Lunch time edit 21SEP2010, ready for JMC to proof read
This commit is contained in:
parent
21a964db69
commit
df0b9de2db
@ -149,24 +149,31 @@ especially where they are non obvious top-level faults.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to analyse from the bottom-up, we need to take
|
||||
small groups of components from the parts~list that naturally
|
||||
work together to perform a simple function;
|
||||
the components to include in a {\fg} are chosen by a human, the analyst.
|
||||
work together to perform a simple function.
|
||||
The components to include in a {\fg} are chosen by a human, the analyst.
|
||||
%We can represent the `Functional~Group' as a class.
|
||||
When we have a
|
||||
`{\fg}' we can look at the components it contains,
|
||||
and from this determine the failure modes of all the components that belong to it.
|
||||
%
|
||||
% and determine a failure mode model for that group.
|
||||
The `{\fg}' as used by the analyst is a collection of component failures modes.
|
||||
%
|
||||
% expand 21sep2010
|
||||
%The `{\fg}' as used by the analyst is a collection of component failures modes.
|
||||
The analysts interest is the ways in which the components within the {\fg}
|
||||
can fail. All the failure modes of all the components with an {\fg} are collected
|
||||
into a flat set of failure modes.
|
||||
%
|
||||
Each of these failure modes, and optionally combinations of them, are
|
||||
formed into `test cases' which are
|
||||
analysed for their effect on the failure mode behaviour of the `{\fg}'.
|
||||
%
|
||||
From this we can determine a new set of failure modes, the failure modes of the
|
||||
Once we have the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg}, we can determine a new set of failure modes, the derived failure modes of the
|
||||
`{\fg}'.
|
||||
%
|
||||
Or in other words we can determine how the `{\fg}' can fail.
|
||||
We can now consider the {\fg} as a sort of super component
|
||||
with a known set of failure modes.
|
||||
with its own set of failure modes.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{From functional group to newly derived component}
|
||||
@ -198,8 +205,8 @@ these `derived~failure~modes'.
|
||||
We thus have a `new' component, or system building block, but with a known and traceable
|
||||
fault behaviour.
|
||||
|
||||
The UML representation shows a `functional group' having a one to one relationship with a derived~component.
|
||||
We can represent this using a UML diagram in figure \ref{fig:cfg}.
|
||||
The UML representation shows a `functional group' having a one to one relationship with a derived~component,
|
||||
which we represent in the UML diagram in figure \ref{fig:cfg}.
|
||||
|
||||
The symbol $\bowtie$ is used to indicate the analysis process that takes a
|
||||
functional group and converts it into a new component.
|
||||
@ -648,6 +655,14 @@ $$ F = \Omega(C) \backslash \{OK\} $$
|
||||
The $OK$ statistical case is the largest in probability, and is therefore
|
||||
of interest when analysing systems from a statistical perspective.
|
||||
This is of interest for the application of conditional probability calculations
|
||||
such as Bayes theorem.
|
||||
such as Bayes theorem \cite{probstat}.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%%-
|
||||
%%- Need a complete and more complicated UML diagram here
|
||||
%%- the other parts were just fragments to illustrate points
|
||||
%%-
|
||||
%%-
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\vspace{40pt}
|
||||
|
@ -13,3 +13,6 @@ paper: paper.tex fmmd_concept_paper.tex
|
||||
#
|
||||
fmmd_concept_paper.tex: fmmd_concept.tex paper.tex
|
||||
cat fmmd_concept.tex | sed 's/fmmd_concept\///' > fmmd_concept_paper.tex
|
||||
|
||||
bib:
|
||||
bibtex paper
|
||||
|
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
|
||||
\input{fmmd_concept_paper}
|
||||
|
||||
\bibliographystyle{plain}
|
||||
\bibliography{vmgbibliography,mybib}
|
||||
\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
|
||||
|
||||
\today
|
||||
\end{document}
|
||||
|
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ $$ dtc(F) = TC $$
|
||||
\caption{Determine Test Cases: dtc: (F) } \label{alg22}
|
||||
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
|
||||
|
||||
\REQUIRE {F is a flat set of failure modes }
|
||||
\REQUIRE {F is a non empty flat set of failure modes }
|
||||
|
||||
\STATE { All test cases are chosen by the investigating engineer(s). Typically all single
|
||||
component failures are investigated
|
||||
|
@ -32,9 +32,8 @@ The goal of the process is to produce a set of failure modes from the perspectiv
|
||||
\paragraph{Symptom Identification}
|
||||
When all `test~cases' have been analysed, a second phase can be actioned. % applied.
|
||||
%
|
||||
This looks at the results of the `test~cases' as symptoms
|
||||
of the sub-system.
|
||||
Single component failures (or combinations) within the functional~group may cause unique symptoms.
|
||||
This looks at the results of the `test~cases' as failure modes from the perspective not of the components, but of the {\fg}/sub-system.
|
||||
%Single component failures (or combinations) within the functional~group may cause unique symptoms.
|
||||
However, many failures, when looked at from the perspective of the functional group, will have the same symptoms.
|
||||
These can be collected as `common symptoms'.
|
||||
To go back to the CD~player example, a failed
|
||||
@ -56,7 +55,9 @@ from the components in a functional~group have been handled\footnote{Software ca
|
||||
failure modes have been included in at least one test case, and modelled individually. For Double
|
||||
Simultaneous fault mode checking, all valid double failure modes can be checked for coverage as well}.
|
||||
Were failure~modes missed, any failure mode model could be dangerously incomplete.
|
||||
It is possible here for an automated system to flag unhandled failure modes.
