Work on state explosion
This commit is contained in:
parent
83e4c4e579
commit
768d2f3ef0
Binary file not shown.
137
fmmd_concept/System_safety_2011/state_exp.tex
Normal file
137
fmmd_concept/System_safety_2011/state_exp.tex
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
|
||||
\documentclass{beamer}
|
||||
|
||||
\usepackage[utf8x]{inputenc}
|
||||
\usepackage{default}
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{document}
|
||||
|
||||
Consider the FMEA type methodologies
|
||||
where we look at all the failure modes in a system, and then
|
||||
see how they can affect all other components within it,
|
||||
to determine its system level symptom or failure mode.
|
||||
We need to look at a large number of failure scenarios
|
||||
to do this completely (all failure modes against all components).
|
||||
This is represented in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp},
|
||||
where $N$ is the total number of components in the system, and
|
||||
$cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{equation}
|
||||
\label{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
|
||||
N.(N-1).cfm % \\
|
||||
%(N^2 - N).cfm
|
||||
\end{equation}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The FMMD methodology breaks the analysis down into small stages,
|
||||
by making the analyst choose functional groups, and then when analysed the groups
|
||||
are treated as components to be used for a higher stage.
|
||||
This is designed to address the state explosion (where $O$ is order
|
||||
of complexity) $O=N^2$ inherent in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp}.
|
||||
|
||||
\clearpage
|
||||
|
||||
We can view the functional groups in FMMD as forming a hierarchy.
|
||||
If for the sake of example we consider each functional group to
|
||||
be three components, figure~\ref{fig:three_tree} shows
|
||||
how the levels work and converge to a top or system level.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{figure}
|
||||
\centering
|
||||
\includegraphics[width=300pt]{./three_tree.png}
|
||||
% three_tree.png: 780x226 pixel, 72dpi, 27.52x7.97 cm, bb=0 0 780 226
|
||||
\caption{Functional Group Tree example}
|
||||
\label{fig:three_tree}
|
||||
\end{figure}
|
||||
|
||||
\clearpage
|
||||
We can represent the number of failure scenarios to check in an FMMD hierarchy
|
||||
with equation~\ref{eqn:anscen}.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{equation}
|
||||
\label{eqn:anscen}
|
||||
\sum_{n=0}^{L} {fgn}^{n}.fgn.cfm.(fgn-1)
|
||||
\end{equation}
|
||||
|
||||
Where $fgn$ is the number of components in each functional group,
|
||||
and $cfm$ is the number of failure modes per component
|
||||
and L is the number of levels, the number of
|
||||
analysis scenarios to consider is show in equation~\ref{eqn:anscen}.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
So for a very simple analysis with three components forming a functional group where
|
||||
each component has three failure modes, we have only one level (zero'th).
|
||||
So to check every failure modes against the other components in the functional group
|
||||
requires 18 checks.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{equation}
|
||||
\label{eqn:anscen2}
|
||||
\sum_{n=0}^{0} {3}^{0}.3.3.(3-1) = 18
|
||||
\end{equation}
|
||||
\clearpage
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
In other words, we have three components in our functional group,
|
||||
and nine failure modes to consider.
|
||||
So taking each failure mode and looking at how that could affect the functional group,
|
||||
we must compare each failure mode against the two other components (the `$fgn-1$' term).
|
||||
|
||||
For the one `zero' level FMMD case we are doing the same thing as FMEA type analysis
|
||||
(but on a very simple small sub-system).
|
||||
We are looking at how each failure~mode can effect the system/top level.
|
||||
We can use equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp} to represent
|
||||
the number of checks to rigorously perform FMEA, where $N$ is the total
|
||||
number of components in the system, and $cfm$ is the number of failures per component.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Where $N=3$ and $cfm=3$ we can see that the number of checks for this simple functional
|
||||
group is the same for equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
|
||||
and equation~\ref{eqn:anscen}.
|
||||
\clearpage
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Example}
|
||||
|
||||
To see the effects of reducing `state~explosion' we need to look at a larger system.
|
||||
Let us take a system with 3 levels and apply these formulae.
|
||||
Having three levels (in addition to the top zero'th level)
|
||||
will require 81 base level components.
|
||||
|
||||
$$
|
||||
%\begin{equation}
|
||||
\label{eqn:fmea_state_exp}
|
||||
81.(81-1).3 = 19440 % \\
|
||||
%(N^2 - N).cfm
|
||||
%\end{equation}
|
||||
$$
|
||||
|
||||
$$
|
||||
%\begin{equation}
|
||||
% \label{eqn:anscen}
|
||||
\sum_{n=0}^{3} {3}^{n}.3.3.(2) = 720
|
||||
%\end{equation}
|
||||
$$
|
||||
|
||||
Thud for FMMD we needed to examine 720 failure mode scenarios, and for traditional FMEA
|
||||
type analysis methods 19440.
|
||||
% In practical example followed through, no more than 9 components have ever been required for a functional
|
||||
% group and the largest known number of failure modes has been 6.
|
||||
% If we take these numbers and double them (18 components per functional group
|
||||
% and 12 failure modes per component) and apply the formulas for a 4 level analysis
|
||||
% (i.e.
|
||||
|
||||
\clearpage
|
||||
Note that for double simultaneous failures the equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp} becomes
|
||||
equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp2} essentially making the order $N^3$.
|
||||
The FMMD case is cubic within the functional groups only, not all the components in the system.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{equation}
|
||||
\label{eqn:fmea_state_exp2}
|
||||
N.(N-1).(N-2).cfm % \\
|
||||
%(N^2 - N).cfm
|
||||
\end{equation}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end{document}
|
BIN
fmmd_concept/System_safety_2011/three_tree.dia
Normal file
BIN
fmmd_concept/System_safety_2011/three_tree.dia
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
BIN
fmmd_concept/System_safety_2011/three_tree.png
Normal file
BIN
fmmd_concept/System_safety_2011/three_tree.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
After Width: | Height: | Size: 13 KiB |
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user