ref to analog apps journal for bubba oscillator
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@ -32,7 +32,12 @@
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keywords = "single-fault",
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keywords = "fault-tolerance"
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}
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@ARTICLE{bubba,
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AUTHOR = "Ron Mancini",
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TITLE = "Design of OP-Amp sine wave oscillators",
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JOURNAL = "Analog Applications Journal: Texas Instruments: August",
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YEAR = "2000"
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}
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@ARTICLE{ftahistory,
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AUTHOR = "Clifton Ericsson",
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TITLE = "Fault Tree Analysis a History",
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@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ The circuit in figure~\ref{fig:circuit2} shows a five pole low pass filter.
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Starting at the input, we have a first order low pass filter buffered by an op-amp,
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the output of this is passed to a Sallen~Key~\cite{aoe}[p.267] second order lowpass filter.
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The output of this is passed into another Sallen~Key filter -- which although it may have different values
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for its resistors/capacitors and thus have a different frequency response -- is idential from a failure mode perspective.
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for its resistors/capacitors and thus have a different frequency response -- is identical from a failure mode perspective.
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Thus we can analyse the first Sallen~Key low pass filter and re-use the results.
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@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ a more sophisticated low pass filter.
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%
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R10 and C10 act as a potential divider, with the crucial difference between a purely resistive potential divider being
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that the impedance of the capacitor is lower for higher frequencies.
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Thus higher frquencies are attenuated at the point that we
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Thus higher frequencies are attenuated at the point that we
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read its output signal.
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However, from a failure mode perspective we can analyse it in a very similar way
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to a potential divider (see section~\ref{potdivfmmd}).
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@ -728,10 +728,6 @@ We represent the desired FMMD hierarchy in figure~\ref{fig:circuit2h}.
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\label{tbl:fivepole}
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\end{table}
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We now can create a {\dc} to represent the circuit in figure~\ref{fig:circuit2}, we can call it
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$FivePoleLP$ and applying the $fm$ function to it (see table~\ref{tbl:fivepole}) yields $fm(FivePoleLP) = \{ HIGH, LOW, FilterIncorrect, NO\_SIGNAL \}$.
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@ -746,20 +742,6 @@ could be easily detected; the failure symptom $FilterIncorrect$ may be less obs
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\clearpage
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\section{Op-Amp circuit 3}
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@ -774,15 +756,17 @@ could be easily detected; the failure symptom $FilterIncorrect$ may be less obs
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%\clearpage
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%\section{Standard Non-inverting OP AMP}
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This circuit is described in the Analog Applications Journal~\cite{bubba}.
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This circuit is described in the Analog Applications Journal~\cite{bubba}[p.37].
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The circuit uses four 45 degree phase shifts, and an inverting amplifier to provide
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gain and the final 180 degrees of phase shift (making a total of 360 degrees of phase shift).
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From a fault finding perspective this circuit is less than ideal.
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The signal path is circular (its a positive feedback circuit) and most failures would simply cause the output to stop oscillating.
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The top level failure modes for the FMMD hierarchy bear this out.
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However, FMMD is a bottom -up analysis methodology and we can therefore still identify
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{\fgs} and apply analysis from a failure mode perspective.
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If we were to analyse this circuit without modularisation, we have 14 components with
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($4.4 +10.2 = 36$) failure modes . Applying equation~\ref{eqnrd2} gives a complexity comparison figure of $13.36=468$.
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The reduce the complexity required to analyse this circuit we apply FMMD and start by determining {\fgs}.
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@ -1316,8 +1300,8 @@ Rigorous FMEA (RFMEA).
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The computational order for RFMEA would be polynomial ($O(N^2.K)$) (where $K$ is the variable number of failure modes).
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This order may be acceptable in a computational environment: However, the choosing of {\fgs} and the analysis
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process are human activities. It can be seen that it is practically impossible to achieve
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RFMEA for anything but trival systems.
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process are by-hand/human activities. It can be seen that it is practically impossible to achieve
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RFMEA for anything but trivial systems.
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%
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% Next statement needs alot of justification
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%
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@ -1541,13 +1525,8 @@ For Functional Group 2 (FG2), let us map:
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FS6 & \mapsto & S5
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\end{eqnarray*}
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This
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AUOMATIC chack can reveal WHEN double checking no longer necessary
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in the hierarchy to cover dub sum !!!!! YESSSS:wq
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This AUTOMATIC check can reveal WHEN double checking no longer necessary
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in the hierarchy to cover dub sum !!!!! YESSSS
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% does not cover what weird side effect may occur though, but then the {\fg} was not modelled correctly in the first place...
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