Separated out the abstract from the paper, so that I can work on the abstract
in isolation.
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@ -12,3 +12,13 @@ all: ${PNG}
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bib:
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bibtex software_fmea
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abs: # bib
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cat abs_pre.tex > abstract.tex
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cat abs.tex >> abstract.tex
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cat abs_end.tex >> abstract.tex
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# bib abs.tex
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pdflatex abstract
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acroread abstract.pdf
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33
papers/software_fmea/abs.tex
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33
papers/software_fmea/abs.tex
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%The certification process of safety critical products for European and
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%other international standards often demand environmental stress,
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%endurance and Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing. Theoretical, or 'static testing',
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%is often also required.
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%
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Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), is a is a bottom-up technique that aims to assess the effect all
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component failure modes on a system.
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It is used both as a design tool (to determine weaknesses), and is a requirement of certification of safety critical products.
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FMEA has been successfully applied to mechanical, electrical and hybrid electro-mechanical systems.
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Work on software FMEA (SFMEA) is beginning, but
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at present no technique for SFMEA that
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integrates hardware and software models known to the authors exists.
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%
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Software generally, sits on top of most modern safety critical control systems
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and defines its most important system wide behaviour and communications.
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Currently standards that demand FMEA for hardware (e.g. EN298, EN61508),
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do not specify it for Software, but instead specify, good practise,
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review processes and language feature constraints.
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This is a weakness; where FMEA % scientifically
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traces component {\fms}
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to resultant system failures, software has been left in a non-analytical
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limbo of best practises and constraints.
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%
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If software FMEA were possible, electro-mechanical-software hybrids could
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be modelled; and could thus be `complete' failure mode models.
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%Failure modes in components in say a sensor, could be traced
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%up through the electronics and then through the controlling software.
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Presently FMEA, stops at the glass ceiling of the computer program.
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This paper presents an FMEA methodology which can be applied to software, and is compatible
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and integrate-able with FMEA performed on mechanical and electronic systems.
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4
papers/software_fmea/abs_end.tex
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4
papers/software_fmea/abs_end.tex
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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\end{document}
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63
papers/software_fmea/abs_pre.tex
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papers/software_fmea/abs_pre.tex
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\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
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%\documentclass[twocolumn,10pt]{report}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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%\usepackage{wassysym}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amsthm}
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\usetikzlibrary{shapes.gates.logic.US,trees,positioning,arrows}
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%\input{../style}
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\usepackage{ifthen}
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\usepackage{lastpage}
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\usetikzlibrary{shapes,snakes}
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\newcommand{\tickYES}{\checkmark}
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\newcommand{\fc}{fault~scenario}
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\newcommand{\fcs}{fault~scenarios}
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\date{}
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%\renewcommand{\encodingdefault}{T1}
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%\renewcommand{\rmdefault}{tnr}
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%\newboolean{paper}
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%\setboolean{paper}{true} % boolvar=true or false
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\newcommand{\ft}{\ensuremath{4\!\!\rightarrow\!\!20mA} }
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\newcommand{\permil}{\ensuremath{{ }^0/_{00}}}
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\newcommand{\oc}{\ensuremath{^{o}{C}}}
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\newcommand{\adctw}{{${\mathcal{ADC}}_{12}$}}
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\newcommand{\adcten}{{${\mathcal{ADC}}_{10}$}}
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\newcommand{\ohms}[1]{\ensuremath{#1\Omega}}
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\newcommand{\fm}{failure~mode}
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\newcommand{\fms}{failure~modes}
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\newcommand{\fg}{functional~group}
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\newcommand{\FG}{\mathcal{G}}
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\newcommand{\DC}{\mathcal{DC}}
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\newcommand{\fgs}{functional~groups}
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\newcommand{\dc}{derived~component}
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\newcommand{\dcs}{derived~components}
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\newcommand{\bc}{base~component}
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\newcommand{\FMMD}{ModularFMEA}
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\newcommand{\bcs}{base~components}
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\newcommand{\irl}{in real life}
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\newcommand{\enc}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{enc}{\longrightarrow}}}
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\newcommand{\pin}{\ensuremath{\stackrel{pi}{\longleftrightarrow}}}
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%\newcommand{\pic}{\em pure~intersection~chain}
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\newcommand{\pic}{\em pair-wise~intersection~chain}
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\newcommand{\wrt}{\em with~respect~to}
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\newcommand{\abslevel}{\ensuremath{\Psi}}
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\setlength{\topmargin}{0in}
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\setlength{\headheight}{0in}
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\setlength{\headsep}{0in}
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\setlength{\textheight}{22cm}
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\setlength{\textwidth}{18cm}
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\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{0in}
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\setlength{\evensidemargin}{0in}
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\setlength{\parindent}{0.0in}
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\setlength{\parskip}{6pt}
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\begin{document}
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\section*{FMEA applied to a hybrid software and hardware sub-system}
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@ -131,39 +131,7 @@ failure mode of the component or sub-system}}}
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%\small
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\abstract{ \em
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%The certification process of safety critical products for European and
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%other international standards often demand environmental stress,
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%endurance and Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing. Theoretical, or 'static testing',
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%is often also required.
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%
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Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), is a is a bottom-up technique that aims to assess the effect all
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component failure modes on a system.
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It is used both as a design tool (to determine weaknesses), and is a requirement of certification of safety critical products.
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FMEA has been successfully applied to mechanical, electrical and hybrid electro-mechanical systems.
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Work on software FMEA (SFMEA) is beginning, but
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at present no technique for SFMEA that
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integrates hardware and software models known to the authors exists.
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%
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Software generally, sits on top of most modern safety critical control systems
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and defines its most important system wide behaviour and communications.
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Currently standards that demand FMEA for hardware (e.g. EN298, EN61508),
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do not specify it for Software, but instead specify, good practise,
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review processes and language feature constraints.
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This is a weakness; where FMEA % scientifically
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traces component {\fms}
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to resultant system failures, software has been left in a non-analytical
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limbo of best practises and constraints.
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%
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If software FMEA were possible, electro-mechanical-software hybrids could
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be modelled; and could thus be `complete' failure mode models.
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%Failure modes in components in say a sensor, could be traced
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%up through the electronics and then through the controlling software.
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Presently FMEA, stops at the glass ceiling of the computer program.
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This paper presents an FMEA methodology which can be applied to software, and is compatible
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and integrate-able with FMEA performed on mechanical and electronic systems.
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\input{abs}
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}
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\today
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