JMC proof read
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@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ failure mode of the component or sub-system}}}
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\setlength{\headsep}{0in}
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\setlength{\headsep}{0in}
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%\setlength{\textheight}{22cm}
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%\setlength{\textheight}{22cm}
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\setlength{\textwidth}{18cm}
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\setlength{\textwidth}{18cm}
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\setlength{\textheight}{24.5cm}
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\setlength{\textheight}{24.35cm}
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%\setlength{\textwidth}{20cm}
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%\setlength{\textwidth}{20cm}
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\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{0in}
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\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{0in}
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\setlength{\evensidemargin}{0in}
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@ -171,20 +171,23 @@ Currently standards that demand FMEA for hardware (e.g. EN298, EN61508),
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do not specify it for software, but instead specify, good practise,
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do not specify it for software, but instead specify, good practise,
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review processes and language feature constraints.
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review processes and language feature constraints.
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%
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%
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This is a weakness
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This is a weakness.
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Where FMEA % scientifically
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Where FMEA % scientifically
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traces component {\fms}
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traces component {\fms}
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to resultant system failures, software has been left in a non-analytical
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to resultant system failures, software has been left in a non-analytical
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limbo of best practises and constraints.
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limbo of best practises and constraints.
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% %
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% %
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If software and hardware integrated FMEA were possible, electro-mechanical-software hybrids could
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If software and hardware integrated FMEA were possible, electro-mechanical-software hybrids could
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be modelled; and could thus be `complete' failure mode models.
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be modelled, and could thus be `complete' failure mode models.
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%
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Failure modes in components in say a sensor, could be traced
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Failure modes in components in say a sensor, could be traced
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up through the electronics and then through the controlling software.
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up through the electronics and then through the controlling software.
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%
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Presently FMEA, stops at the glass ceiling of the computer program.
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Presently FMEA, stops at the glass ceiling of the computer program.
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%
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This paper presents a modular variant of FMEA, Failure Mode Modular De-Composition (FMMD), a methodology which
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This paper presents a modular variant of FMEA, Failure Mode Modular De-Composition (FMMD), a methodology which
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can be applied to software, and is compatible
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can be applied to software, and is compatible
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and integrate-able with FMMD performed on mechanical and electronic systems.
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and integrable with FMMD performed on mechanical and electronic systems.
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}
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}
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%\today
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%\today
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@ -213,7 +216,7 @@ and unstructured non-functional languages}.
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%What FMEA is, briefly variants...
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%What FMEA is, briefly variants...
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Failure Mode effects Analysis is the process of taking
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Failure Mode Effects Analysis is the process of taking
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component failure modes, and by reasoning, tracing their effects through a system
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component failure modes, and by reasoning, tracing their effects through a system
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and determining what system level failure modes could be caused.
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and determining what system level failure modes could be caused.
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%
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%
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@ -268,7 +271,7 @@ In a complicated system, mapping a component failure mode to a system level fail
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will mean a long reasoning distance; that is to say the actions of the failed component will have to be traced through
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will mean a long reasoning distance; that is to say the actions of the failed component will have to be traced through
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several sub-systems and the effects of other components on the way.
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several sub-systems and the effects of other components on the way.
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%
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%
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With software at the higher levels of these sub-systems
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With software at the higher levels of these sub-systems,
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we have yet another layer of complication.
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we have yet another layer of complication.
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%
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%
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In order to integrate software, %in a meaningful way
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In order to integrate software, %in a meaningful way
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@ -504,8 +507,8 @@ to supply a current signal to represent the value to be sent~\cite{aoe}[p.934].
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Usually, $4mA$ represents a zero or starting value and $20mA$ represents the full scale,
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Usually, $4mA$ represents a zero or starting value and $20mA$ represents the full scale,
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and this is referred to as {\ft} signalling.
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and this is referred to as {\ft} signalling.
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%
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%
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{\ft} has a an electrical advantage as well, because the current in a loop is constant~\cite{aoe}[p.20]
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{\ft} has an electrical advantage as well, because the current in a loop is constant~\cite{aoe}[p.20].
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resistance in the wires between the source and the receiving end is not an issue
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Thus resistance in the wires between the source and the receiving end is not an issue
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that can alter the accuracy of the signal.
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that can alter the accuracy of the signal.
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%
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%
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This circuit has many advantages for safety. If the signal becomes disconnected
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This circuit has many advantages for safety. If the signal becomes disconnected
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@ -646,7 +649,7 @@ double read_ADC( int channel ) {
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/* return out of range result */
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/* return out of range result */
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/* if invalid channel selected */
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/* if invalid channel selected */
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if ( channnel > ADC_CHAN_RANGE )
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if ( channel > ADC_CHAN_RANGE )
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return -2.0;
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return -2.0;
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/* set the multiplexer to the desired channel */
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/* set the multiplexer to the desired channel */
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ADCMUX = channel;
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ADCMUX = channel;
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@ -964,7 +967,7 @@ of reasoning for each component failure mode.
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%
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%
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% Part of the design philosophy of a {\ft} loop, is that
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% Part of the design philosophy of a {\ft} loop, is that
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% if anything goes wrong, we should be able to detect it.
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% if anything goes wrong, we should be able to detect it.
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% In fact unless all electrical elements in the loop
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% In fact, unless all electrical elements in the loop
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% are in working order we will detect a failure in
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% are in working order we will detect a failure in
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% the majority of cases.
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% the majority of cases.
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% \paragraph{Sending side of a {\ft} loop}
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% \paragraph{Sending side of a {\ft} loop}
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