as sent to Andrew fish just now
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\abstract{ This chapter defines what is meant by the terms
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components, component fault modes and `unitary~state' component fault modes.
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The application of Bayes theorem in current methodologies, and
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the unsuitability of the `null hypothesis' or p value statistical approach.
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the suitability of the `null hypothesis' or `P' value statistical approach
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ar discussed.
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Mathematical constraints and definitions are made using set theory.
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}
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@ -19,12 +20,12 @@ Using these failure modes we can build a `failure model' from the bottom-up.
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Traditional static fault analysis methods work from the top down.
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They identify faults that can occur in a system, and then work down
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to see how they could be caused. Some apply statistical tequniques to
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determine the likelyhood of component failures causing specific system level errors (see Bayes theorem \ref{bayes}).
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determine the likelihood of component failures causing specific system level errors (see Bayes theorem \ref{bayes}).
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Another top down technique is ato apply cost benifit analysis
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to determine which faults are the highest priority to fix\cite{FMEA}.
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The aim of this study is to produce complete failure
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models of safety critical systems from the bottom-up
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models of safety critical systems from the bottom-up,
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starting, where possible with known component failure modes.
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@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ starting, where possible with known component failure modes.
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It is helpful here to define some terms, `system', `functional~group', `component', `base~component' and `sub-system'.
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A System, is really any coherent entity that would be sold as a safety critical product.
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A sub-system is a system that is part of some larger system.
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A sub-system is a part of some larger system.
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For instance a stereo amplifier separate is a sub-system. The
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whole Sound System, consists perhaps of the following `sub-systems':
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CD-player, tuner, amplifier~separate, loudspeakers and ipod~interface.
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@ -43,18 +44,23 @@ CD-player, tuner, amplifier~separate, loudspeakers and ipod~interface.
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%and breaks it down.
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A sub-system will be composed of component parts, which
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may themselves be sub-systems. However each `component part'
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will have a fault/failure behaviour and it should
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always be possible to obtain a set of failure modes
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for each `component'.
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may themselves be sub-systems.
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Eventually by a recursive downwards process we would be able to identify
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sub-systems built from base component parts.
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Each `component part'
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will have a known fault/failure behaviour.
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That is to say, each base component has a set of known
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ways in which it can fail.
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If we look at the sound system again as an
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example; the CD~player could fail in serveral distinct ways, no matter
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what has happened to it or has gone wrong inside it.
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A top down approach has an intrinsic problem in that we cannot guess
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every possible failure mode at the SYSTEM level.
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Using the reasoning that working from the bottom up forces the consideration of all possible
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component failures (which can be missed in a top~down approach)
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component failures (which could be missed in a top~down approach)
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we are presented with a problem. Which initial collections of base components should we choose ?
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For instance in the CD~player example; to start at the bottom; we are presented with
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@ -92,8 +98,8 @@ Currently this sort of information is generally only available for generic comp
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%At higher levels of analysis, functional~groups are pre-analysed sub-systems that interact to
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%erform a given function.
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\vspace{0.3cm}
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%\begin{table}[p]
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%\vspace{0.3cm}
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\begin{table}[p]
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\begin{tabular}{||l|l||} \hline \hline
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{\em Definition } & {\em Description} \\ \hline
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System & A product designed to \\
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@ -113,10 +119,11 @@ Failure mode & of a `Failure Mode Group' \\ \hline
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Base Component & Any bought in component, which \\
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& hopefully has a known set of failure modes \\ \hline
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\hline
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\label{tab:def}
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\end{tabular}
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%\end{table}
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\vspace{0.3cm}
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\label{tab:def}
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\end{table}
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%\vspace{0.3cm}
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\section{A UML Model of terms introduced}
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@ -130,43 +137,54 @@ Base Component & Any bought in component, which \\
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\end{figure}
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The diagram in figure \ref{fig:fmmd_uml}
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shows the relationships between the terms defined in table \ref{tab:def}.
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shows the relationships between the terms defined in table \ref{tab:def} as classes in a UML model.
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We can start with the functional group. This is a minimal collection
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of components that perform a simple given function.
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For our audio separates rig, this could be
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the compoents that supply power to the laser diode.
