C garret comments 13SEP2013
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@ -1298,9 +1298,9 @@ The post-condition for the monitor function is that it implements the PID contro
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A {\dc} for the standalone temperature controller is now created, and given the name TempController.
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It will have the following failure modes:
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%
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\begin{equationarry}
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\begin{eqnarray*}
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fm ( TempController ) = \{ ControlFailureIndicated, \\ ControlFailure, \\ KnownIndicationError, \\ UnknownIndicationError \}.
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\end{equationarry}
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\end{eqnarray*}
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@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
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\label{sec:chap8}
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\fmeagloss
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This study has examined the processes and state of the art of the four main FMEA variants.
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This study has examined the %processes and state of the art of the
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four main FMEA variants.
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%
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\fmmdglossSTATEEX
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It has exposed shortcomings in these methodologies, which can be summed up as an inability to
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model hybrid software and hardware systems in a satisfactory manner, a problem with state explosion
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and difficulty of re-use of analysis because there is no support for modularity.
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model hybrid software and hardware systems, % in a satisfactory manner,
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a problem with state explosion
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and difficulty of re-use of analysis. % because there is no support for modularity.
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The FMECA and FMEDA variants also suffer from embedding subjective and objective assessments of failure modes.
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A modularised FMEA---Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD)---had been proposed.
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This thesis proposes modularised FMEA---Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD)---to overcome some of these problems.
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This modularised version had been supported by the work already established by the definition of
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{\fms} for {\bcs} in the literature~\cite{fmd91,mil1991,en298,en230}.
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%
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A selection of electronic examples was analysed using FMMD
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which deliberately introduced varying circuit
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Specific electronic examples were analysed using FMMD
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to test circuit %which deliberately introduced varying circuit
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topologies with conventional and circular signal paths
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and mixed digital and analogue designs.
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@ -30,7 +32,9 @@ was significantly reduced.
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\fmmdglossRD
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Not only this, but the analysis naturally provided modules which could be re-used,
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re-used not only in the circuit under analysis but potentially in different and future projects as well.
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both in the same circuit and other circuits
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%re-used not only in the circuit under analysis but potentially in different
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and potentially future projects as well.
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Traditional FMEA methods have been applied to software, but analysis has always been performed separately from
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the electronic FMEA~\cite{sfmeaa,sfmea}. %, and while modular kept strictly to a bottom-up approach.
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@ -42,7 +46,7 @@ Two examples of mixed software and hardware systems were analysed as integrated
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as proof of concept. The first example in chapter~\ref{sec:chap6}, was
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presented to the System Safety IET conference in 2012~\cite{syssafe2012}.
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Chapter~\ref{sec:chap7} viewed FMMD from a formal perspective and looked at problems and constraints
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Chapter~\ref{sec:chap7} viewed FMMD from a formal perspective and examined problems and constraints
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necessary to perform FMEA and FMMD.
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Theoretical performance models were developed (see section~\ref{sec:theoreticalperfmodel}) which showed that with increasing modularisation
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@ -76,7 +80,9 @@ In conclusion then, a new method of failure analysis has been devised which imp
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\item distributed systems, and smart instruments, can now be analysed and assessed,
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\item multiple failures can be analysed (without an undue state explosion cost).
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\end{itemize}
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These benefits fall under the following assumptions and constraints:
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These benefits require the following assumptions and constraints:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Failure modes are available for all {\bcs},
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\item Analysts are capable of finding suitable {\fgs} from electronic schematics,
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@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
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% \newcommand{\fmmdname}{\glossary{name={FMMDNAME},description={ }}
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%\fmodegloss
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossHFMEA}{\glossary{name={system}, description={
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Failure Mode Effect Analysis applied to hardware only (i.e. specifically not applied to software)}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossADC}{\glossary{name={system}, description={
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Analogue to digital converter}}}
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