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@@ -384,12 +384,13 @@ Pages = {279 - 293},
 Title = {An evaluation of failure modes and effects analysis generation method for conceptual design.},
 Volume = {18},
 URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.brighton.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=17784368&site=ehost-live},
-Year = {2005},
+Year = {2005}
 }
 
 @INPROCEEDINGS{931423,
 author={Throop, D.R. and Malin, J.T. and Fleming, L.D.},
-booktitle={Aerospace Conference, 2001, IEEE Proceedings.}, title={Automated incremental design FMEA},
+booktitle={Aerospace Conference, 2001, IEEE Proceedings.}, 
+title={Automated incremental design FMEA},
 year={2001},
 month={},
 volume={7},
@@ -397,7 +398,7 @@ number={},
 pages={7 -3458 vol.7},
 keywords={Analytical models;Design automation;Design engineering;Discrete event simulation;Failure analysis;Hybrid power systems;Performance analysis;Production;Propulsion;Steady-state;aerospace computing;aerospace simulation;discrete event simulation;engineering computing;failure analysis;production engineering computing;CONFIG hybrid discrete event simulator;EPOCH Simulation for Failure Analysis software;EPOCH algorithm;automated incremental design FMEA;automatic generation;design models;engineering product/operations cross-cutting hybrid simulation ;failure modes;failure modes/effects analysis;functional labels;propellant production plant;scenario scripts;scenario-based analyses;space systems;timestep modeling;},
 doi={10.1109/AERO.2001.931423},
-ISSN={},}
+ISSN={}}
 
 @INPROCEEDINGS{5754453,
 author={Snooke, N. and Price, C.},
@@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ pages={1 -6},
 keywords={Analytical models;Fault diagnosis;Hardware;Programming;Software;Testing;Unified modeling language;safety-critical software;MISRA C;component diagrams;low-level languages;low-level programming;model-driven automated software FMEA;model-driven software developments;safety critical embedded systems;sequence diagrams;software development philosophy;software effects analysis;software failure mode;source code embedded testing;state charts;use case diagram;Failure modes and effects analysis;model-driven software development;software FMEA;},
 doi={10.1109/RAMS.2011.5754453},
 ISSN={0149-144X},}
-Baiqiao HUANG
+
 @INPROCEEDINGS{FMECAresearch,
 author={Ying Chen and Cui Ye and Bingdong Liu and Rui Kang},
 booktitle={Prognostics and System Health Management (PHM), 2012 IEEE Conference on}, title={Status of FMECA research and engineering application},
@@ -424,8 +425,7 @@ keywords={automobile industry;electronics industry;failure analysis;military sta
 doi={10.1109/PHM.2012.6228914},
 ISSN={2166-563X},}
 
-Software FMEA Approach Based on Failure Modes
+
-Database
 @ARTICLE{sfmeaauto,
   AUTHOR =       "Barbara J. Czerny et all. Delphi Corporation.",
   TITLE =        "Effective Application of Software Safety Techniques for Automotive Embedded Control Systems",
@@ -448,11 +448,7 @@ Database
 }
 
 
-%A process for failure modes and effects analysis of computer software
 
-%Ozarin, N.
-%Omnicon Group Inc., Hauppauge, NY, USA
-%Siracusa, M. 
 @ARTICLE{procsfmea,
   AUTHOR =       "Ozarin, N.",
   TITLE =        "A process for failure modes and effects analysis of computer software",
@@ -460,14 +456,7 @@ Database
   YEAR =         "2003"
 }
 
-%This paper appears in:
+
-%Software Engineering and Data Mining (SEDM), 2010 2nd International Conference on
-%Date of Conference: 23-25 June 2010
-%Author(s): Wang, Danhua
-%	   State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
-%		  Pan, Jingui
-%			 On Page(s): 187 - 191
-%				     Product Type: Conference Publications 
 @ARTICLE{appswfmea,
   AUTHOR =       "Danhua Wang",
   TITLE =        "An approach of automatically performing fault tree analysis and failure mode effects techniques to Software",
@@ -750,7 +739,7 @@ year = {2012},
   YEAR =         "2002"
 }
 
-@
+
 @BOOK{usefulinfoengineers,
   AUTHOR =       "William Fairbairn",
   TITLE =        "Useful Information for Engineers
@@ -767,7 +756,7 @@ strength of materials, the causes of boiler explosions",
   YEAR =         "2010"
 }
 
