"we" removal started in CH4.

Possibly better to do CH5 next.
This commit is contained in:
Robin P. Clark 2013-09-11 15:51:55 +01:00
parent 9d85c08ea0
commit 7e53e0c05d
3 changed files with 24 additions and 83 deletions

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@ -3,15 +3,16 @@
%\paragraph{Abstract} % : The Scope of this study.}{
{
%
Increasingly we rely on automation in everyday life.
Increasingly society relies on automation in everyday life.
%
Many % of the
automated systems have the potential to cause harm or even death should they fail.
%
Safety assessment and certification is now required for %of
almost all potentially dangerous equipment.
%
As part of the assessment/certification process, we typically apply
a battery of tests, examining features such as resistance to extremes of environment, Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC),
As part of the assessment/certification process, typically
a battery of tests is applied, examining features such as resistance to extremes of environment, Electro Magnetic Compatibility (EMC),
endurance regimes and static testing.
%
Static testing is at the theoretical, or design level, and involves

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@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The acronym FMEA can be expanded as follows:
\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{F - Failures of given component,} Consider a particular component in a system;
\item \textbf{M - Failure Mode,} Choose a particular failure mode of this component; % `failure~mode';
\item \textbf{E - Effects,} Determine the effects this failure mode will cause to the system we are examining;
\item \textbf{E - Effects,} Determine the effects this failure mode will cause; % the system; we are examining;
\item \textbf{A - Analysis,} Analyse how much impact this symptom will have on the environment/operators/the system itself.
\end{itemize}
\fmeagloss
@ -646,9 +646,6 @@ For instance it has been assumed that the resistor R1 going SHORT
will not affect the ADC, the Microprocessor or the UART.
%
%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%% WE removal project ends here today 08SEP2013 %%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
The {\bc} {\fm} R1 SHORT has been examined
and failure reasoning applied,
@ -1510,7 +1507,7 @@ With the addition of subjective failure mode symptoms, the UML model for FMEA ga
The UML data model reveals some undefined qualities of FMEA.
These raise questions and are discussed below.
%
\paragraph{Which, or how many components should we check for each {\fm} entry?}
\paragraph{Which, or how many components should be checked for each {\fm} entry?}
For instance a given {\fm} will have its effect measured in relation
to some of the components in the system.
%

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@ -2,52 +2,6 @@
%% CHAPTER 4 : Failure Mode Modular Discrimination
%%
\label{sec:chap4}
% \ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
% {
% \abstract{
% This paper defines %what is meant by
% the terms
% components, derived~components, functional~groups, component fault modes and `unitary~state' component fault modes.
% %The application of Bayes theorem in current methodologies, and
% %the suitability of the `null hypothesis' or `P' value statistical approach
% %are discussed.
% The general concept of the cardinality constrained powerset is introduced
% and calculations for it described, and then for
% calculations under `unitary state' fault mode conditions.
% Data types and their relationships are described using UML.
% Mathematical constraints and definitions are made using set theory.}
% }
% {
% \section{Overview}
% This chapter defines the FMMD process and related concepts and calculations.
% FMMD is in essence modularised FMEA. Rather than taking each component failure mode
% and extrapolating top level or system failure symptoms from it,
% small groups of components are collected into {\fgs} and analysed,
% and then {\dcs} are used to represent the {\fgs}.
% These {\dcs} are used to then build further {\fgs} until a hierarchy of {\fgs}
% and {\dcs} has been built, converging to a final {\dc}
% at the top of the hierarchy.
%
% Or in other words we take the traditional FMEA process, and modularise it.
% We break down each stage of reasoning
% into small manageable groups, and use the results of those groups, as {\dcs}
% to build higher level groups.
% %This has advantages of concentrating
% %effort in where modules interact,
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVEFirstly, %what is meant by
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVEthe terms
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVEcomponents, failure~modes, derived~components, functional~groups, component fault modes and `unitary~state' component fault modes are defined.
%
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVE The general concept of the cardinality constrained powerset is introduced
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVE and calculations for it described, and performance
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVE calculations (comparing traditional FMEA and FMMD)
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVE are presented. % under `unitary state' fault mode conditions.
%
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVEData types and their relationships are described using UML.
%% J. Howse 04MAY2012 REMOVEMathematical constraints and definitions are made using set theory.
% }
\section{Introduction}
@ -70,18 +24,19 @@ FMMD is in essence a modularised variant of traditional FMEA~\cite{sccs}[pp.34-
%
%\subsection{FMMD Process in outline.}
%
In order to analyse from the bottom-up and apply a modular methodology, we need to take
In order to analyse from the bottom-up and apply a modular methodology,
small groups of components that naturally
work together to perform a simple function: we term these groups `{\fgs}'.
work together to perform a simple function are chosen: these groups are termed `{\fgs}'.
%
\fmmdglossFG
%
The components to include in a {\fg} are chosen by hand.
%a human, the analyst.
%We can represent the `Functional~Group' as a class.
When we have a
{\fg} we can look at the components it contains,
and from this determine the failure modes of all the components that belong to it.
% When we have a
% {\fg} we can look at the components it contains,
% and from this determine the failure modes of all the components that belong to it.
With a {\fg} the failure modes of all the components that belong to it can be determined.
%
%Initial {\fgs} will consist of {\bcs}.
%
@ -111,41 +66,29 @@ Each of these failure modes, and optionally combinations of them, are
formed into test~cases which
are analysed for their effect on the failure mode behaviour of the `{\fg}'.
%
Once we have the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg}, we can determine its symptoms of failure.
Once the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg} is obtained, its symptoms of failure can be determined.
%,
%or the failure modes of the {\dc}.
%for the {\fg}.
%
We view these symptoms as the %derived
failure modes of the {\fg}.
These symptoms are treated as failure modes of the {\fg}.
%
\fmmdglossFG
\fmmdglossSYMPTOM
%Or in other words
That is, we can determine how the {\fg} can fail.
As we now have a set of failure modes for the {\fg} we can treat it as a component.
We can now consider the {\fg} as a `{\dc}' % sort of super component
That is, how the {\fg} can fail has been determined.
%
As a set of failure modes has been defined for the {\fg} it can be treated as a component.
%
The {\fg} can be considered as a `{\dc}' % sort of super component
with its own set of failure modes.
%
\fmmdglossDC
% Rather than taking each component failure mode
% and extrapolating top level or system failure symptoms from it,
% small groups of components are collected into {\fgs} and analysed.
%
%
% %and then {\dcs} are used to represent the {\fgs}.
% We analyse each {\fg} in order to determine its failure mode behaviour.
% %of the {\fg}.
% With the failure mode behaviour we can obtain a set of failure modes
% for the {\fg}.
% %
% Or in other words we determine how the {\fg}, as an entity can fail.
% %
% We can then create a new theoretical component to represent the {\fg}.
% %
% We call this a {\dc}.
% %
%We term this newly created component as a `{dc}'.
%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% UP TO HERE IN WE REMOVAL 11SEP2013
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
%This {\dc} has a set of failure modes: we can thus treat it as a `higher~level' component.
%
Because a {\dc} has a set of failure modes we can use it in higher level {\fgs}