R1 and R2 were the wrong way round in the diagrams.

Now they are the same way around as the paper.

presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex

@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ For the sake of example let us choose resistor R1 in the  OP-AMP gain circuitry.
 \begin{frame}
  \frametitle{FMEA Example: Milli-volt reader}
 \begin{itemize}
-  \pause \item \textbf{F - Failures of given component} The resistor could fail by going OPEN or SHORT (EN298 definition).
+  \pause \item \textbf{F - Failures of given component} The resistor (R1) could fail by going OPEN or SHORT (EN298 definition).
    \pause \item \textbf{M - Failure Mode} Consider the component failure mode SHORT
-   \pause \item \textbf{E - Effects} This will drive the minus input HIGH causing a LOW OUTPUT/READING
+   \pause \item \textbf{E - Effects} This will drive the minus input LOW causing a HIGH OUTPUT/READING
   \pause \item \textbf{A - Analysis} The reading will be out of normal range, and we will have an erroneous milli-volt reading
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ will return most cost benefit.
  \label{fig:f16missile}
 \end{figure}
 Emphasis on determining criticallity of failure.
-Applies some baysian statistics (probabilities of component failues and those causing given system level failures).
+Applies some Bayesian statistics (probabilities of component failures and those causing given system level failures).
 \end{frame}
 
 
@@ -304,9 +304,9 @@ This will typically be the failure rate per million ($10^6$) or
 billion ($10^9$) hours of operation.
 
 \textbf{FMECA $\alpha$ value.}
-The failure mode probability, usually dentoted by $\alpha$ is the  probability of 
+The failure mode probability, usually denoted by $\alpha$ is the  probability of 
 is the probability of a particular failure
-mode occuring within a component.
+mode occurring within a component.
 %, should it fail.
 %A component with N failure modes will thus have
 %have an $\alpha$ value associated with each of those modes.
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ mode occuring within a component.
 \textbf{FMECA $\beta$ value.}
 The second probability factor $\beta$, is the probability that the failure mode
 will cause a given system failure.
-This corresponds to `Baysian' probability, given a particular
+This corresponds to `Bayesian' probability, given a particular
 component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure.
 
 \textbf{FMECA `t' Value}
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ safety Integrity.
 FMEDA does force the user to consider all components in a system
 by requiring that a MTTF value is assigned for each failure~mode.
 This MTTF may be statistically mitigated (improved)
-if it can be shown that selfchecking will detect failure modes.
+if it can be shown that self-checking will detect failure modes.
 \end{frame}
 
 \begin{frame}
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ The Failure modes are also classified as Detected or
 Undetected.
 This gives us four level failure mode classifications:
 Safe-Detected (SD), Safe-Undetected (SU), Dangerous-Detected (DD) or Dangerous-Undetected (DU),
-and the probablistic failure rate of each classification 
+and the probabilistic failure rate of each classification 
 is represented by lambda variables
 (i.e. $\lambda_{SD}$, $\lambda_{SU}$, $\lambda_{DD}$, $\lambda_{DU}$).
 \end{frame}
@@ -516,6 +516,9 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
 
 \end{frame}
 
+
+\subsection{FMEA - Better Metodology - Wish List}
+ 
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMEA - Better Metodology - Wish List}
 
@@ -525,7 +528,7 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
   \pause \item  Rigorous
    \pause \item Reasoning Traceable  
    \pause \item re-useable
-  \pause \item  
+  %\pause \item  
 \end{itemize}
 
 %FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it will allow for 
@@ -568,21 +571,25 @@ This creates an analysis hierarchy.
 \frametitle{FMMD - Outline of Methodology}
 \begin{itemize}
   \pause \item Select `{\fgs}' of components ( groups that perform a well defined function).
-   \pause \item Analyse the failure mode behaviour of a {\fg}. 
+  \pause \item Using the failure modes of the components create failure scenarios.
-   \pause \item  Collect the failures into Symptoms.
+  \pause \item Analyse each failure scenario of the {\fg}. 
-  \pause \item  Create a '{\dc}', where its failure modes are the symptoms of the {\fg} it was derived from.
+  \pause \item Collect Symptoms.
- \pause \item The {\dc} is now available to be used in higher level {\fgs}.
+  \pause \item Create a '{\dc}', where its failure modes are the symptoms of the {\fg} it was derived from.
+  \pause \item The {\dc} is now available to be used in higher level {\fgs}.
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}
 
 
 
-\subsection{example}
+\subsection{FMMD - Example - Milli Volt Amplifier}
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Example - Milli Volt Amplifier}
-We can begin to analyse this by looking for functional groups.
+We can return to the milli-volt amplifier as an example to analyse.
+
+We can begin by looking for functional groups.
 The resistors would together to perform a fairly common function in electronics, that of the potential divider.
-We can now take the failure modes for the resistors (OPEN and SHORT EN298) and see what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg}.
+So our first functional group is $\{ R1, R2 \}$.
+We can now take the failure modes for the resistors (OPEN and SHORT EN298) and see what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg} (the potential divider).
 \begin{figure}
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=100pt]{./mvampcircuit.png}
@@ -854,7 +861,7 @@ type analysis methods 19440.
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Failure Mode Modular De-Composition}
 
-Note that for all possible double simultaneous failures the equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp} becomes
+Note that for all possible double simultaneous failures the equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp2} becomes
 equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp2} essentially making the order $N^3$.
 The FMMD case (equation~\ref{eqn:anscen2}), is cubic within the functional groups only, 
 not all the components in the system.
@@ -873,17 +880,17 @@ not all the components in the system.
 
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Failure Mode Modular De-Composition}
-\textbf{traceability}
+\textbf{Traceability}
 Because each reasoning stage contains associations ($FailureMode \mapsto Sypmtom$)
 we can trace the `reasoning' from base level component failure mode to top level/system
-failure, by traversing the tree/hierarchy. This is in effect documenting the framework of the reasoning.
+failure, by traversing the tree/hierarchy. This is in effect providing a `framework' of the reasoning.
 
 
 \end{frame}
 
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Failure Mode Modular De-Composition}
-\textbf{re-usability}
+\textbf{Re-usability}
 Electronic Systems use commonly re-used functional groups (such as potential~dividers, amplifier configurations etc)
 Once a derived component is determined, it can generally be used in other projects.
  
@@ -892,7 +899,7 @@ Once a derived component is determined, it can generally be used in other projec
 
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMMD - Failure Mode Modular De-Composition}
-\textbf{total coverage}
+\textbf{Total coverage}
 With FMMD we can ensure that all component failure modes
 have been represented as a symptom in the derived components created from them.
 We can thus apply automated checking to ensure that no
@@ -909,9 +916,9 @@ missed in an analysis.
 
 \begin{itemize}
   \pause \item Addresses State Explosion
-   \pause \item Addresses total coverage of all cooomponents and their failure modes
+   \pause \item Addresses total coverage of all components and their failure modes
-   \pause \item Provides tracable reasoning
+   \pause \item Provides traceable reasoning
-  \pause \item derived components are re-useable
+  \pause \item derived components are re-use-able
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}