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@ -34,6 +34,14 @@ build hierarchical bottom-up models of failure mode behaviour.
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\section{ What is a Component ?}
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=400pt,bb=0 0 437 141,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/component.jpg}
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% component.jpg: 437x141 pixel, 72dpi, 15.42x4.97 cm, bb=0 0 437 141
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\caption{A Component and its Failure Modes}
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\label{fig:component}
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\end{figure}
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Let us first define a component. This is anything we use to build a
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product or system with. This could be something quite complicated
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like an integrated microcontroller, or quite simple like the humble resistor.
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@ -56,16 +64,9 @@ each failure mode is referenced back to only one component.
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% by the component ?
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=400pt,bb=0 0 437 141,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/component.jpg}
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% component.jpg: 437x141 pixel, 72dpi, 15.42x4.97 cm, bb=0 0 437 141
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\caption{A Component and its Failure Modes}
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\label{fig:component}
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\end{figure}
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A product naturally consists of many components and these are traditionally
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kept in a `parts list'. For safety critical product this is a usually formal document
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kept in a `parts list'. For safety critical product this is usually a formal document
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and is used by quality inspectors to ensure the correct parts are being fitted.
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For our UML diagram the parts list is simply a collection of components
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as shown in figure \ref{fig:componentpl}.
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@ -100,12 +101,12 @@ starting, where possible with known component failure modes.
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In order to analyse from the bottom-up, we need to take
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small groups of components from the parts~list that naturally
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work together to perform a simple function.
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The components to for the functional groups are chosen by a human, the analyst.
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We can term this a `Functional~Group'. When we have a
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The components to include in a functional group are chosen by a human, the analyst.
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We can term this a `Functional~Group' and represent it as a class. When we have a
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`Functional~Group' we can look at the failure modes of all the components
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in it and decide how these will affect the Group.
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in it and determine a failure mode behaviour for that group.
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Or in other words we can determine the failure modes of the functional
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group. By working from the bottom up we can ensure that
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group. An advantage of working from the bottom up is that we can ensure that
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all component failure modes must be considered. A top down approach
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could miss individual failure modes of components.
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@ -113,20 +114,22 @@ could miss individual failure modes of components.
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\subsection{From functional group to newly derived component}
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The process for taking a functional~group, considering
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all the failure modes of all the componentsin figure \ref{fig:cfg} in it,
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all the failure modes of all the components in it,
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and analysing these is called `symptom abstraction' and
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is dealt with in detail in chapter \ref{symptom_abstraction}.
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In terms of our UML model the symptom abstraction process takes a functional~group,
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and creates a new derived component from it.
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To do this it first creates
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a new set of failure modes, representing the fault behaviour
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of the functional group. This is a human process and to do this the analyst
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must consider all the failure modes of the components in the functional
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group.
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These new failure modes are derived from the functional group, we can therefore call
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%To do this it first creates
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%a new set of failure modes, representing the fault behaviour
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%of the functional group. This is a human process and to do this the analyst
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%must consider all the failure modes of the components in the functional
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%group.
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The newly created derived~component requires a set of failure modes of its own.
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These failure modes are the failure mode behaviour of the fungtional group that it was derived from.
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Because these new failure modes were determined from a derived component we can call
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these `derived~failure~modes'.
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It then creates a new derived~component object, and associates it to this new set of derived~failure~modes.
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%It then creates a new derived~component object, and associates it to this new set of derived~failure~modes.
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We thus have a `new' component, or system building block, but with a known and traceable
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fault behaviour.
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@ -140,14 +143,6 @@ We can represet this using an UML diagram in figure \ref{fig:cfg}
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\caption{UML Meta model for FMMD hierarchy}
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\label{fig:cfg}
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\end{figure}
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%
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% \begin{figure}[h+]
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[width=400pt,bb=0 0 712 235,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/cfg.jpg}
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% % cfg.jpg: 712x205 pixel, 72dpi, 25.12x7.23 cm, bb=0 0 712 205
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% \caption{Components Derived from Functional Groups}
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% \label{fig:cfg}
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% \end{figure}
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\subsection{Keeping track of the dereived components position in the hierarchy}
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@ -158,7 +153,7 @@ The level variable in each Component,
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indicates the position in the hierarchy. Base or parts~list components
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have a `level' of 0. Derived~components take a level based on the highest level
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component used to build the functional group it was derived from plus 1.
