more polishing
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@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ typically of the form of examining scenarios such as
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%are examined.
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FMD-91 is a reference document released into the public domain by the United States DOD
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FMD-91~\cite{fmd91} is a reference document released into the public domain by the United States DOD
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and describes `failures' of common electronic components, with percentage statistics for each failure.
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FMD-91 entries include general descriptions of internal failures alongside {\fms} of use to an FMEA investigation.
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@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ For Op-Amp failures modes, FMD-91\cite{fmd91}{3-116] states,
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These are mostly internal causes of failure, more of interest to the component manufacturer
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than a test engineer % designer
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looking for the symptoms of failure.
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looking for symptoms of failure.
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These failure causes within the Op-Amp need to be translated to symptomatic {\fms}.
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@ -570,13 +570,13 @@ $$ fm(OPAMP) = \{ LOW, HIGH, NOOP, LOW\_SLEW \} . $$
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The EN298 pinouts failure mode technique cannot reveal failure modes due to internal failures,
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and that is why it misses the $LOW\_SLEW$.
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and that is why it misses $LOW\_SLEW$.
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%
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The FMD-91 entries for op-amps are not directly usable as
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component {\fms} in FMEA and require interpretation.
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However, once a failure mode analysis has been carried out, the model can
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be used throughout the FMEA process.
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However, once a failure mode determination has been carried out, the model can
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be re-used throughout the FMEA process.
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%%%% Talk about R differences ?? XXXXX
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@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ the circuit behaviour is measured in finer granularity,
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%
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With this style of fault finding, because it is based on experiment,
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hopping from module to module eliminating working ones, until
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failure is found~\cite{maikowski}, it is efficient in terms of
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failure is found~\cite{maikowski}, is efficient in terms of
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concentrating effort.
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The rationale and work-culture of those tasked to
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@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ deduced).
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\fmmdglossRD
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Reasoning distance, is the number of stages of logic and reasoning used
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in {\fm} analysis to map a failure cause to its potential outcomes; counted
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by th number of {\fm} to component checks made.
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by the number of {\fm} to component checks made.
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%
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The basic FMEA example in section~\ref{basicfmea}
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considered one {\fm} against some of the components in the milli-volt reader.
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@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ cost, problems to be addressed in product production.
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It generally focuses on known problems and using their
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statistical frequency %they occur
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and their cost to fix multiplied gives a Risk Priority Number (RPN)
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number for the germane component {\fm}.
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for the germane component {\fm}.
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%
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Fixing problems with the highest RPN number
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will return most cost benefit~\cite{bfmea}.
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@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ The highest $C_m$ values would represent the most dangerous or serious
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system level failures.
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The highest $C_m$ values would be at the top of a `to~fix' list
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for a project manager, and some levels of risk may be considered unacceptable
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and require re-design of some systems.
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and require re-design. % of some systems.
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\fmmdglossFMECA
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\section{FMEDA - Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis}
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