ok started to say what I want...
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%endurance and Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing. Theoretical, or 'static testing',
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%endurance and Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing. Theoretical, or 'static testing',
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%is often also required.
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%is often also required.
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%
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%
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Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), is a is a bottom-up technique that aims to assess the effect all
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%% INTRO
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% the problem
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% the solution
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% why you would want to read the paper
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The certification process of safety critical products for European and
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other international standards often demand environmental stress,
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endurance and Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing. Theoretical, or 'static testing',
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is often also required. Failure Mode effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool used
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for static testing. Its use is traditionally applied to hardware (electrical and mechanical) systems.
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With the increasing use of micro-controllers in smart instruments and control
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systems generally, software is increasingly being seen as a missing factor in FMEA analysis.
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This paper takes a simple example of a hardware/software hybrid (an industry standard {\ft} input), analyses it
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using hardware and software FMEA, and then discusses the effectiveness of the
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failure modelling from the perspective of the hybrid hardware/software sub-system.
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This paper demonstrates the pitfalls and benefits of applying HFMEA and SFMEA
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to a hybrid system.
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%
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%% MIDDLE
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% some background
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% how important software is today
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%
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Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), is a bottom-up technique that aims to assess the effect all
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component failure modes on a system.
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component failure modes on a system.
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It is used both as a design tool (to determine weaknesses), and is a requirement of certification of safety critical products.
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It is used both as a design tool (to determine weaknesses), and is a requirement of certification of safety critical products.
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FMEA has been successfully applied to mechanical, electrical and hybrid electro-mechanical systems.
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FMEA has been successfully applied to mechanical, electrical and hybrid electro-mechanical systems.
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Work on software FMEA (SFMEA) is beginning, but
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Work on software FMEA (SFMEA) is beginning, but
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at present no technique for SFMEA that
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at present no technique for SFMEA that
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integrates hardware and software models known to the authors exists.
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integrates hardware and software models %known to the authors
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exists. FMEA performed on mechanical and electronic
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systems can be termed Hardware FMEA (HFMEA).
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%
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%
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Software generally, sits on top of most modern safety critical control systems
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Software generally, sits on top of most modern safety critical control systems
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and defines its most important system wide behaviour and communications.
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and defines its most important system wide behaviour and communications.
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Currently standards that demand FMEA for hardware (e.g. EN298, EN61508),
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Currently standards that demand FMEA for hardware (e.g. EN298, EN61508),
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do not specify it for Software, but instead specify, good practise,
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do not specify it for Software, but instead specify, good practise,
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review processes and language feature constraints.
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review processes and language feature constraints.
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%
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This is a weakness; where FMEA % scientifically
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Where FMEA % scientifically
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traces component {\fms}
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traces component {\fms}
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to resultant system failures, software has been left in a non-analytical
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to resultant system failures, software has been left in a non-analytical
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limbo of best practises and constraints.
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limbo of best practises and constraints.
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%
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Where software FMEA (SFMEA) has been applied, it is
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If software FMEA were possible, electro-mechanical-software hybrids could
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performed a separately from the HFMEA.
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be modelled; and could thus be `complete' failure mode models.
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%Failure modes in components in say a sensor, could be traced
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%% CONCLUSIONS.
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%up through the electronics and then through the controlling software.
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%
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Presently FMEA, stops at the glass ceiling of the computer program.
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%
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This paper presents an analysis of a simple software/hardware hybrid sub-system (a {\ft} input circuit, MUX, ADC and two software functions
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that are used to convert the electrical current signal into a value for use in software).
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HFMEA is applied to the hardware and SFMEA to the software components.
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The two failure models are then compared, and then compared with heuristic
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knowledge about {\ft} inputs circuitry and software.
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Conclusions are then reached giving a positive and negative aspects
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of analysing the hardware/software hybrid system using HFMEA and SFMEA.
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This paper presents an FMEA methodology which can be applied to software, and is compatible
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and integrate-able with FMEA performed on mechanical and electronic systems.
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
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\documentclass{article}
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%\documentclass[twocolumn,10pt]{report}
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%\documentclass[twocolumn,10pt]{report}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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