researching smart instruments and FMEA

mybib.bib

@@ -1,4 +1,52 @@
 
+@article{parnas1991assessment,
+  title={Assessment of safety-critical software in nuclear power plants.},
+  author={Parnas, David Lorge and Asmis, GJK and Madey, Jan},
+  journal={Nuclear safety},
+  volume={32},
+  number={2},
+  pages={189--198},
+  year={1991}
+}
+
+@incollection{bishopsmartinstruments,
+year={2010},
+isbn={978-3-642-15650-2},
+booktitle={Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security},
+volume={6351},
+series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
+editor={Schoitsch, Erwin},
+doi={10.1007/978-3-642-15651-9_18},
+title={Overcoming Non-determinism in Testing Smart Devices: A Case Study},
+url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15651-9_18},
+publisher={Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
+keywords={testing; non-determinism; smart instruments; safety},
+author={Bishop, Peter and Cyra, Lukasz},
+pages={237-250}
+}
+
+@incollection{swassessment,
+year={2010},
+isbn={978-1-84996-085-4},
+booktitle={Making Systems Safer},
+editor={Dale, Chris and Anderson, Tom},
+doi={10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_4},
+title={Safety and Assurance Cases: Past, Present and Possible Future – an Adelard Perspective},
+url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_4},
+publisher={Springer London},
+author={Bloomfield, Robin and Bishop, Peter},
+pages={51-67},
+language={English}
+}
+
+@INPROCEEDINGS{smart_instruments_1514209,
+	author={Nobes, T.S.},
+	booktitle={Is Your Product Safe? - IEE Seminar on (Ref. No. 2004/10724)}, title={Functional safety of smart instruments - a user perspective},
+	year={Sept.},
+	pages={67-87},
+	keywords={digital instrumentation;firmware;microprocessor chips;safety systems;smart cards;firmware;functional safety;microprocessors;nuclear industry;process instruments;safety instrumented systems;smart instruments},
+	doi={10.1049/ic:20040542},
+	ISSN={0537-9989},}
 
 @INPROCEEDINGS{bayesfrequentist, 
 	author={Lyons, Loius.}, 

submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ Traditional FMEA deals only with electrical and mechanical components, i.e. it d
 Modern control systems nearly always have a significant software/firmware element,
 and not being able to model software with current FMEA methodologies 
 is a cause for criticism~\cite{safeware}[Ch.12]. Similar difficulties in integrating mechanical and electronic/software
-failure models are discussed in ~\cite{SMR:SMR580}.
+failure models are discussed in ~\cite{SMR:SMR580,swassessment}.
 
 
 \paragraph{Current work on Software FMEA}
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ through to the top (and therefore ultimately controlling) layer of software.
 %% AWE --- Atomic Weapons Establishment have this problem....
 A smart instrument is defined as one that uses a micro-processor and software 
 in conjunction with its sensing electronics, rather than
-analogue electronics only.
+analogue electronics only~\cite{smart_instruments_1514209}.
 %
 It is termed `smart' because it has some software, or intelligence incorporated into it.
 %
@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ with firmware to read the user controls, and display results on an LCD.
 For quality control, many safety critical processes require regular inspections
 and measurements of physical characteristics of materials and machinery.
 %
-For highly critical systems i.e. the nuclear industry, the instruments used to perform these measurements, must be analysed for
-FMEA, to ensure that failure modes within the instrument cannot lead to invalid measurements.
+For highly critical systems i.e. the nuclear industry~\cite{parnas1991assessment}, 
+the instruments used to perform these measurements, must be analysed using traditional assessment (which entails
+FMEA), to ensure that failure modes within the instrument cannot lead to invalid measurements.
 %
 Most modern instruments now use highly integrated electronics coupled to micro-controllers, which read and filter the measurements,
 and interface to an LCD readout.
@@ -129,6 +130,10 @@ the design of instruments.
 While noting that being more modern, these instruments are likely to be more reliable and 
 accurate than the analogue instruments in use some twenty years ago but this cannot be validated 
 to a high level of reliability by traditional FMEA.
+%
+Currently the only way that some smart~instruments have been permitted for
+use in highly critical systems is the have the extensively
+functionally tested~\cite{bishopsmartinstruments}.
 
 \subsection{Distributed real time systems}
 
@@ -240,7 +245,7 @@ software hardware/interface~\cite{embedsfmea}.
 Although this
 would give a better picture of the failure mode behaviour, it
 is by no means a rigorous approach to tracing errors that may occur in hardware
-through to the top (and therefore ultimately controlling) layer of software.
+through to the top (and therefore ultimately controlling) layer of software~\cite{swassessment}.
 
 \paragraph{Current FMEA techniques are not suitable for software}
 

submission_thesis/Makefile

@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ thesis:
 	acroread thesis.pdf || evince thesis.pdf
 
 clean:
-	#touch ${CHAPTERS}
 	rm thesis.pdf
-	rm ${CHAPTERS}
+	rm -rf  thesis.aux  thesis.blg  thesis.glo  thesis.ist  thesis.lof  thesis.lot  \
+		thesis.pdf  thesis.tex~ thesis.toc thesis.bbl  thesis.glg  thesis.gls  \
+		thesis.loa  thesis.log  thesis.out  thesis.tex.backup
 
 bib:
 	pdflatex thesis # do this first otherwise bibtex gets its knickers in a twist