-% Safeware: System safety and Computers
+
 
 @BOOK{safeware,
   AUTHOR =       "Nancy Leveson",

submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The acronym FMEA can be expanded as follows:
    \item \textbf{A - Analysis,} Analyse how much impact this symptom will have on the environment/operators/the system itself.
 \end{itemize}
 %
-FMEA is a broad term; it could mean anything from an informal check on how
+FMEA is a broad term; it could mean anything from an informal check on
 how failures could affect some equipment in %an initial 
 a brain-storming session
 %in product design, 
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ To perform this we need to know how a failure
 mode, considering its effect on other components in the system
 will translate to a system level symptom/failure.
 %
-The result of FMEA  is to determine a system level failures, or symptoms for each given component failure mode.
+The result of FMEA  is to determine a system level failures, 
+or symptoms for each given component failure mode.
 %
 In practise, each entry of an FMEA analysis of a {\bc} {\fm} 
 would typically be one line in a spreadsheet.
@@ -257,7 +258,7 @@ as shown below.
 \end{itemize}
 %
 We note that the main causes of resistor value drift are overloading. % of components.
-This is borne out in in the FMD-91~\cite{fmd91}[232] entry for a resistor network where the failure
+This is borne out in the FMD-91~\cite{fmd91}[232] entry for a resistor network where the failure
 modes do not include drift.
 %
 If we can ensure that our resistors will not be exposed to overload conditions, the 
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ is very widely used in nearly all fields of modern analogue electronics.
 They are typically packaged in dual or quad configurations---meaning
 that a chip will typically contain two or four amplifiers.
 For the purpose of example, we look at
-a typical op-amp designed for instrumentation and measurement, the dual packaged version of the LM358~\cite{lm358}
+a typical op-amp designed for instrumentation and measurement, the dual packaged version of the LM358~\cite{lm358} 
 (see figure~\ref{fig:lm258}), and use this to compare the failure mode derivations from FMD-91 and EN298.
 
 \paragraph{ Failure Modes of an Op-Amp according to FMD-91 }
@@ -398,7 +399,7 @@ EN298 does not specifically define  OP\_AMPS failure modes; these can be determi
 by following a  procedure for `integrated~circuits' outlined in
 annex~A~\cite{en298}[A.1 note e].
 This demands that all open connections, and shorts between adjacent pins be considered as failure scenarios.
-We examine these failure scenarios on the dual packaged  $LM358$~\cite{lm358}%\mu741$  
+We examine these failure scenarios on the dual packaged  $LM358$~\cite{lm358} %\mu741$  
 and determine its {\fms} in table ~\ref{tbl:lm358}.
 Collecting the op-amp failure modes from table ~\ref{tbl:lm358} we obtain the same {\fms}
 that we got from FMD-91, listed in equation~\ref{eqn:opampfms}.
@@ -779,7 +780,8 @@ This means that objective reasoning can be applied to determine objective effect
 of those failures depends upon the Equipment Under Control (EUC)
 and its environment.
 %
-For instance a leak of nuclear material on an aboard a spacecraft could have the consequences
+For instance a leak of nuclear material %on an 
+aboard a spacecraft could have the consequences
 of loss of mission, but a leak on earth could have serious health and environmental consequences.
 This means one line of FMECA describing a system risk is an over simplification (consider that the same
 nuclear material will be present during transport and launch, and when outside earth's environment).
@@ -788,7 +790,7 @@ Subjective appraisal of the outcome of a system failure mode can also
 be subject to management and/or political pressure.
 
 
-\paragraph{Multiple Simultaneous Failure Modes}
+\paragraph{Multiple Simultaneous Failure Modes.}
 %
 FMEA is less useful for determining events for multiple 
 simultaneous 
@@ -959,7 +961,7 @@ double failure scenarios (for burner lock-out scenarios).}
 \end{equation}
  
 For our theoretical 100 components with 3 failure modes each example, this is a reasoning distance of
-$100*99*98*3=2,910,600$ . % failure mode scenarios.
+$100*99*98*3=2,910,600$. % failure mode scenarios.
 In practise there is an additional concern here, that of 
 the circuit topology changes that {\fms} can cause.
 
@@ -1146,7 +1148,7 @@ type standards (EN61508/IOC5108).
 The end result of an EN61508 analysis is an % provides a statistical 
 overall `level of safety' known as a Safety Integrity level (SIL), for a system.
 There are currently four SIL `levels', one to four, with four being the highest level. 
-It allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking checking circuitry.
+It allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking circuitry.
 %
  % for four levels of 
 %safety integrity, referred to as Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).
@@ -1220,8 +1222,8 @@ Again this is usually expressed as a percentage.
 
 $$ SFF = \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_{DD} \big) / \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_D \big) $$
 
-SFF determines how proportionately fail-safe a system is, not how reliable it is ! 
+SFF determines how proportionately fail-safe a system is, not how reliable it is. 
-A Weakness in this philosophy;  adding extra safe failures (even unused ones) improves the SFF, this
+A weakness in this philosophy;  adding extra safe failures (even unused ones) would improve the apparent SFF, this
 apparent loophole is closed in the 2010 edition of the standard. 
 