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So a derived component built from base lavel or parts list components
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So a derived component built from base level or parts list components
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would have a level of 1.
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%\clearpage
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@ -180,169 +175,10 @@ functional group and converts it into a new component.
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$$ \bowtie ( FG ) \mapsto DerivedComponent $$
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%
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% \subsection{Systems, functional groups, sub-systems and failure modes}
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%
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% It is helpful here to define some terms, `system', `functional~group', `component', `base~component' and `sub-system'.
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%
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% A System, is really any coherent entity that would be sold as a safety critical product.
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% A sub-system is a part of some larger system.
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% For instance a stereo amplifier separate is a sub-system. The
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% whole Sound System, consists perhaps of the following `sub-systems':
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% CD-player, tuner, amplifier~separate, loudspeakers and ipod~interface.
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%
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% %Thinking like this is a top~down analysis approach
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% %and is the way in which FTA\cite{nucfta} analyses a System
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% %and breaks it down.
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%
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% A sub-system will be composed of component parts, which
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% may themselves be sub-systems.
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%
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% Eventually by a recursive downwards process we would be able to identify
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% sub-systems built from base component parts.
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% Each `component part'
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% will have a known fault/failure behaviour.
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% That is to say, each base component has a set of known
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% ways in which it can fail.
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%
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% If we look at the sound system again as an
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% example; the CD~player could fail in serveral distinct ways, no matter
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% what has happened to it or has gone wrong inside it.
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%
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% A top down approach has an intrinsic problem in that we cannot guess
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% every possible failure mode at the SYSTEM level.
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% Using the reasoning that working from the bottom up forces the consideration of all possible
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% component failures (which could be missed in a top~down approach)
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% we are presented with a problem. Which initial collections of base components should we choose ?
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%
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% For instance in the CD~player example; to start at the bottom; we are presented with
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% a massive list of base~components, resistors, motors, user~switches, laser~diodes all sorts !
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% Clearly, working from the bottom~up we need to pick small
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% collections of components that work together in some way.
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% These are termed `functional~groups'. For instance the circuitry that powers the laser diode
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% to illuminate the CD might contain a handful of components, and as such would make a good candidate
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% to be one of the base level functional~groups.
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%
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%
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% In choosing the lowest level (base component) sub-systems we would look
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% for the smallest `functional~groups' of components within a system. A functional~group is a set of components that interact
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% to perform a specific function.
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%
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% When we have analysed the fault behaviour of a functional group, we can treat it as a `black box'.
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% We can now call our functional~group a sub-system. The goal here is to know how will behave under fault conditions !
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% %Imagine buying one such `sub~system' from a very honest vendor.
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% %One of those sir, yes but be warned it may fail in these distinct ways, here
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% %in the honest data sheet the set of failure modes is listed!
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% This type of thinking is starting to become more commonplace in product literature, with the emergence
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% of reliability safety standards such as IOC1508\cite{sccs},EN61508\cite{en61508}.
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% FIT (Failure in Time - expected number of failures per billion hours of operation) values
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% are published for some micro-controllers. A micro~controller
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% is a complex sub-system in its self and could be considered a `black~box' with a given reliability.
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% \footnote{Microchip sources give an FIT of 4 for their PIC18 series micro~controllers\cite{microchip}, The DOD
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% 1991 reliability manual\cite{mil1991} applies a FIT of 100 for this generic type of component}
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%
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% As electrical components have detailed datasheets a useful extension of this would
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% be failure modes of the component, with environmental factors and MTTF statistics.
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%
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% Currently this sort of information is generally only available for generic component types\cite{mil1991}.
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%
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%
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% %At higher levels of analysis, functional~groups are pre-analysed sub-systems that interact to
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% %erform a given function.
