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mybib.bib
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mybib.bib
@ -25,6 +25,21 @@ author={Bishop, Peter and Cyra, Lukasz},
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pages={237-250}
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}
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Bishop P, Cyra L,
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Overcoming Non-determinism in Testing Smart Devices: ,
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ESREL 2012, ref: 2-Fr3-2, 25-29 June, 2012, Helsinki
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@incollection{bishopsmartinstruments2,
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year={2012},
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title={Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security},
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volume={6351},
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series={ESREL 2012 Helsinki},
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title={Overcoming Non-determinism in Testing Smart Devices: How to Build Models of Device Behaviour},
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keywords={testing; non-determinism; smart instruments; safety},
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author={Bishop, Peter and Cyra, Lukasz},
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pages={237-250}
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}
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@incollection{swassessment,
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year={2010},
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isbn={978-1-84996-085-4},
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@ -74,7 +74,10 @@ determine which FMEA test scenarios must be re-worked.
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Traditional FMEA deals only with electrical and mechanical components, i.e. it does not have provision for software.
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Modern control systems nearly always have a significant software/firmware element,
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and not being able to model software with current FMEA methodologies
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is a cause for criticism~\cite{safeware}[Ch.12]. Similar difficulties in integrating mechanical and electronic/software
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is a cause for criticism~\cite{safeware}[Ch.12].
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%Even the traditionally conservative nuclear industry is now
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%facing up to the ubiquity of software in control systems~\cite{parnas1991assessment}.
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Similar difficulties in integrating mechanical and electronic/software
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failure models are discussed in ~\cite{SMR:SMR580,swassessment}.
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@ -108,7 +111,7 @@ analogue electronics only~\cite{smart_instruments_1514209}.
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%
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It is termed `smart' because it has some software, or intelligence incorporated into it.
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%
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An AVO-8 multi-meter circa 1970, uses only analogue electronics, and we can determine
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For instance, an AVO-8 multi-meter circa 1970, uses only analogue electronics, and we can determine
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using FMEA how component failures within it could affect readings.
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%
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A modern multi-meter will have a small dedicated micro-processor and sensing electronics, all on the same chip,
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