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\section{Introduction}
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$$ \int_{0\-}^{\infty} f(t).e^{-s.t}.dt \; | \; s \in C$$
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%$$ \int_{0\-}^{\infty} f(t).e^{-s.t}.dt \; | \; s \in C$$
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This thesis describes the application of, mathematical (formal) techniques to
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the design of safety critical systems.
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@ -13,9 +13,53 @@ both the specific `simultaneous failures'\cite{EN298},\cite{EN230},\cite{EN12067
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and the probability to dangerous fault approach\cite{EN61508}.
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The visual notation developed was initially designed for electronic fault modelling.
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However, it could be appleid to mechanical and software domains as well.
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Due to this a common notation/diagram style
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can be used to model any integrated safety relevant system.
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However, it was relaised that could be applied to mechanical and software domains as well.
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This changed the target for the study slightly to encompass these domains in a common notation.
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\section{Background}
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I completed an MSc in Software engineering in 2004 at Brighton university while working for
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an Engineering firm as a software Engineer.
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The firm make industrial burner controllers.
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iIndustrial Burners are potentially very dangerous industrail plant.
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They are subject to stringent safety regulations and any product controlling them
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must conform to specific `EN' standards. This involved not only writing software and designing hardware in compliance,
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but also stages of formal certification testing. The certification testing had to be performed by
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`competent body' recognised under European law. A significant part
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of this process was `static testing'. This involved looking at the design of the products,
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from the perspective of components failing, and the effect on safety this would have.
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Some of the static testing involved checking that the germane `EN' standards had
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been complied with. Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) was also applied. This involved
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looking in detail at critical sections of the product and proposing
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component failure scenarios. For each failure scenario proposed either a satisfactory
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answer was required, or a counter proposal to change the design to cope with
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the comonent failure eventuality. FMEA was time consuming, and being directed by
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experts undoubtly ironed out many potential safety faults before the product saw
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light of day. However it was quickly apparent that only a small proportion
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of copmponent~failure modes was considered. Also there was no formaliswm.
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The component~failure~modes investigated were not analysed within
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any rigourous framework.
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\subsection{Possibility of applying mathematical techniques to FMEA}
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My MSc project was a diagram editor for Constraint diagrams.
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I wanted to apply constriant diagram techniques to FMEA
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and began thinking about how this could be done. One
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obvious factor was that a typical safety critical system could
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have more than 1000 component parts. Each component
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would typically have several failure modes.
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Trying to apply a rigourous methodology on an entire product
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was going to be impractical. To do this with complete coverage
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each component failure mode would have to have been checked against
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the other thousand or so components for influence, and then
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a determination of the effects on the system would have had to have been
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determined. Thus millions of checks would have to have been performed, and
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as FMEA is an `expert only' time consuming technique, this idea was
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obviously impractical.
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\section{Safety Critical Systems}
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@ -23,7 +67,7 @@ can be used to model any integrated safety relevant system.
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A safety critical system is one in which lives may depend upon it or
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it has the potential to become dangerous.
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(/usr/share/texmf-texlive/tex/latex/amsmath/amstext.sty
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(/usr/share/texmf-texlive/tex/latex/amsmath/amstext.sty)
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An industrial burner is typical of plant that is potentially dangerous.
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An incorrect air/fuel mixture can be explosive.
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@ -32,11 +76,13 @@ life support are examples of systems that lives depend upon.
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\subsection{Two approaches : Probablistic, and Compnent fault tolerant}
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There are two main philosophies applied to safety critical systems.
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There are two main philosophies applied to safety critical systems certification.
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\paragraph{Statistical safety Measures}
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One is a general number of acceptable failure per hour of operation.
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This is the probablistic approach and is embodied in the european standard
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EN61508 \cite{EN61508}.
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\paragraph{Prescriptive safety Measures}
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The second philosophy, applied to application specific standards, is to investigate
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components ior sub-systems in the critical safety path and to look at component failure modes
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and ensure that they cannot cause dangerous faults.
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@ -66,14 +112,15 @@ reference chapter dealing speciifically with this but given a quick overview.
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- specific safety standards
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\subsubsection{Overview of current testing and certification}
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ref chapter speciiffically on this but give an overview now
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ref chapter speciifically on this but give an overview now
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\section{Background to the Industrial Burner Safety Analysis Problem}
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An industrial burner is a good example of a safety critical system.
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It has the potential for devatating explosions due to boiler overpressure, or
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It has the potential for devistating explosions due to boiler overpressure, or
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ignition of an explosive mixture, and, because of the large amounts of fuel used,
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is a potential fire hazard. They are often left running unattended 24/7.
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is also a fire hazard. Also Industrial boilers are often left running unattended
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for long periods of time (typically days).
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To add to these problems
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Operators are often under pressure to keep them running. An boiler supplying
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@ -86,7 +133,7 @@ This places extra responsibility on the burner controller.
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These are common place and account for a very large proportion of the enery usage
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in the world today (find and ref stats)
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Industrial burners are common enough to have different specific standards
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written for the fuel types they usei \ref{EN298} \ref{EN230} \ref{EN12067}.
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written for the fuel types they use \ref{EN298} \ref{EN230} \ref{EN12067}.
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A modern industrial burner has mechanical, electronic and software
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elements, that are all safety critical. That is to say
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@ -374,7 +421,7 @@ and how it will react when it does.
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Some systems and components are guaranteed to work within certain environmental constraints,
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temperature being the most typical. Very often what happens to the system outside that range is not defined.
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Where this is the case, these are undetectable errors.
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\section{Project Goals}
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