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Robin P. Clark 2013-09-13 15:14:44 +01:00
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4
submission_thesis/CH6_Software_Examples/software.tex
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@ -1298,9 +1298,9 @@ The post-condition for the monitor function is that it implements the PID contro
A {\dc} for the standalone temperature controller is now created, and given the name TempController. A {\dc} for the standalone temperature controller is now created, and given the name TempController.
It will have the following failure modes: It will have the following failure modes:
% %
\begin{equationarry} \begin{eqnarray*}
fm ( TempController ) = \{ ControlFailureIndicated, \\ ControlFailure, \\ KnownIndicationError, \\ UnknownIndicationError \}. fm ( TempController ) = \{ ControlFailureIndicated, \\ ControlFailure, \\ KnownIndicationError, \\ UnknownIndicationError \}.
\end{equationarry} \end{eqnarray*}
% %
% %

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submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
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@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
\label{sec:chap8} \label{sec:chap8}
\fmeagloss \fmeagloss
This study has examined the processes and state of the art of the four main FMEA variants. This study has examined the %processes and state of the art of the
four main FMEA variants.
% %
\fmmdglossSTATEEX \fmmdglossSTATEEX
It has exposed shortcomings in these methodologies, which can be summed up as an inability to It has exposed shortcomings in these methodologies, which can be summed up as an inability to
model hybrid software and hardware systems in a satisfactory manner, a problem with state explosion model hybrid software and hardware systems, % in a satisfactory manner,
and difficulty of re-use of analysis because there is no support for modularity. a problem with state explosion
and difficulty of re-use of analysis. % because there is no support for modularity.
% %
The FMECA and FMEDA variants also suffer from embedding subjective and objective assessments of failure modes. The FMECA and FMEDA variants also suffer from embedding subjective and objective assessments of failure modes.
% %
A modularised FMEA---Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD)---had been proposed. This thesis proposes modularised FMEA---Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD)---to overcome some of these problems.
% %
This modularised version had been supported by the work already established by the definition of This modularised version had been supported by the work already established by the definition of
{\fms} for {\bcs} in the literature~\cite{fmd91,mil1991,en298,en230}. {\fms} for {\bcs} in the literature~\cite{fmd91,mil1991,en298,en230}.
% %
A selection of electronic examples was analysed using FMMD Specific electronic examples were analysed using FMMD
which deliberately introduced varying circuit to test circuit %which deliberately introduced varying circuit
topologies with conventional and circular signal paths topologies with conventional and circular signal paths
and mixed digital and analogue designs. and mixed digital and analogue designs.
% %
@ -30,7 +32,9 @@ was significantly reduced.
\fmmdglossRD \fmmdglossRD
% %
Not only this, but the analysis naturally provided modules which could be re-used, Not only this, but the analysis naturally provided modules which could be re-used,
re-used not only in the circuit under analysis but potentially in different and future projects as well. both in the same circuit and other circuits
%re-used not only in the circuit under analysis but potentially in different
and potentially future projects as well.
Traditional FMEA methods have been applied to software, but analysis has always been performed separately from Traditional FMEA methods have been applied to software, but analysis has always been performed separately from
the electronic FMEA~\cite{sfmeaa,sfmea}. %, and while modular kept strictly to a bottom-up approach. the electronic FMEA~\cite{sfmeaa,sfmea}. %, and while modular kept strictly to a bottom-up approach.
@ -42,7 +46,7 @@ Two examples of mixed software and hardware systems were analysed as integrated
as proof of concept. The first example in chapter~\ref{sec:chap6}, was as proof of concept. The first example in chapter~\ref{sec:chap6}, was
presented to the System Safety IET conference in 2012~\cite{syssafe2012}. presented to the System Safety IET conference in 2012~\cite{syssafe2012}.
% %
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap7} viewed FMMD from a formal perspective and looked at problems and constraints Chapter~\ref{sec:chap7} viewed FMMD from a formal perspective and examined problems and constraints
necessary to perform FMEA and FMMD. necessary to perform FMEA and FMMD.
% %
Theoretical performance models were developed (see section~\ref{sec:theoreticalperfmodel}) which showed that with increasing modularisation Theoretical performance models were developed (see section~\ref{sec:theoreticalperfmodel}) which showed that with increasing modularisation
@ -76,7 +80,9 @@ In conclusion then, a new method of failure analysis has been devised which imp
\item distributed systems, and smart instruments, can now be analysed and assessed, \item distributed systems, and smart instruments, can now be analysed and assessed,
\item multiple failures can be analysed (without an undue state explosion cost). \item multiple failures can be analysed (without an undue state explosion cost).
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
These benefits fall under the following assumptions and constraints: %
These benefits require the following assumptions and constraints:
%
\begin{itemize} \begin{itemize}
\item Failure modes are available for all {\bcs}, \item Failure modes are available for all {\bcs},
\item Analysts are capable of finding suitable {\fgs} from electronic schematics, \item Analysts are capable of finding suitable {\fgs} from electronic schematics,

2
submission_thesis/style.tex
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@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
% \newcommand{\fmmdname}{\glossary{name={FMMDNAME},description={ }} % \newcommand{\fmmdname}{\glossary{name={FMMDNAME},description={ }}
%\fmodegloss %\fmodegloss
\newcommand{\fmmdglossHFMEA}{\glossary{name={system}, description={
Failure Mode Effect Analysis applied to hardware only (i.e. specifically not applied to software)}}}
\newcommand{\fmmdglossADC}{\glossary{name={system}, description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossADC}{\glossary{name={system}, description={
Analogue to digital converter}}} Analogue to digital converter}}}