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%
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% %\vspace{0.3cm}
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% \begin{table}[h]
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% \begin{tabular}{||l|l||} \hline \hline
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% {\em Definition } & {\em Description} \\ \hline
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% System & A product designed to \\
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% & work as a coherent entity \\ \hline
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% Sub-system & A part of a system, \\
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% & sub-systems may contain sub-systems \\ \hline
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% Failure mode & A way in which a System, \\
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% & Sub-system or component can fail \\ \hline
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% Functional Group & A collection of sub-systems and/or \\
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% & components that interact to \\
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% & perform a specific function \\ \hline
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% Failure Mode & The collection of all failure \\
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% Group & modes from all the members of a \\
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% & functional group \\ \hline
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% Derived & A failure mode determined from the analysis \\
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% Failure mode & of a `Failure Mode Group' \\ \hline
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% Base Component & Any bought in component, which \\
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% & hopefully has a known set of failure modes \\ \hline
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% \hline
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% component_failure_modes_definition/
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% \end{tabular}
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% \label{tab:def}
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% \caption{Table of FMMD definitions}
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% \end{table}
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% %\vspace{0.3cm}
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%
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% \section{A UML Model of terms introduced}
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%
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%
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% \begin{figure}[h]
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[width=350pt,bb=0 0 680 500,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/fmmd_uml.jpg}
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% % fmmd_uml.jpg: 680x500 pixel, 72dpi, 23.99x17.64 cm, bb=0 0 680 500
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% \caption{UML respresentation of Failure Mode Data types}
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% \label{fig:fmmd_uml}
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% \end{figure}
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%
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% The diagram in figure \ref{fig:fmmd_uml}
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% shows the relationships between the terms defined in table \ref{tab:def} as classes in a UML model.
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% We can start with the functional group. This is a minimal collection
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% of components that perform a simple given function.
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% For our audio separates rig, this could be
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% the compoents that supply power to the laser diode.
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% From the `Functional~Group' we can now collect
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% all the `failure modes of the `components', and
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% produce a `Failure~Mode~Group'. This
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% has a reference to the `Functional~Group', and is a collection
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% of `failure modes.
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% By analysing the effects of the failure modes in the `Failure~Mode~Group'
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% we can determine the failure mode behaviour of the functional group.
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% This failure mode behaviour is a collection of derived failure modes.
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% We can now consider the Functional group as a component now, because
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% we have a set of failure modes for it.
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%
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% \subsection{Sub-System Class Definition}
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% A sub-system can be defined by the classes used to create it, and
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% its set of derived failure modes.
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% In this way sub-systems naturally form trees, with the lower most leaf nodes being
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% base components.
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% Note that the UML model is recursive. We can build functional groups using sub-systems
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% as components. This UML model naturally therefore, forms a hierarchy
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% of failure mode analysis, which has a one top level entry, that being the SYSTEM.
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% The TOP level entry will determine the failure modes
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% for the product/system under analysis.
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%
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% \subsection{Refining the UML model to use inheritance}
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% We can refine this model a little by noticing that a system is merely the
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% top level sub-system. We can thus have System inherit sub-system.
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% A derived failure mode, is simply a failure mode at a higher level of analysis
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% it can therefore inherit `failure\_mode'.
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%
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% The modified UML diagram using inheritance is figure \ref{fig:fmmd_uml2}.
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% \begin{figure}[h]
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[width=350pt,bb=0 0 877 675,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_uml2.jpg}
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% % fmmd_uml2.jpg: 877x675 pixel, 72dpi, 30.94x23.81 cm, bb=0 0 877 675
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% \caption{UML Representation of Failure Mode Data Types}
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% \label{fig:fmmd_uml2}
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% \end{figure}
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% %
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% % \begin{figure}[h]
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% % \centering
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% % \includegraphics[width=350pt,bb=0 0 680 500,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/fmmd_uml2.jpg}
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% % % fmmd_uml.jpg: 680x500 pixel, 72dpi, 23.99x17.64 cm, bb=0 0 680 500
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% % \caption{UML respresentation of Failure Mode Data types}
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% % \label{fig:fmmd_uml2}
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% % \end{figure}
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\section{Unitary State Component Failure Mode sets}
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\paragraph{Design Descision/Constraint}
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An important factor in defining a set of failure modes is that they
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should be as clearly defined as possible.
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It should not be possible for instance for
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@ -362,7 +198,7 @@ within one package.
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\begin{definition}
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A set of failure modes where only one fault mode
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can be active at a time is termed a `unitary~state' failure mode set.
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This is termed the $U$ set thoughout this study.
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%This is termed the $U$ set thoughout this study.
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This corresponds to the `mutually exclusive' definition in
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probability theory\cite{probandstat}.
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\end{definition}
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