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From the `Functional Group we can now collect
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all the `failure modes of the `components, and
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produce a `Failure Mode Group. This
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has a reference to the `Functional Group, and is a collection
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From the `Functional~Group' we can now collect
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all the `failure modes of the `components', and
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produce a `Failure~Mode~Group'. This
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has a reference to the `Functional~Group', and is a collection
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of `failure modes.
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By analysing the effects of the failure modes in the `Failure Mode Group'
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By analysing the effects of the failure modes in the `Failure~Mode~Group'
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we can determine the failure mode behaviour of the functional group.
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This failure mode behaviour is a collection of derived failure modes.
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We can now consider the Functional group as a component now, because
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we have a set of failure modes for it.
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We can term this set of failure modes a sub-system.
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Note that this is recursive. We can build functional groups using sub-systems
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\subsection{Sub-System Class Definition}
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A sub-system can now be defined by the classes used to create it, and
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its set of derived failure modes.
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Note that the UML model is recursive. We can build functional groups using sub-systems
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as components. This UML model naturally therefore, forms a hierarchy
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of failure mode analysis, which has a one top level entry, that being the SYSTEM.
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The TOP level entry will determine the failure modes
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for the product/system under analysis.
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\subsection{Refining the UML model to use inheritance}
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We can refine this model a little by noticing that a system is merely the
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top level sub-system. We can thus have System inherit sub-system.
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A derived failure mode, is simply a failure mode at a higher level of analysis
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it can therefore inherit `failure\_mode'.
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The modified UML diagram using inheritance is figure \ref{fig:fmmd_uml2}
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The modified UML diagram using inheritance is figure \ref{fig:fmmd_uml2}.
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=350pt,bb=0 0 680 500,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/fmmd_uml2.jpg}
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% fmmd_uml.jpg: 680x500 pixel, 72dpi, 23.99x17.64 cm, bb=0 0 680 500
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\caption{UML respresentation of Failure Mode Data types}
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\includegraphics[width=350pt,bb=0 0 877 675,keepaspectratio=true]{./fmmd_uml2.jpg}
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% fmmd_uml2.jpg: 877x675 pixel, 72dpi, 30.94x23.81 cm, bb=0 0 877 675
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\caption{UML Representation of Failure Mode Data Types}
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\label{fig:fmmd_uml2}
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\end{figure}
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%
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% \begin{figure}[h]
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[width=350pt,bb=0 0 680 500,keepaspectratio=true]{component_failure_modes_definition/fmmd_uml2.jpg}
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% % fmmd_uml.jpg: 680x500 pixel, 72dpi, 23.99x17.64 cm, bb=0 0 680 500
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% \caption{UML respresentation of Failure Mode Data types}
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% \label{fig:fmmd_uml2}
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% \end{figure}
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\subsection{Unitary State Component Failure Mode sets}
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@ -181,7 +199,7 @@ Having a set of failure modes where $N$ modes could be active simultaneously
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would mean having to consider $2^N$ failure mode scenarios.
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%
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Should a component be analysed and simultaneous failure mode cases exit,
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the combinations could be represented by a new failure modes, or
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the combinations could be represented by new failure modes, or
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the component should be considered from a fresh perspective,
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perhaps considering it as several smaller components
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within one package.
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@ -239,7 +257,7 @@ the failure mode set is not unitary~state and does not exist in the family of se
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\subsection{Component Failure Modes and Statistical Sample Space}
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%\paragraph{NOT WRITTEN YET PLEASE IGNORE}
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A sample space is defined as the set of all possible outcomes.
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When dealing with failure modes, we are not interested in
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the state where the compoent is working perfectly or `OK' (i.e. operating with no error).
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@ -254,6 +272,7 @@ is therefore
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$$ F = \Omega(K) \backslash OK $$
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\subsection{Bayes Theorem}
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\paragraph{NOT WRITTEN YET PLEASE IGNORE}
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\label{bayes}
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Describe application - likely hood of faults being the cause of symptoms -
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probablistic approach - no direct causation paths to the higher~abstraction fault mode.
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@ -271,6 +290,7 @@ to
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%unitary~state set family.
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\subsection{Tests of Hypotheses and Significance}
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\paragraph{NOT WRITTEN YET PLEASE IGNORE}
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Linked in with Bayes theorem
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Accident analysis
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plane crashes and faults etc
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