 
@@ -1230,7 +1232,7 @@ apparent loophole is closed in the 2010 edition of the standard.
 \subsection{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
 To achieve SIL levels, diagnostic coverage and SFF levels are prescribed along with
 hardware architectures and software techniques. 
-The overall   the aim of SIL is classify the safety of a system,
+The overall   the aim of SIL is to classify the safety of a system,
 by statistically determining how frequently it can fail dangerously.
 
 
@@ -1352,8 +1354,9 @@ However, as with the components that we should check against a {\fm}, there are
 the reasoning stages for an FMEA entry.
 %FMEA does not stipulat which
 Ideally each FMEA entry would contain a reasoning description
-for each component the {\fm} is checked against, so that the the entry can be reviewed or revisited/audited.
+for each component the {\fm} is checked against, so that the entry can be reviewed or revisited/audited.
-Because FMEA is traditionally performed with one entry per component {\fm} full reasoning descriptions
+%
+Because FMEA is traditionally performed with one entry per component {\fm}, full reasoning descriptions
 are rare.
 This means that re-use, review and checking of traditional analysis must be started from `cold'.
 

submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ practise % practise is a noun and practise is a verb
 in a 
 critical light.
 Chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} introduced concepts underlying FMEA, and this chapter seeks to
-use these concepts to the determine the drawbacks and advantages in its current usage.
+use these concepts to determine the drawbacks and advantages in its current usage.
 %
 Legally mandatory FMEA for a large proportion of safety critical systems
 in Europe and the USA, at the very least means that experienced
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ and look for ways in which it could be done better and more efficiently.
 A major problem is with the scope of examination---or required reasoning distance---to apply 
 for FMEA analysis.
 Checking all combinations quickly leads to a state explosion problem:
-limiting the number of components to check for against for a given {\bc}
+limiting the number of components to check for against a given {\bc}
 {\fm} could address this.
 %
 The difficulties of integrating software
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ FMEA requirements.
 Other problems such as the inability to easily re-use, and validate/audit (through
 traceable reasoning) FMEA models are presented.
 %
-Finally we conclude with a list of deficiencies in current FMEA methodologies, and present a wish list
+Finally we conclude with a list of deficiencies in current FMEA methodologies and present a wish list
 for an improved methodology.
 
 \section{Historical Origins of FMEA: {\bc} {\fm} to system level failure/symptom paradigm}
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ but the structure of current FMEA reports does not encourage this.
 Given the {\bc} {\fm} to system level failure mode paradigm it is 
 difficult to re-use FMEA analysis.
 %
-Several strategies to aid re-use have been proposed~\cite{rudov2009language, patterns6113886,931423 }, but
+Several strategies to aid re-use have been proposed~\cite{rudov2009language, patterns6113886, 931423}, but
 the fundamental problem remains, that, with any changes 
 to the component base in a system, it is very difficult to
 determine which FMEA test scenarios must be re-worked.
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ Traditional FMEA cannot ensure that each failure mode of all its
 components are checked against any other components in the system which
 it may affect, due to state explosion.
 %
-FMEA is therefore performed using heuristics to decide
+FMEA is therefore performed using heuristics % at best
+to decide
 which components to check the effect of a component failure mode on.
 %We could term the number of checks made for each failure mode
 %on aspects of the system to be the reasoning distance.
@@ -220,8 +221,9 @@ FMEA), to ensure that failure modes within the instrument cannot lead to invalid
 %
 Some work has been performed to offer black~box---or functional testing---of these instruments instead of 
 static analysis~\cite{Bishop:2010:ONT:1886301.1886325}. 
+%
 However, black box testing of smart instruments is
-yet to be a an approved method of validation.
+yet to be an approved method of validation.
 
 Most modern instruments now use highly integrated electronics coupled to micro-controllers, which read and filter the measurements,
 and interface to an LCD readout.
@@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ systems. %by traditional FMEA.
 %to a high level of reliability by traditional FMEA.
 %
 Currently the only way that some smart~instruments have been permitted for
-use in highly critical systems is the have the extensively
+use in highly critical systems is to have them extensively
 functionally tested~\cite{bishopsmartinstruments}.
 
 
@@ -260,7 +262,7 @@ This adjustment could be direct, or could  be another CANbus message passed to a
 %
 In terms of FMEA, see figure~\ref{fig:distcon}, our reasoning path spans (at least) four interface layers of electronics to software.
 %
-Traditional FMEA does not cater for the software hardware interface, and here we have the addition complications
+Traditional FMEA does not cater for the software hardware interface, and here we have the additional complications
 %with the additional complications
 of the communications protocol used to transmit data and the failure mode characteristics
 of the communications physical layer.