diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH6_Evaluation/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH6_Evaluation/copy.tex
index 014279d..f78a5bd 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH6_Evaluation/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH6_Evaluation/copy.tex
@@ -20,22 +20,57 @@
 % RANGE == OUTPUTS
 %
 
-When performing FMEA, we have a system under investigation, which will be
-comprised of a collection of components which have associated failure modes.
-The object of FMEA is to determine cause and effect: 
-from the failure modes (the causes, {\fms} of {\bcs}) to the effects (or symptoms of failure) at the top level.
+When performing FMEA we consider the system under investigation
+to be a collection of components which have associated failure modes.
 %
+The object of FMEA is to determine cause and effect.
+We apply reasoning  to calculate, using the failure modes, the effects
+%from these failure modes (the causes, {\fms} of {\bcs}) to the effects
+(or symptoms of failure) at the top level.
+%
+We can view FMEA as a process, taking each component in the system and for all its failure modes 
+applying analysis.
+%
+This however entails a problem: which other components in the system must we
+check against the %current failure mode.
+each particular failure mode.
+%
+Often a component failing will have obvious effects on functionally adjacent components.
+Sometimes %though, perhaps in the case of de-coupling capacitors in a digital ciruit,
+side effects of failure may manifest due interaction with other components not obviously functionally related.
+%% CONTEXT OF SYSTEM FAILURE: PERHAPS NOT RELEVANT HERE
+%
+% The symptoms of failure are dependent upon the context, or environment that the system operates in.
+% We can trace all base component failure modes to corresponding system failures: but the effect
+% of the system failure depends upon how the system is used.
+% %
+% A resistor failure could, for instance, make a process reading go out of range.
+% This could cause the process to be stopped or simply one reading out of many would
+% be marked faulty and be dealt with in the next maintenance phase of the plant.
+% %
+% Another resistor failing could cause a dangerous control problem.
+%
+%The context of the system failures is the important thingy bob dooo dah.
+%
+%
+%Also a particular component failure mode may  affect the performance of another.
+The temptation with FMEA can be to think through a line of failure mode reasoning without considering
+side effects.
+%%
 To perform FMEA rigorously
 we could stipulate that every failure mode must be checked for effects
 against all the components in the system.
+%
+This would mean we would be looking for all possible side effects that a base component failure could cause.
+%
 We could term this `rigorous~FMEA'~(RFMEA).
 The number of checks we have to make to achieve this, gives an indication of the complexity of the task.
 This is described in section~\ref{sec:rd}, where the reasoning distance, or complexity to
 analyse a single FMEA failure scenario, is given in equation~\ref{eqn:complexity}.
-
 %
-We could term this `comparison~complexity', as  the number of 
-paths between failure modes and components necessary to achieve RFMEA for a given system/functional~group.
+%
+We term this `comparison~complexity', the number of 
+paths between failure modes and components necessary to achieve RFMEA for a given system/{\fg}.
 
 % (except its self of course, that component is already considered to be in a failed state!).
 %