Added ASIL subsection
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mybib.bib
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mybib.bib
@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ ISSN={Doi:10.1145/2330667.2330683},}
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issn = {1022-7091},
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pages = {459--475},
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numpages = {17},
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=590564.590572},
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url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm\?id=590564.590572},
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acmid = {590572},
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publisher = {J. C. Baltzer AG, Science Publishers},
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address = {Red Bank, NJ, USA},
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@ -672,6 +672,35 @@ ISSN={0149-144X},}
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YEAR = "2004"
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}
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@INPROCEEDINGS{6464473,
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author={Ward, D.D. and Crozier, S.E.},
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booktitle={System Safety, incorporating the Cyber Security Conference 2012, 7th IET International Conference on},
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title={The uses and abuses of ASIL decomposition in ISO 26262},
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year={2012},
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pages={1-6},
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keywords={automotive electrics;automotive electronics;},
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doi={10.1049/cp.2012.1523},
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}
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@article{Kafka20122,
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title = "The Automotive Standard ISO 26262, the Innovative Driver for Enhanced Safety Assessment; Technology for Motor Cars ",
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journal = "Procedia Engineering ",
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volume = "45",
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number = "0",
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pages = "2 - 10",
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year = "2012",
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note = "2012 International Symposium on Safety Science and Technology",
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issn = "1877-7058",
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doi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2012.08.112",
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url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705812031244",
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author = "Peter Kafka",
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keywords = "Historical perspective",
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keywords = "main normative items",
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keywords = "Functional unit and functional safety",
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keywords = "Hardware and software assessment",
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keywords = "Life cycle considerations",
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keywords = "Impact on safety assessment performed in automotive industry "
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}
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@ARTICLE{bubba,
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AUTHOR = "Ron Mancini",
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@ -1457,12 +1457,55 @@ The overall aim of SIL is to classify the safety of a system,
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by statistically determining how frequently it can fail dangerously.
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\fmmdglossFMEDA
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%
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\subsection{Automotive Safety Integrity Levels}
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%
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%\subsection{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
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%\subsection{ FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
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%FMEA can be used as a term simple to mean Failure Mode Effects Analysis, and is
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%part of product approval for many regulated products in the EU and the USA...
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\label{sec:asil}
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%
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The EN61508 variant for automotive use, as defined in standard ISO~26262, is known as the Automotive SIL (ASIL)~\cite{Kafka20122}.
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%
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Safety instrumented functions (SIFs) for vehicles are assigned ASIL ratings.
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%
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ASIL classifications are rated from A to D, where D is the most safety critical.
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%
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For instance very critical functions such as the brakes and steering will have the highest ASIL rating of D.
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%
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The automotive industry generally uses bought in modules % which must have been tested and approved,
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typically built by specialist companies.
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%
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These modules themselves must have been tested and approved so, for a car manufacturer
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designing from scratch is not generally financially feasible.
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%
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This means that to implement an ASIL SIF designers will usually have to rely on bought in modules.
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%
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However, these bought in modules may not be rated to the ASIL level required by the SIF.
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% %
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% ASIL functions are therefore often implemented in a modular fashion.
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%
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Because of the modular paradigm forced on the designers by having to buy in components
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a process has been developed called `ASIL~de-composition'~\cite{6464473}.
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%
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This allows a highly safety critical function to be implemented
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with lower ASIL rated components, as long as it can be shown that they
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have independent failure causes and implement redundancy. % for the SIF.
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%
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This is in effect a top down de-composition of safety requirements.
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%
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This is rather like the demand for multiple engines on an aircraft
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that must make a long journeys over the sea to statistically limit
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the likelihood of one failure cause --- i.e. one engine failure --- causing a serious incident.
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%
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The drawback to this redundancy concept is an unexpected common failure mode~\cite{allfour}.
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%
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The ASIL philosophy does represent a modular approach to safety analysis.
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This makes it of interest to this study, which later proposes a modular failure mode analysis methodology.
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%
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\section{FMEA used for Safety Critical Approvals}
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\fmmdglossDFMEA
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\subsection{DESIGN FMEA: Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
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@ -1482,6 +1525,8 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
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This could be considered as a design check method, deliberately
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looking for weaknesses at a theoretical level.
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%
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Because design FMEA meetings can have the format of a meeting and discussion
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it can have the following drawbacks:
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%\subsection{DESIGN FMEA: Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
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%
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% \begin{figure}[h]
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