great a short abstract was required. NO ONE TOLD ME
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\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.5}
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\clearpage
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\chapter*{Declaration}
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@ -136,3 +136,128 @@ Signed
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\\
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Dated
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\clearpage
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\section*{Abstract}
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\subsection*{Failure Mode Modular De-Composition}
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%
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% This should be a three hundred word summary of the work and findings
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% Supervisors did not warn me this was required.
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% I found out by reading the OU ``how to get a PhD'' book in the bath, and then wading through the Brighton University
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% regulations where it is stated on page 14 of a 30+ page document filled with mostly n/a regulations to me.
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% Ho HUM. No wonder these shits have trouble working in the real world.
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%
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%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% BEGINING --- Introduce the field
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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The certification process of safety critical products for European and other international
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standards typically demand environmental stress, endurance and electro magnetic compatibility testing.
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%
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Theoretical, or `static~testing' also a requirement.
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%
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Failure Mode effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool used for static testing.
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FMEA is a bottom-up technique that aims to assess the effects
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of all component failure modes in a system.
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%
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Its use is traditionally limited to hardware systems. % only.
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%
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With the growing complexity of modern electronics traditional FMEA
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is suffering from state explosion and re-use of analysis problems.
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%
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Also with the now ubiquitous use of micro-controllers in smart~instruments and control systems,
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software is increasingly being seen as a `missing~factor' for FMEA. % analysis.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% Middle work and findings
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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This thesis presents a new modular variant of FMEA, Failure Mode Modular Decomposition (FMMD).
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%
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FMMD has been designed to integrate mechanical/electronic and software
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failure models, by treating them all as components in terms of their failure modes.
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%
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For instance, software functions,
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electronic and mechanical components
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can all be assigned sets of failure modes.
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%
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FMMD builds failure mode models from the bottom-up by incrementally analysing
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{\fgs} of components, using the results of analysis to create higher level {\dcs},
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which in turn can be used to build {\fgs}.
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%
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In this way a hierarchical failure mode model
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is built.
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%
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Software functions are treated as components by FMMD and can thus be incorporated seamlessly into
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the failure mode hierarchical model.
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%
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A selection of examples, electronic circuits and hardware/software hybrids are analysed using
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this new methodology.
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%
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The results of these analyses are then discussed from the perspective of safety critical application.
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%
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Performance in terms of test efficiency is greatly improved by FMMD and
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the examples analysed and theoretical models are used to demonstrate this.
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%
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%Because FMMD is modular and hierarchical, and deals with all its objects in
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%terms of their failure mode behaviour, it is ideally suited to creating integrated software and hardware models.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% End what has been achieved ---- all in 300ish word OK here we go.
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%Conclusions are presented listing the
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%and FMMD is compared with traditional HFMEA and SFMEA.
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This thesis presents a methodology that solves the state explosion problems of FMEA;
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provides integrated hardware and software failure mode models;
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facilitates multiple failure mode analysis;
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encourages re-use of analysis work
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and can be used to produce traditional format FMEA reports.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% The certification process of safety critical products for European and other international
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% standards often demand environmental stress, endurance and Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing.
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% Theoretical, or `static testing',is often also required. Failure Mode effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool used for static testing.
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% Its use is traditionally applied to hardware (electrical and mechanical) systems.
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% With the increasing use of micro-controllers in smart~instruments and control systems,
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% software is increasingly being seen as the `missing factor' in FMEA analysis.
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% This paper presents a new modular variant of FMEA, Failure Mode Modular Decomposition (FMMD).
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% Because FMMD is modular and hierarchical, and deals with all its objects in
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% % terms of their failure mode behaviour, it is ideally suited to creating integrated software and hardware models.
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% FMEA is a bottom-up technique that aims to assess the effects
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% of all component failure modes on a system. It is used both as a design tool (to determine weaknesses),
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% and is a requirement of certification of safety critical products. FMEA has been successfully applied to
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% mechanical, electrical and hybrid electro-mechanical systems. Work on software FMEA (SFMEA) is beginning,
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% but at present no technique for SFMEA that integrates hardware and software models exists.
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% Software in current embedded systems practise sits on top of most modern safety critical control systems
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% [and inside many data collection/actuator modules (smart~instruments)], and defines their most important
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% system wide behaviour, interfaces and communications. Currently standards that demand FMEA for hardware
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% (e.g. EN298, EN61508), do not specify it for software, but instead specify, computer architecture, good software practise,
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% review processes and language feature constraints. Where FMEA traces component failure modes to resultant system failures,
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% software has been left in a non-analytical limbo of best practises and constraints. Where SFMEA has been applied---for some
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% automotive and highly safety critical systems---it has always been performed separately from hardware FMEA (HFMEA).
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% %
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% At present the hardware/software interface is a source for confusion and misunderstanding, and in many organisations,
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% the actual design teams for software and hardware work in separate departments. Subtle errors of electronic systems for instance,
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% may not be picked up by software specialists, and vice versa. It would be desirable to have a methodology that provides seamless
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% software and hardware integration in its failure modelling. FMMD has been designed to integrate mechanical/electronic and software
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% failure models, by treating all modular components in terms of their failure modes. For instance, a software function,
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% or an electronic or a mechanical component can be assigned a known set of failure modes.
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% This paper presents an overview of the FMMD methodology and then an FMMD analysis of a simple software/hardware hybrid sub-system.
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%
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%
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% The example system chosen is a 4->20mA input circuit consisting of a resistive element, multiplexer (MUX),
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% Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) and two software functions. The purpose of this system is to convert an
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% electrical current signal into a value for use in software. FMMD is applied to the hardware (resistive element, MUX and ADC)
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% and to the software components (two `C' functions), producing one integrated failure mode model.
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% The 4->20mA input circuitry used in the example and its related software, are accepted practise and in
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% common use, and therefore its failure mode behaviour is well known and understood. For this reason it is a
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% good example to use for comparing the results from FMMD analysis with known failure mode behaviour
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% from the field/direct experience of engineers. The failure model is then discussed and compared with
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% heuristic knowledge of 4->20mA inputs, circuitry and software.
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% Conclusions are then presented listing the benefits and draw-backs of analysing the
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% hardware/software hybrid system using FMMD, and FMMD is compared with traditional HFMEA and SFMEA.
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