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tidying and compiles under 12.04 ubuntu now

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robin 2012-05-07 13:04:39 +01:00
parent c6b20536aa
commit 8a442a065c
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24
submission_thesis/CH4_FMMD/copy.tex
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@ -51,14 +51,12 @@ paper
{ {
chapter chapter
} }
describes the data types and concepts for the Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD) method. starts with a worked example of the new methodology Failure Mode Modular De-composition (FMMD), and then
When analysing a safety critical system using describes the data types and concepts for the method, using these a UML class model is built
any form of Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), we need clearly defined failure modes for and then notation is developed.
all the components that are used in a given system.
%
We introduce a constraint that
component failure modes must be mutually exclusive within individual components.
This concept is later developed as the condition of `unitary state' fault modes (see section~\ref{sec:unitarystate}).
%When this constraint is complied with, we can use the FMMD method to %When this constraint is complied with, we can use the FMMD method to
%build hierarchical bottom-up models of failure mode behaviour. %build hierarchical bottom-up models of failure mode behaviour.
%This and the definition of a component are %This and the definition of a component are
@ -84,7 +82,7 @@ This concept is later developed as the condition of `unitary state' fault modes
To demonstrate the principles behind FMMD, we analyse a To demonstrate the principles behind FMMD, we use it to analyse a
commonly used circuit, the non-inverting op amp~\cite{aoe}[p.234], shown in figure \ref{fig:noninvamp}. commonly used circuit, the non-inverting op amp~\cite{aoe}[p.234], shown in figure \ref{fig:noninvamp}.
@ -547,7 +545,13 @@ of component failures.
\clearpage \clearpage
% When analysing a safety critical system using
% any form of Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), we need clearly defined failure modes for
% all the components that are used in a given system.
% %
% We introduce a constraint that
% component failure modes must be mutually exclusive within individual components.
% This concept is later developed as the condition of `unitary state' fault modes (see section~\ref{sec:unitarystate}).
\section{Defining terms} \section{Defining terms}

2
submission_thesis/Makefile
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
all: bib chapters_sub_make all: bib chapters_sub_make
pdflatex thesis pdflatex thesis
makeindex thesis.glo -s thesis.ist -t thesis.glg -o thesis.gls makeindex thesis.glo -s thesis.ist -t thesis.glg -o thesis.gls
acroread thesis.pdf acroread thesis.pdf || evince thesis.pdf
clean: clean:
#touch ${CHAPTERS} #touch ${CHAPTERS}