|
||||
It is possible here for an automated system to flag unhandled failure modes,
|
||||
which solves the main failing of top~down methodologies \cite{topdownmiss}, that of not
|
||||
guaranteeing to model all component failure modes.
|
||||
\ref{requirement at the start}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ where $a_n,b_n,c_n$ are component failure modes.
|
||||
|
||||
\paragraph{Finding all failure modes within the functional group}
|
||||
|
||||
For fmMD failure mode analysis, we need to consider the failure modes
|
||||
For FMMD failure mode analysis, we need to consider the failure modes
|
||||
from all the components in the functional group as a flat set.
|
||||
This can be found by applying function $fm$ to all the components
|
||||
in the functional~group and taking the union of them (where F is the set of all failure modes for all components in the functional group) thus:
|
||||
@ -188,8 +189,8 @@ $c\_2$ & $fs\_7$ & $g_{7}$ & SP2\\ \hline
|
||||
%\vspace{0.3cm}
|
||||
|
||||
Table~\ref{tab:fexsymptoms} shows the analysis process.
|
||||
As we are only looking at single fault possibilities for this example each failure mode
|
||||
is represented by a test~case.
|
||||
As we are only looking at single fault possibilities for this example each test case
|
||||
is represented by one failure mode.
|
||||
Chosen combinations of Component failure modes become test cases\footnote{The test case stage is necessary because for more complex analysis we have to consider the effects of combinations of component failure modes}.
|
||||
The test cases are analysed w.r.t. the functional~group.
|
||||
These become functional~group~failure~modes ($g$'s).
|
||||
@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ Note that $g_6$ has \textbf{not dissappeared from the analysis process}.
|
||||
Were the designer to have overlooked this test case, it would appear as a failure mode of the derived component.
|
||||
i.e. were it not to have been grouped in $SP3$, $ fm(DC)$ would have been $ \{ SP1, SP2, g_6 \}$.
|
||||
Because the process can be computerised, we can easily flag symptoms that have not been
|
||||
included a derived component.
|
||||
included as failure modes in a {\dc}.
|
||||
% Aw boring ! no jokes ?
|
||||
% This is rather like a child not eating his lunch and being served it cold for dinner\footnote{Although I was only ever threatened with a cold dinner once, my advice to all nine year olds faced with this dilemma, it is best to throw the brussel sprouts out of the dining~room window while the adults are not watching!}!
|
||||
%
|
||||
@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ This generalises the function $\bowtie$ and allows us to build
|
||||
hierarchical failure mode models.
|
||||
|
||||
Where a {\fg} is composed of derived components, for sake of example
|
||||
Where $DC_1, DC_2, DC_3 $ are {\dc}'s and $DCFM$ is a set of failure modes thus
|
||||
where $DC_1, DC_2, DC_3 $ are {\dc}'s and $DCFM$ is a set of failure modes thus
|
||||
$FG = \{ DC_1, DC_2, DC_3 \}$ and $DCFM = FM(FG)$
|
||||
|
||||
We can apply the symptom abstraction process $\bowtie$
|
||||
|
@ -29,10 +29,11 @@ The goal of the process is to produce a set of failure modes from the perspectiv
|
||||
\paragraph{Symptom Identification}
|
||||
When all `test~cases' have been analysed, a second phase is applied.
|
||||
%
|
||||
This looks at the results of the `test~cases' as symptoms
|
||||
of the sub-system.
|
||||
Single component failures (or combinations) within the functional~group may cause unique symptoms.
|
||||
However, many failures, when looked at from the perspective of the functional group, will have the same symptoms.
|
||||
This looks at the results of the `test~cases' as failure modes from the perspective of
|
||||
of the {\fg}/sub-system.
|
||||
%%Single component failures (or combinations) within the functional~group may cause unique symptoms.
|
||||
However, many failures, when looked at from the perspective of the functional group, will have the same `symptoms' (or
|
||||
in other words the sub-system/{\fg} will fail in the same way for a variety of causes.
|
||||
These can be collected as `common symptoms'.
|
||||
To go back to the CD~player example, a failed
|
||||
output stage, and a failed internal audio amplifier,
|
||||
@ -43,10 +44,12 @@ will both cause the same failure; $no\_sound$ !
|
||||
|
||||
\paragraph{Collection of Symptoms}
|
||||
The common symptoms of failure and lone~component failure~modes are identified and collected.
|
||||
We can now consider the functional~group as a component and the common symptoms as its failure modes.
|
||||
We can now consider the functional~group as a component and the symptoms as its failure modes.
|
||||
Note that here because the process is bottom up, we can ensure that all failure modes
|
||||
associated with a functional~group have been handled.
|
||||
Were failure~modes missed, any failure mode model could be dangerously incomplete.
|
||||
It is possible here for an automated system to flag unhandled failure modes.
|
||||
\ref{requirement at the start}
|
||||
It is possible at this stage for an automated system to flag unhandled failure modes,
|
||||
which fulfills the wish list in chapter \ref{requirement at the start}, removing
|
||||
the main drawback with top-down methodologies, that of missing component failure mode
|
||||
in the model \cite{nancy_crit_fta_top_down}.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Specific measurements
|
||||
and checks will be made, and finally a component or a low level sub-system
|
||||
will be found to be faulty.
|
||||
A natural fault finding process is thus top~down.
|
||||
Top down fault isolation/finding techniques are described in \ref{NETWORKDECOMPOSITION}.
|
||||
Top down formal fault isolation/finding techniques for electronics are described in \cite{maikowski}.
|
||||
|
||||
%%
|
||||
%% to fool the graphics insertion to make it compatible
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user