FMEA types now sub-sections---still have to think more about the conclusions...

mybib.bib

@@ -29,17 +29,21 @@
   YEAR =         "2012"
 }
 
-@INPROCEEDINGS{sfmeainterface,
+@ARTICLE{sfmeainterface,
 author={Ozarin, N.W.},
-booktitle={Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2009. RAMS 2009. Annual}, title={Applying software failure modes and effects analysis to interfaces},
+booktitle={Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2009. RAMS 2009. Annual}, 
+journal={Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2009. RAMS 2009. Annual},
+title={Applying software failure modes and effects analysis to interfaces},
 year={2009},
 month={jan.},
+pages={533 - 538},
 volume={},
 number={},
-pages={533 -538},
 keywords={mission-critical system;safety-critical system;software failure mode and effect analysis;software variable;system recovery;},
 doi={10.1109/RAMS.2009.4914732},
-ISSN={0149-144X},}
+ISSN={0149-144X}}
+%%#%%
+
 
 @ARTICLE{sfmea,
   AUTHOR =       "Chris Price, Neal Snooke",
@@ -199,11 +203,10 @@ publisher = {John Wiley & Sons, Ltd},
 issn = {2047-7481},
 url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smr.580},
 doi = {10.1002/smr.580},
-pages = {n/a--n/a},
 keywords = {integrated design, FMEA, safety standards},
 year = {2012},
 }
-
+%%pages = {n/a--n/a},
 
 @ARTICLE{fafmea,
   AUTHOR =       "Zigmund Bluvband, Pavel Grabov",

papers/fmea_software_hardware/software_fmea.tex

@@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ and determining what system level failure modes could be caused.
 FMEA has its roots in the previous century where simple electro-mechanical systems were the norm.
 Modern control systems nearly always have a significant software/firmware element,
 and not being able to model software with current FMEA methodologies 
-is a cause for criticism~\cite{safeware}[Ch.12].
+is a cause for criticism~\cite{safeware}[Ch.12]. Similar difficulties in integrating mechanical and electronic/software
+failure models are discussed in ~\cite{SMR:SMR580}.
 
 %Software FMEA techniques have been proposed
 
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ current signal into a voltage that we can read with an ADC.%
 
 \begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
- \includegraphics[width=200pt]{./ftcontext.png}
+ \includegraphics[width=250pt]{./ftcontext.png}
  % ftcontext.png: 767x385 pixel, 72dpi, 27.06x13.58 cm, bb=0 0 767 385
  \caption{Context Diagram for {\ft} loop}
  \label{fig:ftcontext}
@@ -386,7 +387,7 @@ value representing the voltage read (see code sample in figure~\ref{fig:code_rea
 %%{\vbox{
 \begin{figure}[h+]
 
-\tiny
+\footnotesize
 \begin{verbatim}
 /***********************************************/
 /* read_4_20_input()                           */
@@ -443,7 +444,7 @@ voltage value.
 %{\vbox{
 \begin{figure}[h+]
 
-\tiny
+\footnotesize
 \begin{verbatim}
 /***********************************************/
 /* read_ADC()                                  */
@@ -510,7 +511,12 @@ the base components in this design.
 We now apply FMMD starting with the hardware.
 
 
-\section{Hardware FMEA}
+\section{Failure Mode effects Analysis}
+
+Four emerging and current techniques are now used to 
+alpply FMEA to the hardware, the software, the software medium and the software hardware insterface.
+
+\subsection{Hardware FMEA}
 
 The hardware FMEA requires that for each component we consider all failure modes
 and the putative effect those failure modes would have on the system.
@@ -550,8 +556,8 @@ the multiplexer and the analogue to digital converter.
 The last two failures both lead to the system failure of  $VAL\_ERROR$ .
 They could lead to low or high reading as well, but we would only be able to determine this
 from knowledge of the software systems criteria for these.
-
+\clearpage
-\section{Software FMEA - variables in place of components}
+\subsection{Software FMEA - variables in place of components}
 
 For software FMEA, we take the variables used by the system,
 and examine what could happen if they are corrupted in various ways~\cite{procsfmea, embedsfmea}.
@@ -607,8 +613,8 @@ We must now determine putative system failure modes for these variables becoming
 \end{tabular}
 \end{table} 
 }
-
+\clearpage
-\section{Software FMEA - failure modes of the medium ($\mu P$) of the software}
+\subsection{Software FMEA - failure modes of the medium ($\mu P$) of the software}
 
 Microprocessors/Microcontrollers have sets of known failure modes, these include RAM, ROM
 EEPROM failure\footnote{EEPROM failure is not applicable for this example.} and 
@@ -653,7 +659,7 @@ oscillator clock timing
 }
 
 \clearpage
-\section{Software FMEA - The software/hardware interface}
+\subsection{Software FMEA - The software/hardware interface}
 
 As FMEA is applied separately to software and hardware
 the interface between them is an undefined factor.