moved approvals FMEA to the end

presentations/fmea/fmea_pres.tex

@@ -131,41 +131,6 @@ double failure scenarios (for burner lock-out scenarios).
 
 \end{frame}
 
-\section{FMEA used for Saftey Critical Aprovals}
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
-Experts from Approval House and Equipement Manufacturer
-discuss selected component failure modes
-judged to be in critical sections of the product.
-
-
-\begin{figure}[h]
- \centering
- \includegraphics[width=100pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./tech_meeting.png}
- % tech_meeting.png: 350x299 pixel, 300dpi, 2.97x2.53 cm, bb=0 0 84 72
- \caption{FMEA  Meeting}
- \label{fig:tech_meeting}
-\end{figure}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
-
-\begin{figure}[h]
- \centering
- \includegraphics[width=70pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./tech_meeting.png}
- % tech_meeting.png: 350x299 pixel, 300dpi, 2.97x2.53 cm, bb=0 0 84 72
- \caption{FMEA  Meeting}
- \label{fig:tech_meeting}
-\end{figure}
-
-\begin{itemize}
-  \pause \item Impossible to look at all component failures let alone apply FMEA rigorously.
-  \pause \item In practise, failure scenarios for critical sections are contested, and either justified or extra safety measures implemented.
-   \pause \item Meeting notes or minutes only.
-\end{itemize}
-
-\end{frame}
 
 \section{PFMEA - Production FMEA : 1940's to present}
 
@@ -345,6 +310,7 @@ if it can be shown that selfchecking will detect failure modes.
 \end{frame}
 
 \begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
 Failure modes are classified as Safe or Dangerous according 
 to the putative system level failure they will cause.
 The Failure modes are also classified as Detected or
@@ -356,6 +322,7 @@ is represented by lambda variables
 (i.e. $\lambda_{SD}$, $\lambda_{SU}$, $\lambda_{DD}$, $\lambda_{DU}$).
 \end{frame}
 \begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
 \textbf{Diagnostic Coverage.}
 The diagnostic coverage is simply the ratio
 of the dangerous detected probabilities
@@ -369,6 +336,7 @@ $$ DiagnosticCoverage = \Sigma\lambda_{DD} / \Sigma\lambda_D $$
 
 
 \begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
 The diagnostic coverage for safe failures, where  $\Sigma\lambda_{SD}$ represents the percentage of
 safe detected base component failure modes,
 and $\Sigma\lambda_S$ the total number of safe base component failure modes,
@@ -388,9 +356,49 @@ $$ SFF = \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_{DD} \big) / \big( \Sigma\lambda_
 \end{frame}
 
 \begin{frame}
+\frametitle{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
  SIL Levels are how they are calculated
 \end{frame}
 
+
+
+\section{FMEA used for Safety Critical Approvals}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
+Experts from Approval House and Equipment Manufacturer
+discuss selected component failure modes
+judged to be in critical sections of the product.
+
+
+\begin{figure}[h]
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics[width=100pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./tech_meeting.png}
+ % tech_meeting.png: 350x299 pixel, 300dpi, 2.97x2.53 cm, bb=0 0 84 72
+ \caption{FMEA  Meeting}
+ \label{fig:tech_meeting}
+\end{figure}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
+
+\begin{figure}[h]
+ \centering
+ \includegraphics[width=70pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./tech_meeting.png}
+ % tech_meeting.png: 350x299 pixel, 300dpi, 2.97x2.53 cm, bb=0 0 84 72
+ \caption{FMEA  Meeting}
+ \label{fig:tech_meeting}
+\end{figure}
+
+\begin{itemize}
+  \pause \item Impossible to look at all component failures let alone apply FMEA rigorously.
+  \pause \item In practise, failure scenarios for critical sections are contested, and either justified or extra safety measures implemented.
+   \pause \item Meeting notes or minutes only.
+\end{itemize}
+
+\end{frame}
+
 \section{FMEA - General Criticism}
 \begin{frame}
 \frametitle{FMEA - General Criticism}
@@ -402,42 +410,60 @@ $$ SFF = \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_{DD} \big) / \big( \Sigma\lambda_
   \pause \item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's.
 \end{itemize}
 
-FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it will allow for 
+%FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it will allow for 
-self checking features, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture,
+%self checking features, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture,
-but
+%but
 
 \end{frame}
 
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{FMEA - Better Metodology - Wish List}
 
+\begin{itemize}
+  
+   \pause \item State explosion  
+  \pause \item  Rigorous
+   \pause \item Reasoning Traceable  
+   \pause \item re-useable
+  \pause \item  
+\end{itemize}
+
+%FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it will allow for 
+%self checking features, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture,
+%but
+
+\end{frame}
 \section{Failure Mode Modular De-Composition}
-\subsection{FMEA and complexity of each failure scenario analysis}
 \begin{frame}
  
-Consider the FMEA type methodologies
+% Consider the FMEA type methodologies
-where we look at all the failure modes in a system, and then 
+% where we look at all the failure modes in a system, and then 
-see how they can affect all other components within it,
+% see how they can affect all other components within it,
-to determine its system level symptom or failure mode.
+% to determine its system level symptom or failure mode.
-We need to look at a large number of failure scenarios
+% We need to look at a large number of failure scenarios
-to do this completely (all failure modes against all components).
+% to do this completely (all failure modes against all components).
-This is represented in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp},
+% This is represented in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp},
-where $N$ is the total number of components in the system, and 
+% where $N$ is the total number of components in the system, and 
-$cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component.
+% $cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component.
-
+% 
-\begin{equation}
+% \begin{equation}
-  \label{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
+%   \label{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
-  N.(N-1).cfm % \\
+%   N.(N-1).cfm % \\
-  %(N^2 - N).cfm 
+%   %(N^2 - N).cfm 
-\end{equation}
+% \end{equation}
 
 
 The FMMD methodology breaks the analysis down into small stages,
-by making the analyst choose functional groups, and then when analysed the groups
+by making the analyst choose functional groups of components, which are then when analysed.
-are treated as components to be used for a higher stage.
+When analysed, we will have a set of symptoms of failure for the functional group.
-This is designed to address the state explosion (where $O$ is order
+We can then create a derived~component,
+to represent the functional group.
+We can use derived components to form `higher~level' functional groups.
+This addresses the state explosion (where $O$ is order
 of complexity) $O=N^2$ inherent in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp}.
 \end{frame}
 
-
+\begin{frame}
 We can view the functional groups in FMMD as forming a hierarchy.
 If for the sake of example we consider each functional group to
 be three components, figure~\ref{fig:three_tree} shows
@@ -451,7 +477,7 @@ how the levels work and converge to a top or system level.
  \label{fig:three_tree}
 \end{figure}
 
-\clearpage
+\end{frame}
 We can represent the number of failure scenarios to check in an FMMD hierarchy
 with equation~\ref{eqn:anscen}.
 
@@ -498,7 +524,7 @@ group is the same for equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp22}
 and equation~\ref{eqn:anscen}.
 \clearpage
 
-\section{Example}
+%\section{Example}
 
 To see the effects of reducing `state~explosion' we need to look at a larger system.
 Let us take a system with 3 levels and apply these formulae.