to the top and vice versa.
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%
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Having a failure mode graph/model where base component failure modes are traceable to top event events,
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provides a forward search failure mode model.
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%
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We can use this model to derive information
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to assist in creating related models such as FTA~\cite{nucfta,nasafta},
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traditional FMEA, FMECA~\cite{safeware}[p.344], FMEDA~\cite{scsh}
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and other failure mode analysis methodologies.
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@ -1496,31 +1489,41 @@ with the op-amp.
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This {\fg} is now analysed and a {\dc} created to
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This {\fg} is now analysed and a {\dc} created to
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represent the failure mode behaviour of the {\em INVAMP}.
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represent the failure mode behaviour of the {\em INVAMP}.
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%
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%
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An analysis report is generated as part of the {\fg} to {\dc}
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%
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We may now use the {\em INVAMP} {\dc} in even higher level {\fgs}.
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%
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An analysis report is generated for each stage in the FMMD % {\fg} to {\dc}
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process. %\footnote
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process. %\footnote
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By having an analysis report report for each analysis stage,
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%
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%i.e. {\fg} to {\dc},
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%
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\paragraph{Traceability and quality of FMMD analysis.}
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By having an analysis report report for each analysis stage, %i.e. {\fg} to {\dc},
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we add traceability to the reasoning applied to the FMEA process.
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we add traceability to the reasoning applied to the FMEA process.
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%
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%
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Consider that traditional FMEA has one large reasoning stage, that of component failure mode
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Consider that traditional FMEA has one large reasoning stage, that of component failure mode
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directly to system level failure. The reasoning given is typically one line
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directly to system level failure. The reasoning given is typically a one line comment
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on a spreadsheet entry~\cite{sccs}[p.38]. % (if we are lucky!).
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on a spreadsheet entry~\cite{sccs}[p.38]. % (if we are lucky!).
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%
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%
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FMMD typically has several reasoning stages from {\dc} {\fms} to system level failure modes.
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FMMD typically has several reasoning stages (i.e. from each {\dc} to {\fms}) up to to
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final system level failure modes.
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%
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%
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Thus, each possible cause for a system {\fm} will have a collection of analysis reports associated with it.
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Thus, each possible cause for a system {\fm} will have a collection of FMMD analysis reports associated with it.
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%
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%
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These collections of analysis reports will provide a cause and effect
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These collections of analysis reports will provide a cause and effect
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story for each possible scenario that could cause the system level failure.
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story for each possible scenario that could cause the system level failure.
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%
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%
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This increases the traceability---or documented paper trail---for the understanding the
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Traceability of design processes are considered necessary for
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failure event causes and potentially for use in diagnostics.
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safety critical product~\cite{en61508} and is an important concept
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in quality systems~\cite{iso9001}.
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%
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%
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We may now use the {\em INVAMP} {\dc} in even higher level {\fgs}.
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Having analysis reports increases the traceability---or documented paper trail---aiding understanding
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and maintainability for failure mode models.
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%
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Also a detailed cause and effect model is useful creating diagnostic schemas~\cite{dbamafta}.
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\subsection{Keeping track of the derived components position in the hierarchy}
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\paragraph{Keeping track of the derived components position in the hierarchy}
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\label{sec:alpha}
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\label{sec:alpha}
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The UML meta model in figure \ref{fig:cfg}, shows the relationships
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The UML meta model in figure \ref{fig:cfg}, shows the relationships
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between the entities used in FMMD.
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between the entities used in FMMD.
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@ -2142,4 +2145,21 @@ The abstraction level concept is formally defined in section~\ref{sec:abstractio
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\section{Conclusion}
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\section{Conclusion}
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Tie into wish list at end of chapter 3.
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Tie into wish list at end of chapter 3. Solves state explosion, completeness, traceability, models for related such as FMECA
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\paragraph{State explosion problem of FMEA solved by FMMD}.
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\paragraph{Uses of the FMMD failure mode model.}
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%
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Having a failure mode graph/model where base component failure modes are traceable to top event events,
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provides a forward search derived failure mode model.
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%
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A forward search means that we can ensure that
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all known component failure
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modes have been considered in the analysis.
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%
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We can use this model to derive information
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to assist in creating related models such as FTA~\cite{nucfta,nasafta},
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traditional FMEA, FMECA~\cite{safeware}[p.344], FMEDA~\cite{scsh}, diagnostics schemas~\cite{dbamafta}
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and other failure mode analysis methodologies.
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