morning edit spell check.

SOON:

Chap 5 to bton for chris garret
Chap 7 to J Howse

fmmd_concept/fmmd_concept.tex

@@ -563,9 +563,11 @@ model can be implemented on a spreadsheet, where each component
 has a calculated risk, a fault detection time (if any), an estimated risk importance
 and other factors such as de-rating and environmental stress.
 With one component failure mode per row, 
-all the statistical factors for SIL rating can be produced\footnote{A SIL rating will apply 
-to an installed plant, i.e. a complete installed and working SYSTEM. SIL ratings for individual components or 
-sub-systems are meaningless, and the nearest equivalent would be the FIT/PFD and SFF and diagnostic coverage figures.}.
+all the statistical factors for SIL rating can be produced\footnote{A SIL rating will 
+apply to an installed plant, i.e. a complete installed and working SYSTEM. 
+SIL ratings for individual components or 
+sub-systems are meaningless, and the nearest equivalent would be the 
+FIT/PFD and SFF and diagnostic coverage figures.}.
 
 
 
@@ -622,14 +624,14 @@ and its international analog standard IOC5108.
 \subsubsection{ FMEDA weaknesses }
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Possibility to miss the effects of failure modes at SYSTEM level.
-\item Statistical nature allows a proportion of undetected failures for given S.I.L. level. These could be catostophic failures, as long as the percieved probability is low enough, they are considered acceptable for EN61508.
+\item Statistical nature allows a proportion of undetected failures for given S.I.L. level. These could be catastrophic failures, as long as the perceived probability is low enough, they are considered acceptable for EN61508.
 \item Complex component interaction effects are more likely to be seen (because self diagnostic capability is considered), than FMEA or FMECA but can still be missed.
 \item Allows a small proportion of `undetectable' error conditions.
 \item No possibility to model base component level double failure modes.
 \end{itemize}
 %AND then how we can solve all there problems
 
-\section{A wish list for a failure mode methodolgy}
+\section{A wish list for a failure mode methodology}
 \begin{itemize}
 \item All component failure modes must be considered in the model.
 \item It should be easy to integrate mechanical, electronic and software models \cite{sccs}[pp.287].
@@ -637,7 +639,7 @@ and its international analog standard IOC5108.
 \item It should have a formal basis, that is to say, be able to produce mathematical proofs
 for its results, such as system level error causation trees, reliability and safety statistics.
 \item It should be easy to use, ideally using a 
-graphical syntax (as oppossed to a formal symbolic/mathematical text based language).
+graphical syntax (as opposed to a formal symbolic/mathematical text based language).
 \item From the top down, the failure mode model should follow a logical de-composition of the functionality
 to smaller and smaller functional groupings \cite{maikowski}.
 \item Multiple failure modes may be modelled from the base component level up.
@@ -682,8 +684,8 @@ and ensure they are included in the model.
 By taking components that form {\fg}s from the bottom up
 and then taking those to form higher level
 {\fg}s we can get a close approximation of the de-composition process from the bottom up.
-The philosophy of top down de-compositon is very similar.
-Top down de-compositon applies functional 
+The philosophy of top down de-composition is very similar.
+Top down de-composition applies functional 
 de-composition, because it seeks to break the system down
 into manageable and separately testable entities.
 A second justification for this is that the design process for a product requires both top down and bottom-up
@@ -691,7 +693,7 @@ thinking. To analyse a system from the bottom-up is a useful
 design validation process in itself \cite{sommerville}.
 %%
 %% CAN we find a ref for both top and bottom up being used 
-%% as design validaion ????
+%% as design validation ????
 
 \paragraph{Design Decision: Methodology must be bottom-up.}
 In order to ensure that all component failure modes are handled,
@@ -877,7 +879,7 @@ there is a phase of symptom collection.
 We can use the symbol $alpha$ to represent the abstraction level
 and make it an attribute of a component.
 Base components will have an $\alpha$ level of zero.
-A derived component when created must alwayave a graater $\alpha$ value than any
+A derived component when created must always have a greater $\alpha$ value than any
 of the components included in the {\fg} from which it was derived.
 
 
@@ -908,7 +910,7 @@ Functional groups are collections of components
 that work together to perform a simple function.
 %
 We can perform a failure mode effects analysis on each of the component failure
-modes within a {\fg}. Because we can implemenent the process in software we can 
+modes within a {\fg}. Because we can implement the process in software we can 
 thus ensure that all component failure modes 
 are included in the model. 
 %
@@ -960,18 +962,18 @@ create higher level {\fg}s in later stages.
 % \end{figure}
 % 
 % \vspace{20pt}
-% NEED DIAGRAM OF HIERACY
+% NEED DIAGRAM OF HIERARCHY
 % \vspace{20pt}
 
 We associate a component with its failure modes.
-This is represented in UML in figure \ref{fig:componentconcept}.
+This is represented in UML in figure \ref{fig:component concept}.
 
 \begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_concept/component.jpg}
  % component.jpg: 467x76 pixel, 72dpi, 16.47x2.68 cm, bb=0 0 467 76
  \caption{Component with failure modes UML diagram}
- \label{fig:componentconcept}
+ \label{fig:component concept}
 \end{figure}
 
 
@@ -1101,11 +1103,11 @@ are built from components performing a given task.
 By breaking the problem of failure mode analysis into small stages
 and building a hierarchy, the problems associated with the cross products of
 all failure modes within a system are reduced by an exponential order.
-This is because the mutliple failure modes are considered
+This is because the multiple failure modes are considered
 within {\fgs} which have fewer failure modes to consider 
 at each FMMD stage.
 Where appropriate, multiple simultaneous failures can be modelled by
-intoducing test~cases where the conjunction of failure modes is considered.
+introducing test~cases where the conjunction of failure modes is considered.
 
 \subsubsection {Inhibit Conditions}
 Some failure modes only occur when another failure has occurred, or
@@ -1242,7 +1244,7 @@ The re-factored UML diagram is shown in figure \ref{fig:refactored_uml}.
 {
 % chapter
 \section{Re-Factoring the UML Model}
-This chapter has used UML diagrams to develop the data types required to implment FMMD.
+This chapter has used UML diagrams to develop the data types required to implement FMMD.
 The terms used in FMMD and the UML data model are further refined in 
 chapter \ref{defs}.
 }