robin/Robin_PHD
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

morning edit

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Robin Clark 2010-08-02 08:45:03 +01:00
parent a5749d3588
commit b5f8a03743
1 changed files with 11 additions and 10 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

21
symptom_ex_process/algorithm.tex
View File

@ -165,12 +165,12 @@ $$ DTC(F) = TC $$
\ENDIF
\IF{Double fault checking}
\STATE { let $f1,f2$ represet a component failure modes }
\STATE { let $f1,f2$ represet a component failure modes, and $c$ a component in the functional group }
%\ENSURE { That all failure modes are represented in at least one test case }
\ENSURE { $ \forall f1,f2 \;where\; \not(f1,f2) \in c\;such\;that\; (f \in F)) \wedge (f \in \bigcup TC) $ }
\COMMENT { This corresponds to checking that at least each possible double failure mode is considered at
least once in the analysis; more rigorous cardinality constraint
checks may be required for some safety standards. Not if both failure modes
\ENSURE { $ \forall f1,f2 \;where\; (f1,f2) \not\in c\;such\;that\; (f \in F)) \wedge (f \in \bigcup TC) $ }
\COMMENT { This corresponds to checking that each possible double failure mode is considered
as a test case; more rigorous cardinality constraint
checks may be required for some safety standards. Note if both failure modes
in the check are sourced from the same component $c$ the test case is impossible
under unitary state failure mode conditions}
\ENDIF
@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ $$ CDC: \mathcal{SP} \mapsto \mathcal{DC} $$
\STATE { $DC := DC \cap f_l$ } \COMMENT{ this is saying place $f_l$ into $DC$'s collection of failure modes}
\ENDFOR
\ENSURE { $FM(DC) \neq \emptyset$ } \COMMENT{Ensure that DC has a known set of failure modes}
\RETURN DC
%\hline
@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ Algorithm \ref{alg:sympabs55} is the final stage in the process. We now have a
derived~component $DC$, which has its own set of failure~modes. This can now be
used in with other components (or derived~components)
to form functional~groups at higher levels of failure~mode~abstraction.
Hierarchies of fault abstraction can be built that can model an entire SYSTEM.
%Hierarchies of fault abstraction can be built that can model an entire SYSTEM.
\section{Linking all five stages}
@ -334,10 +335,10 @@ $$ \bowtie: \mathcal{FG} \mapsto \mathcal{DC} $$
\begin{algorithmic}[1]
\STATE {F = FM (FG)} \COMMENT{ collect all the failure modes from the from the components in the functional~group }
\STATE {TC = DTC (F)} \COMMENT{ determine all test cases to apply to the functional group }
\STATE {R = ATC (TC)} \COMMENT{ analyse the test cases, for failure mode behaviour of the functional~group }
\STATE {SP = FCS (R)} \COMMENT{ find common symptoms of failure for the functional group }
\STATE {F = FM (FG)} \COMMENT{ collect all component failure modes }%from the from the components in the functional~group }
\STATE {TC = DTC (F)} \COMMENT{ determine all test cases } %to apply to the functional group }
\STATE {R = ATC (TC)} \COMMENT{ analyse the test cases }%, for failure mode behaviour of the functional~group }
\STATE {SP = FCS (R)} \COMMENT{ find common symptoms }%of failure for the functional group }
\STATE {DC = CDC (SP)} \COMMENT{ create a derived component }
\RETURN $DC$